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In this dissertation, I examine cultural differences in perceptions of time looking at 
intertemporal decisions, social norms, policy preferences, and behaviors in the environmental 
domain.  Looking closely at the environmental domain allows for a unique opportunity to 
examine whether or not cultural worldviews or social norms are motivating environmental 
behaviors (e.g. energy conservation).  It is also possible to test whether the uncertain nature of 
climate change and its impacts over time results in different temporal discounting rates compared 
to other intertemporal choice domains (e.g. financial gains or financial losses).  I draw upon 
theories of the self to argue that culture affects intertemporal decisions.  I describe research 
supporting culture‟s effect on how individuals evaluate gains and losses, or benefits and risks, 
over different temporal horizons.  I test whether culture affects temporal orientations, such that 
cultures that encourage holistic thinking are more likely to view the self and environment as 
continuous over long time horizons, while those cultures that encourage focused thinking are less 
likely to see such continuity over time.  I next draw on theoretical and empirical evidence from 
cross-cultural psychology to argue that these country differences in temporal orientations have an 
effect on intertemporal decisions, examining in particular decisions about environmental policy 
and energy conservation behaviors.  In Study 1, I compare Anglo-Saxon countries with Latin-




hierarchic, and fatalistic) play in influencing environmental policy preferences and pro-
environmental behavioral intentions.  In Study 2, I test whether different construals of the self 
(either independent or interdependent) have an influence, above and beyond worldview effects, 
on environmental decisions.  Finally, in Study 3, I compare Americans and Japanese to look at 
the effect of psychological connectedness above and beyond its effect on discounting.  I also test 
whether there is cross-cultural variation in expectations in the types of green behaviors (e.g. easy 
versus hard) to engage in.  With the three studies that I summarize in the chapters that ensue, I 
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 Culture‟s role in shaping environmental (and other) behaviors has been explored over the 
years with a heavy reliance on theories and methods that look at differences in values and 
attitudes (Dake, 1992; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978; Leiserowitz, 
2006; Stern & Gardner, 1994; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Schwartz, 1992; Singelis, 1994).  
More recently, theoretical focus has shifted to seeing culture as a dynamic construct comprised 
of a cluster of discrete schemas, social norms and customs that can be activated by different 
situational cues to influence attitudes and behaviors.  While the influence of culture on risk 
taking has been studied more extensively (e.g., (Hsee & Weber, 1999a, 1999b)), cross-cultural 
investigations of intertemporal choice and discounting of future costs or benefits have been 
scarce, an imbalance recently observed by Weber and Morris (2010).  Given the importance of 
discounting in determining decisions about behaviors that have environmental (and other) 
consequences and observed national level differences in environmentally-relevant behavior 
(2005; Hardisty & Weber, 2009), it is important to supplement the two existing studies about 
cultural differences in discounting (Du, Green, & Myerson, 2002; Takahashi et al., 2009) with 
additional empirical work, and to do so using intertemporal decisions that are more stylized and 
financial as well as intertemporal decisions in the environmental domain.  Thus, the primary goal 
of this dissertation is to examine how culture comes into play when making decisions about 
future events.  I do so by examining the role of culture in environmental decisions.  I also focus 
on some variables that others have not previously considered in combination when studying 




connectedness, and social norms).  Finally, I tested whether any observed effects of culture or of 
these other variables are domain specific or can be applied to other contexts of intertemporal 
choice. 
 
Overview of this Dissertation 
 
 In this chapter, I use theories from cross-cultural psychology to argue that different 
construals of the self and of time influence decisions about the future.  I start by describing 
research of culture‟s effect on how individuals evaluate gains and losses, or benefits and risks, 
over different temporal horizons.  I then argue that culture affects temporal orientation, such that 
cultures that encourage holistic thinking are more likely to view the self as continuous over long 
time horizons, while those that encourage focused thinking are less likely to view such continuity 
over time.  Based on existing literature on environmental decisions, I proceed to demonstrate that 
cultural attitudes and worldviews drive different decisions and behaviors (Dake, 1992; Peters & 
Slovic, 1996; Reusswig, 2005).  I next draw on theoretical and empirical evidence to argue that 
cultural differences in temporal orientations have an effect on intertemporal decisions, such as 
decisions about environmental policy and energy conservation behaviors (Atran et al., 2005; 
Dake, 1991; Lorenzoni, Leiserowitz, De Franca Doria, Poortinga, & Pidgeon, 2006; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Schwartz, 1992; Singelis, 1994; Wakslak, Nussbaum, Liberman, & Trope; 
Wang 2001).   I examine in Chapter 2 how cultural worldviews affect the relationship between 
culture and environmental policy preferences and behavioral intentions by relying on data that 
was previously collected by Anthony Leiserowitz as a part of a cross-national study using the 




value orientations (Schwartz, 1992; Singelis, 1994), to identify other possible psychological 
determinants of environmental decisions that might be influenced by culture.  I hypothesize and 
test predictions about the role of independent versus interdependent self-construals on 
environmental policy preferences and pro-environmental behavior intentions and find that self-
construal does not affect policy preferences, but does affect behavioral intentions.  Independent 
self-construal, and not interdependent self-construal, is a significant predictor of pro-
environmental behaviors.  
To maintain some consistency in the measures that I use across my three studies, I 
include Leiserowitz‟s Policy Index and Behavior Index as dependent variables along with new 
measures that I added for subsequent experiments.  While not all of the variables and effects I 
test are the same across the studies, having the same dependent variables help with inferences 
about similarities and differences found across studies.  In Chapter 4, I compare cultural 
worldviews, environmental attitudes and psychological connectedness in Americans and 
Japanese and test the how these factors explain differences between the two cultural groups in 
their energy conservation behaviors.   I chose to compare these two countries along dimensions 
of environmental attitudes and behaviors partly because of accessibility to participants in both 
countries, but also because the similarities in economic and technologic development in both 
countries allows for me to use the same behavioral questions for both. In Chapter 4, I find that 
Americans generally support more green behaviors than Japanese and these effects are mediated 
by cultural worldviews like egalitarianism (Study 3a).  In Chapter 4, I also test my predictions 
about psychological connectedness and find that Japanese are more psychologically connected to 
other Japanese, non-Japanese, and the environment now and 25 years from now than Americans 




Japanese also report greater connectedness to their future self than Americans do. These 
differences in psychological connectedness do not explain the variance in environmental 
behaviors as well as cultural worldviews do (Study 3b).  I also find differences between the two 
cultures in what is expected of themselves and of others in regards to energy conservation 
behaviors.  Americans expect easy behaviors from themselves and difficult behaviors of other 
Americans, while Japanese expect difficult behaviors of themselves and of other Japanese.  I also 
test my predictions about time discounting in Chapter 4 and find that gains are generally 
discounted more than losses (Study 3c).  I also find cultural differences with Japanese 
discounting gains more than Americans and Americans discount losses more than Japanese in 
both financial and environmental domains.   I summarize and discuss my research findings, 
including their theoretical and practical implications, in Chapter 5.  Finally, I propose possible 
future research directions based on these results.   
 
Culture and Decision Making 
 
 In the decision making literature, risk and uncertainty are two factors that have received 
great attention.  Many research agendas involving uncertainty as a variable have to do with how 
people make decisions under uncertainty; namely, decisions under probabilistic uncertainty (Fox 
& Tversky, 1995, 1998, 2003; Tversky & Fox, 1995). Only recently have researchers began to 
identify the role of social identity in acting to reduce uncertainty within specific social domains 
such as resource dilemmas (Hogg & Grieve, 2004; Shuper, Sorrentino, Otsubo, Hodson, & 
Walker, 2004; Van den Bos, 2001b; Van den Bos, Poortvliet, Maas, Miedema, & Van den Ham, 




why individuals identify with social groups and adopt shared attitudes (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
By defining an individual‟s place in society, the mere knowledge of one‟s group belongingness 
serves an emotional significance and helps an individual to construct a positive self-image. 
Social identity provides a sense of epistemic security under conditions of uncertainty because 
group belonging creates a shared reality between group members and social norms, making clear 
what the expected behaviors are in such contexts (Hogg, 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Given the 
uncertainty about how others will behave in a social dilemma, social identity is salient when 
making decisions and people are more likely to adhere to social norms (Van den Bos, 2001a).   
In the context of environmental decisions, social identity affects how much people are willing to 
cooperate and make personal sacrifices (e.g. curbing energy use) for the benefit of others in a 
resource dilemma (Van den Bos, 2001a).  
 Researchers have already demonstrated that there are systematic cultural differences in 
risk preferences and risk attitudes. For example, women are generally more risk averse than men 
(Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002); these differences are not the manifestation of differences in 
biology between the two genders, but rather differences in how they are socialized. In a study of 
cross-national differences, Bontempo, Bottom, & Weber (1997) observed differences in how the 
risks of financial gambles are perceived in a group of students and analysts from Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, the Netherlands, and the United States. It has also been found that the Chinese from the 
P.R.C. are less risk averse in financial decision making than Americans are (Hsee & Weber, 
1999b). These observed cultural differences in risk preference between Chinese and American 
participants are more likely a result of differences in the perception of risk rather than 
differences in attitudes towards perceived risk (Weber & Hsee, 1998). More generally, 




result from perceptions of the risks and benefits of a particular activity as opposed to the 
differences in attitudes towards perceived risk (Weber et al., 2002; Weber & Hsee, 1998).  In the 
domain of environmental decisions (e.g. about climate change) this would mean that cultural 
differences can be attributed to how much climate risk is perceived rather than attitudes about 
environmental risks. A great deal of attention has been given to the role of culture in influencing 
risk perceptions (Dake, 1991, 1992); however, while some like Dake (1992) and Leiserowitz 
(2003) have studied this within the environmental domain, there is still much to be learned about 
it.  This dissertation attempts to contribute more insights to what is already known about the 
relationship between culture and perceptions of environmental risk.       
 Theories, such as the Cultural Theory of Risk, have been developed to explain individual 
and cultural differences in perceptions and attitudes about health, safety including environmental 
hazards.  Looking to cultural dimensions may shed light on existing social structures and norms 
that motivate different climate attitudes and behaviors.  In Mary Douglas‟s seminal work that 
formed the structure of Cultural Theory (Douglas, 1970), risk were described to be best 
understood in terms of “plural social constructions of meaning,” (Dake, 1992) or social 
constructions of reality.  Societal harms, such as natural disasters, sickness, and famine, tend to 
be associated to behavior that deviates from societal norms.   This pattern of behavior promotes 
particular social structures and teaches individuals to associate certain behaviors as aversive and 
focus blame on those who defy societal expectations (Douglas, 1970; Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982).  Unlike other theories of risk perception that emphasize the economic and psychological 
aspects, the Cultural Theory of risk stresses the importance of social structures and institutions 
that provide individuals with value systems that influence how they perceive risk. Dake (1991, 




and communication and proposed that risk is always socially constructed. In perceiving risks and 
responding to them, cultural worldviews provide the blueprint for how to interpret natural 
phenomena. Risk is not merely the result of a subjective evaluation of the perceived probabilities 
of harm, but is “intersubjective [and] a matter of shared cognition,” (Dake, 1992).  The 
foundation that social institutions provide a framework, or cultural scripts, for individuals to 
perceive their environment applies to the area of risk perception as well, as demonstrated by the 
Cultural Theory of risk.   
 Risk taking and risk avoidance are products of the relationships that individuals have in 
their social worlds because risk perception is socially constructed (Dake, 1991; Thompson, Ellis, 
& Wildavsky, 1990).  To put Cultural Theory into the context of environmental issues, when 
individuals blame the government, or “the system”, for the failure to reduce environmental 
damage, this blaming behavior is functional in that it justifies and reinforces the particular 
pattern of social relations from which they came to be (Thompson et al., 1990). Cultural Theory 
breaks down social relations into five cultural patterns of interpersonal relationships: 
hierarchical, individualist, egalitarian, fatalist, and autonomous (Douglas, 1970; Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982; Thompson et al., 1990).   
 Dake (1991, 1992) applies these patterns to uncover a framework for understanding risk 
perceptions, belief systems, and social relations.  Highly stratified groups, or hierarchically 
arranged groups, would, in the context of risk perception hold the belief that nature is robust and 
resilient, but also accept the limitations of nature as well.  They would confer decision-making to 
“experts” in this social arrangement. Groups with strong in-group versus out-group boundaries 




associated with hierarchy” (Dake, 1992) and frame risk in ethical terms in order to focus on the 
social and political dimensions and also criticize various institutions that may be responsible for 
overall risk management.  Individualists perceive nature as benign and “if people are released 
from artificial constraints (like excessive environmental regulations and enforcement sanctions) 
there will be few limits to the abundance for all, and this will more than compensate for any 
hazards that are created in the process.”  Valuing decisions based on personal judgment over 
collective control, individualists‟ preferred risk management strategy would be deregulation 
(Dake, 1992; Rayner, 1992).  Lastly, fatalism in cultures appears in the form of high levels of 
prescription and minimal participation.  Fatalistic cultures believe that nature is capricious and 
“rationaliz[e] isolation and resignation to stringent controls,” (Dake, 1992; Mars, 1982). They 
adopt a “why bother?” attitude towards risk management.  Autonomy, the fifth cultural pattern, is 
an asocial way of life and few examples of such cultures exist.   
 Some of these predicted patterns could apply to climate risk perception.  Egalitarian 
worldviews could be correlated to pro-environmental beliefs because the ethical action to address 
climate change is to make individual sacrifices, such as energy conservation and increasing fuel 
prices.  Hierarchical worldview could be correlated with greater support for government controls 
and policies because of their general deference to experts and authorities to regulate social order. 
Individualists and fatalists are least likely to engage in pro-environmental behaviors or support 
environmental policies because of their self-interest, in the case of individualists, or their apathy, 
in the case of fatalists.  Based on these definitions, I predict that:  
 




 Hypothesis 2 (Study 1):  Hierarchists and individualists will be supportive of 
environmental policies. 
 If I find support for these hypotheses, I will go on to test whether these worldviews 
mediate culture‟s effect on environmental policy preferences and behaviors or interact with 
them.  In Chapter 2, I will test these predictions by comparing cross-national data from Anglo-
Saxon countries (which tend to be individualistic) and Latin-American countries (which tend to 
be collectivistic).  These two cultural groups are compared because the Leiserowitz dataset I use 
was collected in both Anglo-Saxon countries (i.e. United States and Great Britain) and Latin-
American countries (i.e. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico).  Based on these basic assumptions 
about the nature of these two types of cultures and their level of individualism and collectivism, I 
also make the following predictions: 
 Hypothesis 3 (Study 1):  More Latin-Americans will be egalitarians than Anglo-
 Saxons. 
 Hypothesis 4 (Study 1):  More Anglo-Saxons will be individualists than Latin-
 Americans.  
 If all of these propositions are supported, I will carry out mediation analyses using the 
worldviews, egalitarianism and individualism, as possible mediators of the relationship between 
culture (Anglo-Saxon versus Latin-American) and environmental policy preferences and 
behaviors.  This is to determine whether the differences observed between the two cultural 
groups can be attributed to psychological factors such as differences in worldviews rather than a 




 Hypothesis 5 (Study 1):  Egalitarianism will mediate the effect of culture on pro-
 environmental behaviors, such that Latin-Americans are more egalitarian and more 
 willing to engage in green behaviors than Anglo-Saxons. 
Hypothesis 6 (Study 1):  Individualism will mediate the effect of culture on policy 
preferences, such that Anglo-Saxons are more individualistic and less supportive of 
policy preferences than Latin-Americans.    
 
Cultural Determinants of Attitudes and Behaviors 
 
 In the evolution of cultural psychology and anthropology, many theories and measures 
were developed in the aim to capture the cultural variations across quantifiable and measurable 
dimensions. One predictor of cultural-patterns of behavior is the independent-interdependent 
self-construal scale (Fiske, 2002; Gudykunst et al., 1996b; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeir, 
2002; Singelis, 1994), related to the cultural construct of self-construal.  Self-construal represents 
a collection of thoughts, feelings, and actions concerned with the relationship between self and 
other (Singelis, 1994).  Independent selves seek to separate themselves from others by focusing 
on their unique attributes and self-expression.  In contrast, to have an interdependent construal of 
the self is to have a desire to stay connected with the social context and with others. Gudykunst 
et al. (1994; 1996a) found that independent self construal correlates positively with 
individualistic values but not with collectivistic values while interdependent self construal was 
correlated positively with collectivistic values but not with individualistic values.  The 
implication of these different construals of the self for cognitive, affective, and motivational 




conceptualization of the self is that culture, cognition, and motivation are all inextricably linked 
guiding our perceptions, attitudes and behaviors and the information that we attend to.   
 Independent and interdependent self-construal as presented by Markus and Kitayama 
(1991) has to do with beliefs about the self in relationships, or beliefs about the relation between 
the self and the other. In highlighting some of the key differences between independent and 
interdependent self-construals, Markus and Kitayama (1991) discussed the functional role of the 
“other” in a person‟s sense of self.  For example, for independent individuals, self-evaluation is 
an important process that helps distinguish themselves from others and from the environment.  
Thus, the role that the “other” plays is to serve as a base for which people with an independent 
self-construal can compare themselves to and evaluate themselves.  For the interdependent 
person, the “other” plays a critical role in their self-definition.  Their relationships to others in 
particular contexts help them to define themselves.   
 Applying theories and constructs commonly used by cross-cultural psychologists to the 
domain of environmental decision making, the functional role of culture in shaping cognitions, 
motivations, and behaviors may be better understood.  Some are already studying the 
relationship between self-construal and environmental decisions and finding that self-construal 
does affect environmental concerns (Stern & Dietz, 1994). The degree to which objects such as 
plants, animals and other people are included within a person‟s cognitive representation of the 
self predicts the degree to which these objects are valued (Schultz, 2001).  Self-construal is a 
more robust determinant of environmental concern than values or culture considered alone 
because these three factors are actually incorporated and interrelated in self-construal (Arnocky, 
Stroink, & DeCicco, 2007).  Self-construal predicts cooperation and competition with others in 




how likely one is to engage in conservation behavior (Van Vugt, 2001).  While independent self-
construal is associated with competition in resource sharing contexts, interdependent self-
construal is linked to cooperative behavior in those contexts.   
The impact of self-construal on attitudes and behaviors may extend beyond beliefs about 
the general relationship between the self and the other.  Nisbett, Peng, Choi, and Norenzayan 
(2001) found evidence that this distinction between Westerners and Easterners can be extended 
to areas beyond just theories of the self.  They found cross-cultural differences in systems of 
thought.   Specifically, they found that East Asians were more likely to engage in holistic, 
dialectical thinking than Westerners by attending to an entire field, using less categories and 
formal logic, and relying more heavily on experience-based knowledge.  In contrast, Western 
thinkers were more analytical and focus primarily on objects and categories, relying on rules and 
formal logic.  Westerners tend to detach an object from its context instead of thinking holistically 
like East Asians, and are more inclined towards abstract thinking.  These types of findings 
suggest that some people have rather narrow construals of the world, while others have broader 
construals.  If individuals are egocentric when thinking about the self in relation to others and to 
the environment, is it possible that they are narrow and egocentric when thinking about events in 
the future or events over an extended temporal period?  If individuals are more collectivistic and 
holistic in their thinking patterns and self-construal, are they more likely to be more holistic in 
thinking about time and events in the future?   
 Pro-environmental attitudes have been found to be consistent with Asian cultural values, 
while they are perceived to be inconsistent with Western ideals (Aoyagi-Usui, Vinken, & 
Kuribayashi, 2003; Ester, Vinken, Simões, & Aoyagi-Usui, 2003).  Although a great deal of 




still a lot to learn about the cognitive and motivational mechanisms driving differences seen 
across cultures.  How people think about the future and evaluate information under conditions of 
uncertainty is an important determinant of environmental decision making.  Cultures have 
different scripts regarding time horizons and the value that a person places on future events can 
be a function of cultural conditioning (Bazerman, Moore, & Gillespie, 1999; Geert Hofstede, 
1980; Hong & Chiu, 2001; Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000; Oyserman & Lee, 2008; Wang, 2001).  
In more collectivistic societies (e.g. Latin America, Eastern Asia) rather than individualistic 
societies (e.g., United States), the strong motivation to preserve social harmony may extend to 
temporal harmony and psychological connectedness, in which the present self is closely bonded 
to the future self and to others.  Studies comparing systems of thought across cultures have found 
that East Asians are more likely to engage in holistic dialectical thinking than Westerners who 
engage in more analytical thinking (Nisbett et al., 2001; Oyserman & Lee, 2008).  It is possible 
that because East Asians are socialized to think in more holistic ways that they are better able to 
process information about the distant future than Westerners who are more accustomed to 
thinking in concrete, objective ways, perhaps making them more inclined to focus on events in 
the near future as opposed to the far future.  Thus, my propositions are about the implications of 
self-construal on making long-term judgments and decisions: 
Hypothesis 7 (Study 2):  Interdependent self-construal leads to greater orientation 
and awareness of future events. 
 
Hypothesis 8 (Study 2): Independent self-construal leads to a focus on the present 





 Another proposition about self-construal and environmental decision making is about the 
impact of self-construal on preferences for climate policy and pro-environmental behaviors.  It is 
possible that interdependent self-construal is more likely to be associated with a greater ability to 
account for the long-term impact of climate change because of the orientation towards holistic 
thinking.  Perhaps interdependent self-construal predicts an ability of individuals to consider 
information beyond the self in the present and instead consider information about the self and the 
other over an extended time period.  Given these differences in construals of the self, I expect 
that interdependent self-construal will be associated with greater concern for the community and 
for the environment, while independent self-construal will not.  As a result of this greater 
awareness and appreciation of relationships to the others and to the environment, interdependent 
selves will be associated with a greater willingness to sacrifice individual needs for the benefit of 
the group. Based on these assumptions, I propose that: 
 
Hypothesis 9 (Study 2):  Interdependent self-construal is associated with greater 
support for pro-environmental policies and behaviors, but independent self-
construal will not. 
 
 Another widely used cultural framework is Schwartz‟s Theory of Basic Human Values 
(Schwartz, 1994, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990).  The Schwartz Value Theory (Schwartz, 
1992; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005) defines values as, “emotion-linked beliefs that represent 
desirable, transsituational goals or modes of conduct that promote these goals.”  Values, as 
defined by Schwartz and his colleagues, are guiding principles in life and guide individuals to 




along with those of Durkheim (1947), Parsons (1951) and others, is that value consensus is 
essential to maintaining social order by increasing cooperation and facilitating accommodation 
as opposed to violence in resolving conflicting interests.  Schwartz (1992) generated a list of 57 
values that he based on samples of students and elementary school teachers across over 40 
countries and identified 10 distinct dimensions of values that are defined by the motivational 
goals they serve: power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, 
benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security. Schwartz suggests that while all ten values can 
be found across cultures, cross-cultural differences arise when you look at how important each 
dimension is.    Although gender differences were not found across value system and these 
values tend to have similar meanings for men and for women (Prince-Gibson & Schwartz, 1998) 
these values do exist across cultures and how they are prioritized distinguishes cultures from one 
another (Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995).  Socioeconomic development was found to 
increase value consensus while political democratization was found to decrease consensus 
(Schwartz, 1996).  Political attitudes are influenced by values and these attitudes in turn 
influence how decisions are made.  The relationship of Schwartz‟s cultural values, especially 
harmony and conservatism, to evaluations of climate policies and pro-environmental behaviors 
will be looked at in greater detail in Chapter 3.     
 
Psychological Connectedness to Self, Others and the Environment  
 
 While some cultures like the People‟s Republic of China and the United States do not 
vary in their attitudes about risk (Weber & Hsee, 1998), these cultures do vary in their risk 




possible that they do vary in their attitudes and perceptions about time or temporal continuity.  
The degree of perceived psychological connectedness between oneself in the near versus the 
distant future affects intertemporal decisions (Bartels & Rips, 2009).  When making decisions 
about climate change, many time-related considerations arise.  Questions such as „how much will 
energy prices rise over the years‟ or „will temperatures continue to rise at the same rate or a 
different rate as the years progress‟ or „how will I feel about living in a world without glaciers‟ 
are examples of what may run through a decision maker‟s mind.  Given the centrality of 
temporal factors to thinking about climate change and climate solution, it is possible that 
decisions that affect climate change in the aggregate can be influenced by psychological 
connectedness.  It is worth exploring whether what is known about the role of psychological 
connectedness in decision making and intertemporal choice can be applied to the specific domain 
of environmental decisions.  Specifically, in Study 3, I will look at different types of 
psychological connectedness.  One is the degree of connectedness between the self in the near 
and distant future, similar to the construct studied by Bartels and Rips (2009).  In addition to that, 
I will focus on connectedness between the self and other in the near and distant future, as well as 
the self and the environment in the near and distant future.   
Some individuals have been found to focus their attention on immediate events than 
distant events while others do the opposite (Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 1994).  
It is possible that a difference in temporal orientation interacts with the effect of self-construal on 
environmental decisions.  The way an individual evaluates future events can be influenced by a 
variety of motivational factors and orientation of the world. How psychologically connected an 
individual may feel towards their future selves may have an effect on how certain intertemporal 




that demonstrates systematic differences in how people construe and evaluate near versus distant 
future events.  They argue that greater temporal distance of an event or entity is mentally 
represented in more abstract, goal-related ways while smaller temporal distance of an event or 
entity is represented in more concrete and contextual ways.   This suggests that the same person 
sees things in different ways as a result of differences in construals of the self based on the time 
dimension.  Thus, the temporal distance of an event plays an important role is shaping 
perceptions, attitudes and behaviors across different domains.  The degree of similarity in 
temporal construals across cultures warrants further investigation.  Depending on how 
generalizable temporal constructs are across cultures, the processes driving cultural variations in 
environmental decision making may be better understood. 
 The idea that cultures vary in their temporal orientation is not a new idea.  For example, 
Hofstede‟s cultural dimension of long-term orientation was initially identified as the fifth 
dimension because the previous dimensions could not adequately explain some of the differences 
he observed between Eastern and Western nations (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede & Bond, 1988). It 
distinguishes societies based on their time horizons, or the importance that they place on the 
future as opposed to the past and present.  Long-term orientation stands for the fostering of 
virtues oriented towards future rewards, in particular perseverance and thrift. Found on the 
opposite end of the spectrum, short-term orientation stands for the fostering of virtues related to 
the past and present, in particular, respect for tradition, preservation of ‘face’ and fulfilling social 
obligations (Hofstede, 2001). The value a culture places on the future versus the past and present 
is representative of that culture‟s time horizon. Persistence, perseverance, status, thrift, and 
having a sense of shame were all values listed by Hofstede as reflecting a long-term oriented 




orientation.  On the other end of the dimension is short-term orientation that is characteristic of 
cultures that place value on personal stability, protecting one‟s face, respect for tradition, and 
reciprocation of greetings, favors, and gifts. In general, Western countries tend to score low on 
long-term orientation.  Under Hofstede‟s model, there are different cultural norms around time 
horizons and these differences in time orientations influence the way an individual perceives and 
values relationships to others. 
 There are systematic differences in how people construe and evaluate future versus 
present events.  Events that are in the distant future are mentally represented in abstract, goal-
related ways while events in the near future are represented in more concrete, contextual ways 
(Trope & Liberman, 2003).  People are more confident about what they will be like in the near 
future than in the remote future because the future is difficult to predict and there is too much 
uncertainty about whether there is continuity into the distant future (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003).  
When large changes in psychological connectedness are expected because of life events, 
individuals tend to prefer to receive benefits or rewards before such a change manifests, and for 
losses or burdens to be delayed until afterwards (Bartels & Rips, 2009).  Pronin et al. (2007) 
found that when comparing the decisions people make for their future selves to those they make 
for others, they tend to be quite similar.  These decisions for the future self and for others were 
distinct from the decisions made for the present self.   
 The processes by with individuals consider temporal dimensions are especially important 
in the domain of environmental decisions.  Climate change demands the evaluation of events that 
will take place in the future, and the exact time frame is ambiguous and uncertain.  When making 
future decisions, such as health or financial decisions, there is a tendency for people to discount 




around the notion that temporal discounting may vary by domain (Hardisty & Weber, 2009; 
Krantz & Kunreuther, 2007), building upon previous work reporting variations in risk attitudes 
by decision domain (Weber et al., 2002). Furthermore, both risk perception and risk attitudes 
have been found to vary by culture (Bontempo et al., 1997; Hsee & Weber, 1999a; Weber & 
Hsee, 1998).  Different cultural traditions may result in a diversity of perspectives about 
intertemporal decisions and risk perception.  An individual‟s motivational goals (e.g., need for 
belonging, desire to distinguish oneself from others, etc.) are shaped by the social norms and 
rules that are prevalent in one‟s dominant culture.  There may be different cultural rules guiding 
intertemporal choices and these rules may be domain specific.  This is interesting to consider 
because of the types of mental processing modes that thinking about short-term versus long-term 
events primes.  Cultural variation in discounting rates may be the result of different preferences 
and attitudes about risk and whether or not risk information is evaluated in abstract or concrete 
ways.   These types of individual and cultural differences in intertemporal orientation may be an 
interesting facet of processes behind environmental decisions.   
 Based on what is known about the role of psychological connectedness in decision 
making, it is possible to predict that environmental decisions about the current self will be 
distinct from decisions about the future self and the future other.  Those who are more inclined to 
think in more holistic terms may see a greater continuity between their current selves, their future 
selves, and the future other.  This is especially important in thinking about climate change 
because most of the decisions that an individual has to make in the present require that they 
make personal sacrifices that will affect their present selves for the benefit of others in the near 




environment, the more they may be willing to make sacrifices in their current lifestyles in order 
to reduce its negative impact on future selves and others.  Therefore, I propose: 
 
Hypothesis 10 (Study 3b):  There will be greater psychological connectedness (i.e., 
less psychological distance) between the current self and the future (self, other, and 
environment) in Japanese than in Americans, and this will mediate the effect of 
culture on environmental behaviors. 
 
 While I made cross-cultural comparisons between Anglo-Saxon and Latin-American 
countries in Study 1, Study 3 made comparisons between the United States and Japan.  There 
was a factor of convenience in sampling populations from these two cultures because of my 
personal ties to the United States and Japan, their languages, and their resources. However, there 
were a few additional advantages to studying these two countries instead of the ones from Study 
1.  For example, unlike the populations surveyed in Study 1, the United States and Japan are 
more similar in terms of economic and technological development (World Bank Development 
Indicators, 2010).  In addition, the literature comparing the two countries along dimensions like 
self-construal is very extensive (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  Furthermore, both countries have 
been at the forefront of the international discussion about climate change and climate policy, 
specifically with the United States represented as less pro-environmental than Japan that 
generally is represented as more pro-environmental with its policies and technologies (Pizer, 
2004).  Since Study 1 compared Anglo-Saxon cultures with Latin-American ones, adding an 
Asian culture to the mix, can help test the generalizability of the findings from Study 1, as well 




 Study 3b further investigates the extent to which perceived connections to others, future 
self, and the environment are related, and possibly the result of a single culture-level difference 
(attention to center vs. periphery), and whether it is this central difference or its manifestations in 
these three directions (connectedness to future self, other, and environment) that are responsible 
for observed differences in environmental decisions.  If members of collectivistic societies like 
Japan are more likely to feel a strong connection to group goals and social norms, then their 
environmental behaviors should be similar to what they think others in their society should be 
doing to help the environment.  In individualistic societies like the United States, there may be 
less consistency between what the individual does and what is expected of others in their culture.  
By asking participants to report their current pro-environmental behaviors and to report what 
they think others in their in-group (i.e., other Americans or other Japanese) should be doing for 
the environment, it is possible to determine if perceived social norms are important in making 
environmental decisions.  Therefore, I propose:  
 
Hypothesis 11 (Studies 3a & 3b): The degree of connectedness to others will result in 
different expectations for what others in the same culture should be doing to 
mitigate the effects of climate change than what each individual actually does. 
 
  Hypothesis 11a: Environmental behaviors expected of the self will be similar  
  to behaviors expected of others in Japan, but not in the United States. 
 
 Even though some cross-national comparisons of environmental attitudes exist (Aoyagi-




pro-environmental behaviors with a focus on discounting.  Temporal discounting and 
intertemporal choice have been studied in financial and health domains (Bontempo et al., 1997; 
Chapman, 1996a, 1996b; Du et al., 2002; Weber et al., 2007; Chapman & Elstein, 1995; Green 
& Myerson, 2004).  Theories have been formulated around the notion that temporal discounting 
may vary by domain (Hardisty & Weber, 2009; Krantz & Kunreuther, 2007; Tsukayama & 
Duckworth, 2010), in parallel to previous work reporting variations in risk attitudes by decision 
domain (Weber et al., 2002).  In making financial decisions, individuals are often asked to 
evaluate options with transferrable outcomes, such as monetary gains or losses.  Unlike financial 
risk, climate risk deals with more abstract, uncertain, and non-transferrable goods.  It also 
requires the consideration of a very distant future and the impact it will have on oneself as well 
as on others.   
 In the domain of environmental decisions, some studies look at whether or not climate 
risk is perceived differently from other types of risk and whether the same discounting rates 
apply to the environmental decisions as some of the other domains.  For example, Hardisty and 
Weber (2009) found that monetary and environmental domains shared the same discounting 
rates, while health domains did not.  Some cultural differences in discounting rates have also 
been reported.  Westerners tend to discount delayed outcomes more quickly and frequently than 
East Asians (Takahashi et al., 2009).  Different cultural traditions may result in different 
perspectives on intertemporal decisions and these cultural perspectives guiding intertemporal 
choices may vary by domain.  Empirical work on discounting has been identified as an 
understudied area of investigation of cultural differences in decision making (Weber & Morris, 
2010).  Thus, I will examine if discounting rates for environmental gain and loss scenarios (as 




different, I will then test whether or not differences in perceptions of temporal continuity and 
psychological connectedness mediates these differences in discounting rates.  Therefore, I 
propose: 
 
Hypothesis 12 (Study 3c): More environmental behaviors and less discounting by 
Japanese than Americans. 
 
 Hypothesis 12a: Psychological connectedness will be inversely proportional 
 to discounting of future environmental and financial outcomes and will 
 mediate the effect of culture on discounting.   
 
 Cultural factors influence public attitudes and behaviors towards the environment 
and the way that people address environmental issues (Dunlap, 1993; Dunlap, G. H. Gallup, & 
A. M. Gallup, 1993; Stern, Dietz, Kalof, & Guagnano, 1995).  Chapter 4 will evaluate other 
possible psychological processes (such as connectedness and perceived social norms) that may 
help explain differences in environmental policy attitudes, behaviors, and decisions between 
cultures.  In order to address the question of how culture impacts intertemporal choices, a better 
understanding of the relationship between these cultural constructs and temporal orientations 
(specifically, connectedness to future self and likelihood of considering future consequences) 
will also be pursued in Chapter 3.  Hence, in Chapter 3, the relationship between cultural values, 
temporal orientation, and environmental attitudes will be the primary focus.  In addition, the 




and behaviors across cultures will also be discussed.  (A summary of the hypotheses presented in 









 In Study 1, I analyze data that was previously collected and used by Anthony Leiserowitz 
(2003) to study the effect of affective imagery on perceptions of and attitudes toward climate 
change.  The dataset spans five countries and the original study evaluates how people perceive 
climate change, whether it is dangerous or not, and whether exposure to negative affective 
imagery about climate change (through a movie The Day After Tomorrow) changes these earlier 
evaluations of risk.  In Study 1, rather than look at the role of the experimental manipulation (i.e., 
the movie) in perceptions of climate risk, policy preferences, and behavioral intentions, I look 
exclusively at participants in the control group to explore the role that attitudes and cultural 
worldviews (such as egalitarian, individualistic, hierarchical, and fatalistic worldviews) play in 
the relationship between culture and support for environmental policies and green behaviors.   
 
Background information on Leiserowitz study 
 
 Leiserowitz (2004) used the film The Day After Tomorrow as a stimulus to engage 
viewers into thinking about the risks of climate change in a more concrete, tangible way through 
visual experiences.  When moviegoers who watched The Day After Tomorrow were compared to 
those who did not watch the movie, Leiserowitz (2004) found that those who saw the movie 
were more likely to be concerned about global warming. American risk perceptions and policy 
support are strongly linked to experiential factors, such as affect, imagery, and values 




Japan, and the United Kingdom. Reusswig (2005) describes three “peculiarities” when he 
compares the Japanese, German, and American studies. First, a greater percentage of American 
participants compared to German and Japanese participants responded that they believe climate 
is random. This holds true for both movie watchers and non-watchers. Second, while most 
participants in all three countries responded that climate is stable within limits before watching 
the movie, interesting differences were found after watching the movie. The percentage of 
Americans who believed climate is stable within limits had risen whereas the percentage of 
German and Japanese participants fell.   Lastly, Reusswig noted that the percentage of Germans 
believing that climate shows a delicate balance increased after viewing the film and the greatest 
percent increase in the Japanese participants was in those who felt that climate is random. These 
reported findings identify cultural differences in how the movie‟s message about climate change 
is perceived (Leiserowitz, 2004) and suggest that responses to climate change are linked to both 
psychological and socio-cultural factors.   
 Leiserowitz (2003, 2004, 2005a, 2005b)  continued to explore this line of reasoning, that 
affective responses to climate change are essential in predicting behavioral outcomes, when 
designing his studies on individual differences in climate risk perceptions. By taking a closer 
look at how affect, imagery, and worldviews influence risk perceptions, policy preferences, and 
behavior, Leiserowitz (2003) was able to construct a sketch of where the American public stands 
in relation to climate change issues.  He found that although Americans were becoming more 
aware and concerned about global warming, they only have a superficial knowledge of the 
impact it would have on people‟s lives.  Global warming was not perceived as a national priority, 




prices to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  These findings are also important to keep in mind 
when thinking of mitigation policies.  
 Experiential factors, such as affect and imagery, influence American risk perceptions and 
policy preferences (Leiserowitz, 2003, 2005b, 2006; Leiserowitz et al., 2006) 2006b.  
Leiserowitz (2006b) explored how affective images of global warming and cultural values 
influence climate risk policies. As negative affect increases, risk perception and support for 
policies addressing global warming increased.   Three values drawn from Cultural Theory were 
measured and found to have influence on climate risk perception were: egalitarianism, 
individualism, and hierarchism.  Egalitarianism was found to be associated with increased risk 
perception while individualism and hierarchism was found to be correlated with decreased risk 
perception.  In addition, socio-demographic factors such as gender, ethnicity, and political 
affiliations were found to have an effect on risk perception and explained 20% of the variance in 
risk perception among the participants Leiserowitz (2004, 2006b) sampled.  Specifically, those 
who perceive a greater risk of climate change tended to be females, minorities, liberals and 
members of environmental groups and newspaper readers.  Those who did not perceive global 
warming as a great threat were more likely to be whites, males, conservatives and registered 
voters.  The way in which affect, imagery, and worldview impacts climate risk perception, can 
be better understood by looking more closely at these variables and their relationship to one 
another and climate risk perception, policy preferences, and behavioral responses.  To build on 
these published findings, in Study 1, I compare Anglo-Saxon countries with Latin-American 
countries to test my hypotheses about the role of worldviews in effecting cultural differences in 




Participants and Design 
 
 1813 people from six different university campuses
1
 across five countries participated in 
this study.  In the original study, participants belonged to one of three conditions; one was a 
control condition and the remaining two were exposed to the experimental manipulation.  For the 
purposes of this analysis, only data from the participants in the control condition will be used.  
Participants completed a questionnaire with items asking about their attitudes and knowledge 
about global warming.  In addition, the questionnaire included items to measure what cultural 
theorists call cultural worldviews (Dake, 1991, 1992; Douglas, 1970; Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982; Thompson et al., 1990).  These worldviews were egalitarianism, individualism, 
hierarchism, and fatalism.   
 
Method and Materials 
 
Demographics  
 The sample consisted of 588 participants from the United States, England, Brazil, 
Mexico, and Argentina.  The data was aggregated into two groups, one representing Anglo-
Saxon countries (n = 292) for the United States and England, and another representing Latin-
American countries (n = 296), for Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina.  By categorizing these 
participants into two groups, Anglo-Saxon and Latin-American, it is possible to make 
comparisons between individualistic cultures (Anglo-Saxons) and more collectivistic cultures 
                                                 
1
  100 participants from the University of Oregon and 101 participants from Columbia University in New 
York, 99 participants from the University of Anglia, England, 100 participants from Universidade Federal do Ceará, 
Brazil, 96 participants from Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, and 100 participants from Universidad de 




(Latin-Americans).  47.4% of the participants were male in the Anglo-Saxon sample and 37.1% 
of the participants in the Latin-American sample were male.  60.1% of Anglo-Saxon participants 
reported being between 20 and 29 years of age, while 57.1% of Latin-American participants 
reported being in that age group. 
 
Independent Measures 
 Trust.  Participants reported trust based on the question: How strongly do you trust or 
distrust the following groups to tell you the truth about climate change / global warming? Trust 
was calculated by taking the mean of the responses to the following 11 items: (1) Religious 
leaders, (2) the media, (3) friends and family, (4) environmental organizations, (5) government 
scientists, (6) university scientists, (7) industry scientists, (8) people from your local community, 
(9) local authorities, (10) the national government, (11) and corporations (α = .79).  Responses 
were given using a four-point scale (1 = strongly distrust, 2 = somewhat distrust, 3 = somewhat 
trust, 4 = strongly trust).   
 Self-efficacy.  Perceptions of self-efficacy were determined by calculating the mean of the 
responses to the following three items: (1) it is just too difficult for me as an individual to do 
much about climate change/global, (2) trying to save energy does not do much to help combat 
climate change/global warming, and (3) using public transportation instead of a car does not 
really do much to combat climate change/global warming (α = .67).  Responses were given using 
a four-point scale (1 = strongly agree, 2 = somewhat agree, 3 = somewhat disagree, and 4 = 
strongly disagree).  
 Perceived climate risk.  To determine how climate risk is perceived, I calculated the 





Item 1: How serious of a threat do you think climate change / global warming is 
to: a) you and your family, b) your local community, c) people in the United 
States, d) people in other countries, and e) non-human nature?  Responses were 
given using a four-point scale (1 = not at all serious, 2 = not very serious, 3 = 
somewhat serious, 4 = very serious). 
 
Item 2:  Worldwide, how likely do you think it is that each of the following will 
occur, during the next 50 years due to climate change / global warming?:  a) 
standards of living will decrease, b) increased rates of disease, c) food shortages, 
d) flooding of major cities, e) more intense storms, hurricanes, tornadoes, f) a 
shutdown of the north Atlantic current/thermohaline circulation, and g) a new ice 
age.  Responses were given using a four-point scale (1 = very unlikely, 2 = 
somewhat unlikely, 3 = somewhat likely, 4 = very likely). 
 
Item 3:  In the [United States/United Kingdom/Argentina/Brazil/Mexico] how 
likely do you think it is that each of the following will occur, during the next 50 
years due to climate change / global warming?: a) standards of living will 
decrease, b) increased rates of disease, c) food shortages, d) flooding of major 
cities, e) more intense storms, hurricanes, tornadoes, and f) a new ice age.  
Responses were given using a four-point scale (1 = very unlikely, 2 = somewhat 





 Worry about climate change.  This variable was determined by the response to a single 
item:  How much do you worry about climate change/global warming? (1 = not at all, 2 = only a 
little, 3 = a fair amount, 4 = a great deal). 
 Knowledge about causes of climate change. Leiserowitz determined how knowledgeable 
each participant is about the causes of climate change based on responses to the question: Please 
indicate whether or not you think the following directly contribute to climate change/global 
warming.  Scores were determined by calculating the number of correct responses out of 8 items: 
(1) nuclear power plants, (2) damage to ozone layer, (3) burning fossil fuels (coal, gas, oil), (4) 
deforestation, (5) greenhouse gas emissions, (6) natural variability, (7) toxic waste (nuclear, 
chemical), and (8) use of aerosol spray cans (α = .39): 
 
Cultural Worldviews 
 Egalitarianism.    The egalitarianism index (Dake, 1991) was calculated by taking the 
mean score of responses to the five items that follow: (1) I support government efforts to get rid 
of poverty, (2) Companies and institutions should be organized so everybody can influence 
important decisions, (3) The world would be a more peaceful place if its wealth were divided 
more equally among nations, (4) We have gone too far in pushing equal rights (reverse-coded), 
and (5) Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in our society (α = .48).  
Responses could range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).   
 Individualism.  The individualism index (Dake, 1991) was calculated by taking the mean 
score of responses to the five items that follow: (1) Our government tries to do too many things 
for too many people.  We should just let people take care of themselves, (2) If the government 




best when it lets individuals take responsibility for their own lives without telling them what to 
do, (4) People are poor because they are lazy and lack will power, and (5) The (federal) 
government interferes too much in our everyday lives (α = .56).  Responses could range from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).   
 Hierarchism.  The hierarchism index (Dake, 1991) was calculated by taking the mean 
score of responses to the five items that follow: (1) The sooner we get rid of the traditional 
family structure, where the father is the head of the family and the children are taught to obey 
authority automatically, the better.  The old-fashioned way has a lot wrong with it (reverse-
coded), (2) Students must be taught to challenge their parents‟ views, confront the authorities, 
and criticize the traditions of our society (reverse-coded),  (3) It is always better to trust the 
judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion, than to listen to the noisy rabble-
rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people‟s minds, (4) People should show 
more respect to people in positions of authority, and (5) Society should be organized more like 
the military, with a strict chain of command (α = .62).  Responses could range from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).   
 Fatalism.  The fatalism index (Dake, 1991) was calculated by taking the mean score of 
responses to the five items that follow: (1) It doesn‟t make much difference if people elect one or 
another political candidate, for nothing will change, (2) I really don‟t have much control over my 
future, I‟m just trying to keep up with all of the demands on me, (3) It‟s no use worrying about 
public affairs; I can‟t do anything about them anyway, (4) I feel that I have little value as an 
individual in society, and (5) The future is too uncertain for a person to make serious plans (α = 
.62).  Responses could range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). 





 Policy Preferences.  Policy preferences were quantified by taking the mean of the 
responses to the following four items that were scored along a four-point scale (1 is strongly 
oppose, 2 is somewhat oppose, 3 is somewhat favor, and 4 is strongly favor).  The first item (1) 
was: “In February of 2005, an international agreement called the Kyoto Protocol went into effect 
in which developed countries collectively agreed to reduce their emissions of the greenhouse 
gases (carbon dioxide, methane, etc.) that are said to cause global warming.  How much do you 
favor or oppose this agreement?”  The next three items were based on the statement, “To address 
climate change/global warming, the government should…,” (2) raise taxes on fuels each year, for 
the next ten years to get people to use less energy, (3) restrict or ration the amount of energy each 
household is allowed to use, and (4) spend money on campaigns to persuade people to cut back 
on driving (α = .54). 
 Behavioral Intentions.  Behavioral intentions were scored as the mean of the responses to 
the following seven items coded along a four point scale where 1 is very unlikely, 2 is somewhat 
unlikely, 3 is somewhat likely, and 4 is very likely: How likely are you to do each of the 
following in the near future? (1) purchase a more fuel efficient car, (2) Join, donate money to, or 
volunteer with an organization working on issues related to climate change/global warming, (3) 
Make your views on climate change/global warming clear to politicians, (4) Talk to friends or 
family about how to reduce or prevent climate change/global warming, (5) Make more effort to 
reduce person impact, e.g. recycle, use less electricity/gas, (6) Fly less often, and (7) Bicycle or 







Independent Samples t-test of Means of Independent and Dependent Variables 
 Correlation coefficients between the independent and dependent variables used in Study 
1 can be found in Table 2.  Anglo-Saxon participants reported less worry about climate change 
(M = 2.51, SD = .56) than Latin-American participants (M = 3.27, SD = .46), and this difference 
was statistically significant, t (584) = -18.01, p < .001.  A similar trend was found for perceived 
climate risk, with Anglo-Saxons perceiving less risk (M = 2.69, SD = .55) than Latin-Americans 
(M = 3.23, SD = .44), t (586) = -13.33, p < .001).  When it came to having a greater knowledge 
base about climate change, Anglo-Saxons were more knowledgeable (M = 4.57, SD = 1.26) than 
Latin-Americans (M = 3.59, SD = .95), t (586) = -6.01, p < .001. Anglo-Saxons reported greater 
beliefs of self-efficacy (M = 3.04, SD =.68) than Latin-Americans (M = 2.82, SD = .73).  I do not 
find any significant differences in the means for trust scores for Anglo-Saxons (M = 2.48, SD = 
0.39) and Latin-Americans (M = 2.50, SD = 0.48), t (586) = 0.48, ns.   When comparing 
worldviews, the two groups differed significantly in their egalitarianism but not for 
individualism, hierarchism, or fatalism, with Anglo-Saxons supporting egalitarian views less (M 
= 3.12, SD = .50) than Latin-Americans (M = 3.35, SD = .41), t (586) = 10.68, p < .001, which is 
consistent with Hypothesis 3, but not Hypothesis 4.  Anglo-Saxons were in general more 
supportive of climate policies than Latin-Americans, (Ms = 2.95 vs. 2.82, SDs = .60 vs. .51) and 
this difference was statistically significant, t (585) = 2.75, p < .01.  In contrast, when it came to 
green behaviors, Latin-Americans were more supportive (M = 3.12, SD = .47) than Anglo-
Saxons (M = 2.82, SD = .55), t (585) = -7.11, p < .05.  While I find that Latin-Americans are 




Anglo-Saxons support environmental policies more than Latin-Americans (that does not support 
Hypothesis 6 that Anglo-Saxons will be less supportive of policies). 
 
Regression Analyses for Policy Preferences and Behavioral Intentions 
 In the next set of analyses, I examine more closely the relationship between culture and 
worldviews and its influence on policy preferences and behavioral intentions (Regression results 
can be found in Tables 3 & 4).  Most interesting is that culture remains a significant predictor of 
policy preferences even after the addition of cultural worldviews and other co-variates (like 
knowledge about climate change, self-efficacy, perceived climate risk, etc.) (see Table 3); 
however, in predicting behavioral intentions, culture is a significant predictor when demographic 
factors and cultural worldviews are added to the regression (Models 1 & 2 in Table 4) , but is not 
a significant predictor once additional factors like perceived climate risk and self-efficacy are 
included in the regression (Model 3).      
 Egalitarian Worldviews and Policy Preferences.  Since Latin-Americans were 
significantly more likely to be egalitarian than Anglo-Saxons, but less supportive of green 
policies than Anglo-Saxons, I tested the effect of the „Culture x Egalitarianism‟ interaction on 
green policies, but did not find a significant interaction effect (β = -.07, t = -1.61, ns).      
 Egalitarian Worldviews and Behavioral Intentions.  Latin-Americans were significantly 
more likely to support green behaviors than Anglo-Saxons.  Since they were also more likely to 
support egalitarian worldviews, a mediation analysis was performed to test whether or not 
egalitarianism mediated the effect of culture on behavioral intentions.  To establish mediation, 
egalitarianism must be shown to predict behavioral intentions, and the effect of culture on 




displayed in Figure 2, egalitarianism significantly predicted behavioral intentions, (β = .33, t = 
8.56, p < .001), which supports Hypothesis 1. The relationship between culture and behavioral 
intentions did not become non-significant, but the strength of this relationship was slightly 
reduced when egalitarianism was entered into the model (from β = .28, t = 7.11, p < .001 to β = 
.22, t = 5.47, p < .001), and egalitarianism remained significant (β = .28, t = 7.19, p < .001). The 
Sobel test showed that the effect of culture on behavioral intentions was significantly lower when 
egalitarianism was controlled for, relative to when it was not, t = 4.61, p < .001. I can conclude 
that the relationship between culture and behavioral intentions is partially mediated by 
egalitarianism, but it does not fully support my prediction that there will be a full mediation 
effect (Hypothesis 5). 
 Hierarchical Worldviews and Policy Preferences.  I find a significant effect of the 
interaction between culture and hierarchism on policy preferences.  Anglo-Saxons were slightly 
more supportive of hierarchical worldviews than Latin-Americans (Ms = 2.08 vs. 2.05, SDs = .51 
vs. .55, respectively), although this difference in means was not statistically significant.  
Although the effect size is minimal for this interaction effect as indicated by the modest R
2
 value 
of .03, a significant Culture x Hierarchism interaction was found, β = -.16, t = -3.54, p < .001, 
such that greater hierarchism for Anglo-Saxons was correlated with greater policy support but 
less policy support for Latin-Americans.   
 Hierarchical Worldviews and Pro-Environmental Behavioral Intentions.  Next, I 
performed a regression analysis to test for an interaction effect between culture and hierarchism 
on behavioral intentions.  Although the effect size is minimal for this interaction effect (R
2
 = 
.02), a significant Culture x Hierarchism interaction was found, β = .15, t = 3.27, p < .001, such 




environmental behaviors but less support for environmental behaviors for Latin-Americans.  
 Individualistic Worldviews and Policy Preferences.  While the difference in 
individualism between Anglo-Saxons (M = 2.06, SD = .53) and Latin-Americans (M = 2.01, SD 
=.46) was not significant, when I conducted a regression analysis to test for an interaction effect 
between culture and individualism on policy preferences, I found a significant Culture x 
Individualism interaction, β = -.13, t = -3.01, p = .003, R2= .02.  This was not predicted by 
Hypothesis 6, which assumed that the Anglo-Saxons would be more individualistic than Latin-
Americans and as a result Anglo-Saxons were expected to be less supportive of environmental 
policies than Latin-Americans.  Instead I found the opposite interaction effect, with greater 
individualism predicting greater support for policy interventions in Anglo-Saxons, but less 
support in Latin-Americans.  Although individualistic worldviews are associated with a greater 
independence from government controls, it does not always predict support for environmental 
policies and culture influences this relationship. 
 Individualistic Worldviews and Pro-Environmental Behavioral Intentions.  I found a 
significant Culture x Individualism interaction effect on pro-environmental behavioral intentions 
( β = .16, t = 3.55, p < .001), although the effect was small (R2= .03).  The interaction is such that 
lower individualism scores predicted greater support for pro-environmental behaviors in 
Japanese but greater individualism predicted less support for pro-environmental behaviors in 
Americans.   
 Fatalistic Worldviews and Policy Preferences.  I also tested the role that fatalism plays in 
the relationship between culture and policy preferences using a regression analysis, but did not 
find a significant interaction between culture and fatalistic worldviews, β = -.07, t = -1.62, ns.  




 Fatalistic Worldviews and Pro-Environmental Behavioral Intentions.  I also tested the 
role that fatalism plays in the relationship between culture and behavioral, again finding no 
significant interaction effect between culture and fatalistic worldviews, β = .07, t = 1.54, ns.  





 Culture influences public attitudes and behaviors toward the environment and the way 
that people address environmental issues (Dunlap, 1993; Dunlap, G.H. Gallup, & A.M. Gallup, 
1993; Stern et al., 1995).  Results from Study 1 using Anthony Leiserowitz‟s dataset demonstrate 
a link between culture and environmental decision making.  As predicted in Hypothesis 2 and 6, 
the effect of egalitarian worldview on environmental policy preferences is different from its 
effect on intentions for pro-environmental behaviors.  In comparing policy preferences between 
Anglo and Latin countries, there was no significant interaction effect between culture and 
egalitarianism on policy preferences.  In general,  Anglo-Saxons are more supportive of 
environmental policies than Latin Americans, but based on individual regressions by country, I 
found that the effect of egalitarianism is significant for Anglo countries (i.e., policy support 
increases as egalitarianism increases) but not for Latin countries.  Its role in affecting intentions 
for pro-environmental behaviors was different from this observed relationship between 
egalitarian worldview and policy preferences. Using Baron and Kenny‟s (1986) four-step method 
to test for mediation, egalitarianism was identified as a significant mediator of the relationship 




relationship (in partial support of Hypothesis 5). Once egalitarian worldview is taken into 
account, the effect of culture on support for pro-environmental behaviors (i.e., more support of 
such behaviors in Latin countries than Anglo countries as predicted in Hypothesis 3) is less 
significant, while egalitarianism remains a significant predictor of support behaviors, with 
greater egalitarianism having predicted more support. These results suggest that cultural 
differences in supportiveness for environmental behaviors may manifest in different ways such 
as an individual‟s belief in egalitarian values.  Study 2 and Study 3 will evaluate other possible 
psychological processes (such as self-construal, connectedness, and perceived social norms) that 
may help explain differences in environmental policy attitudes, behaviors and decisions between 
cultures.  It is also possible that in addition to these four types of cultural worldviews, a 
combination of environmental attitudes and cultural worldviews may influence culture‟s effect 








 In Study 2, I added items from Singelis‟ Self Construal (Singelis, 1994) scale to 
Leiserowitz‟s questionnaire from Study 1 to test the hypothesis that the way an individual 
construes his or her relation to others (independent vs. interdependent) influences preferences 
about a phenomenon like climate change (Hypothesis 7-9).  Thinking about climate change 
requires consideration of its consequences on others over a long and uncertain time horizon. I 
also included items from Schwartz‟s Value Survey (Schwartz, 1992) to examine the types of 
values that are correlated to decisions about future events, such as the effects of climate change.  
Based on the findings from Study 1, it seems that cultural worldviews influence the effect that 
culture has on policy preferences and behavioral intentions.  The goal of Study 2 is to examine 
different types of cultural worldviews and value orientations that were specifically designed for 
the study of cross-cultural differences and not solely for the risk domain.  In particular, I wanted 
to identify which cultural value orientations are related to decisions about environmental issues.  
This study was carried out in the United States to replicate the Anglo effects in Study 1 and to 
also pre-test to see if there is a relationship between these additional worldviews (e.g. Schwartz 
values) and the two dependent variables from Study 1 (i.e., policy preferences and behavioral 
intentions). Study 2 was carried out to test my hypotheses that interdependent self-construal 
leads to greater orientation and awareness of future events (Hypothesis 7) and that independent 
self-construal leads to a focus on the present and on events taking place in the near future 




American participants if I would find support for my main effects predictions about self-
construal (Hypothesis 7 & 8) before comparing across cultures.  The hope was to shed light on 
some motivational factors that may influence how individuals evaluate information, such as 
climate change information, that requires accounting for uncertain outcomes over a long 
temporal horizon.  It may also be possible to determine which cultural value orientations are 
associated with time and uncertainty.    
 
Participants and Design 
 
 Sixty undergraduate and graduate students from Columbia University in New York City 
were recruited to participate in this survey.  Students were required to be over 18 years of age in 
order to be a participant in this study.  Twelve (20.0%) were male and thirty-four (56.7%) were 
female, while fourteen (23.3%) did not indicate their sex.  One (1.7%) was a freshman, eleven 
(18.3%) were sophomores, eleven (18.3%) were juniors, eight (13.3%) were seniors, fourteen 
(23.3%) were graduate students, one (1.7%) was enrolled in a post-baccalaureate program, and 
fourteen (23.3%) did not indicate their year in school.   Twenty-five (41.7%) described 
themselves as Caucasian, one (1.7%) as Latino, five (8.4%) as African-American, thirteen 
(11.9%) as Asian or Pacific Islander and two (3.4%) as belonging to another ethnicity.   
 
Materials and Methods 
 
 Procedures and materials follow closely from Study 1, with a few differences that need to 
be noted.  These differences had to do with the measures that were included in the survey.  Items 




Value Survey (1992).  These two scale measures were counterbalanced in order to control for 
any order effects.  A correlation matrix of these variables can be found in Table 5. 
 
Independent Variables 
 Self-Construal.  To measure self-construal, the twenty-four item self-construal scale 
designed by Singelis (1994) was used.  Twelve items were for independent self-construal and 
twelve were for interdependent self-construal.  Participants read the following instructions, “The 
following questions measure a variety of feelings and behaviors in various situations. Read each 
of the statements below as if it referred to you. Beside each statement write the number that best 
matches your agreement or disagreement. Please respond to every statement. Thank you.”  
Responses were given along a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
(strongly agree).  A sample item from the independent scale is: “I enjoy being unique and 
different from others in many respects.”  A sample item from the interdependent scale is: “It is 
important for me to maintain harmony within my group.”  Individual participants' scores were 
calculated by taking the mean of the twelve items for each scale, resulting in two scores, one for 
independent self-construal and one for interdependent self-construal.  Singelis (1994) reported 
Cronbach's alphas for these two subscales as approximately .74 for interdependence and .70 for 
independence.  To see all 24 scale items, refer to Appendix A. 
Schwartz Values Survey
2
.  Participants were asked to rate a list of 57 values using a nine-
point scale where -1 indicates opposed to values, 0 is not important, 3  is important,  6 is very 
important, and 7 is supremely important.  These items were used to calculate scores for the ten 
                                                 
2
 Schwartz‟s seven cultural level value orientations are: embeddedness, hierarchy, mastery, affective autonomy, 
intellectual autonomy, egalitarianism, and harmony.  These seven orientations are appropriate to use for between-
country analyses. Since my sample consists of participants from the United States only, the more appropriate 




motivational values that Schwartz highlighted.  The ten values were: power, achievement, 
hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and 
security.  The raw scores are obtained by taking the mean of the scores for each item included in 
a value orientation.   To get the mean rating score for each individual, I computed each 
individual‟s total score on all value items and then divide by the total number of items, which is 
57.  To see all 57 items, refer to Appendix B.  
 
Dependent Measures 
 Policy Preferences.  Policy preferences were quantified by taking the mean of the 
responses to the following four items that were scored on a four-point scale (1 is strongly 
oppose, 2 is somewhat oppose, 3 is somewhat favor, and 4 is strongly favor).  The first item was: 
In February of 2005, an international agreement called the Kyoto Protocol went into effect in 
which developed countries collectively agreed to reduce their emissions of the greenhouse gases 
(carbon dioxide, methane, etc.) that are said to cause global warming.  How much do you favor 
or oppose this agreement? The next three items were:  To address climate change/global 
warming, the government should: a) raise taxes on fuels each year, for the next ten years to get 
people to use less energy, b) restrict or ration the amount of energy each household is allowed to 
use, c) spend money on campaigns to persuade people to cut back on driving. 
 Behavioral Intentions.  Behavioral intentions were scored as the mean of the responses to 
the following seven items coded along a four point scale where 1 is very unlikely, 2 is somewhat 
unlikely, 3 is somewhat likely, and 4 is very likely: How likely are you to do each of the 
following in the near future? (1) purchase a more fuel efficient car, (2) Join, donate money to, or 




Make your views on climate change/global warming clear to politicians, (4) Talk to friends or 
family about how to reduce or prevent climate change/global warming, (5) Make more effort to 
reduce person impact, e.g. recycle, use less electricity/gas, (6) Fly less often, and (7) Bicycle or 





Self-Construal and Policy Preferences 
 Independent self-construal.  I did not find a significant effect of independent self-
construal on policy preferences, β = -.12, t = -.81, ns.  A correlation matrix with self-construal 
and dependent variables can be found in Table 5. 
 Interdependent self-construal.  Interdependent self-construal did not have a significant 
effect on policy preferences,  β = .10, t = .72, ns.  Multiple regression results with self-construal 
and policy preferences can be found in Table 6. 
 
Self-Construal and Behavioral Intentions 
 Independent self-construal.   Independent self-construal does not predict pro-
environmental behavior intentions, β = -.11, t = -.52, ns.  In Hypothesis 9, I predicted that 
independent self-construal will not have an effect on policy preferences and behavioral intentions 
and my findings do not support this prediction. 
 Interdependent self-construal.  I did not find a significant effect of interdependence on 
behavioral intentions, β = .06, t = .39, ns.  I had predicted that interdependent self-construal 




9) and did not find evidence to support this hypothesis. Multiple regression results with self-
construal and behavioral intentions can be found in Table 7.   
 
Schwartz’s Values and Policy Preferences 
 
 Achievement.   Achievement is a moderately significant predictor of policy preferences, β 
= .41, t = 1.99, p < .10 (R
2 
is .17). Those scoring low on achievement values were slightly less 
likely to support policy interventions than those scoring high on achievement. The primary goal 
of this type is personal success through demonstrated competence. Competence is evaluated in 
terms of what is valued by the system or organization in which the individual is located.  The 
individual items that comprised this value were ambitious, influential, capable, and successful.  
The R
2 
value is .17 suggesting that high versus low achievement values is a good predictor of 
policy preferences.   
 Security.  Security is a significant predictor of policy preferences, β = .38, t = 2.77, p < 
.01.   The R
2 
value is .14 indicating that this dimension of security, and whether a person values 
this more or less, is a relatively robust predictor of policy preferences when compared to the 
other values.  Those scoring low on the security value were less likely to support policy 
interventions than those scoring high on security. The motivational goal of this type is safety, 
harmony, and stability of society or relationships, and of self.  This type of relational motivation 
appears to be an important indicator of environmental policies preferences. 
  




 Self-direction.  Self-direction is a significant predictor of behavioral intentions, β = -.47, t 
= -3.63, p < .001. Those scoring low on self-direction were actually more likely to support pro-
environmental behavioral changes than those scoring high on self-direction (R
2 
= .22). The 
motivational goal of this value type is independent thought and action (for example, choosing, 
creating, exploring). Self-direction comes from the need for control and mastery along with the 
need for autonomy and independence.  This suggests that perhaps less desire for independence a 
significant motivator of support for green behaviors, and this is consistent with the results I 
found with independent self-construal and behavioral intentions. 
 Universalism.   I found universalism to be a significant predictor of behavioral intentions, 
β = -.44, t = -3.35, p < .01.  Those scoring low on universalism were more likely to report greater 
likelihood of engaging in pro-environmental behaviors (R
2 
= .20).  The motivational goal of 
universalism is the understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection of the welfare for all 
people and for nature.  This result is not consistent with what I would predict about the effect of 
this motivational value on pro-environmental behaviors.  I would expect that the more a person 
values the welfare of others and of nature, the more they will be motivated to adopt behaviors 
that will help reduce the negative impacts that human activities have on the environment.  This 
suggests that instead of one‟s attitudes towards nature, other motivational values may be more 
robust indicators of pro-environmental behaviors.  When I regress both self-direction onto 
behavioral intentions and then add universalism to the model, I find that the universalism does 
not contribute that much predictive strength to the original model with an ∆R 2 value of only .08.  
Self-direction alone results in an R 
2 
of .22, suggesting that when both values are taken into 







 People with independent self-construals see the self as stable and separate from 
interpersonal contexts (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Oyserman et al., 2002; Singelis, 1994).  
Independent individuals value self-promotion, autonomy, assertiveness, and uniqueness. In 
contrast, people with interdependent self-construals see the self as a more flexible entity and one 
that is inextricably linked and intertwined with the social context (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; 
Oyserman et al., 2002; Singelis, 1994).  As such, interdependent individuals value maintaining 
group harmony and are motivated to fit in and assimilate with the group.  In Study 2, I found 
results that are contradictory to my predictions.  In the presence of other variables (as shown in 
the multiple regressions), neither independent nor interdependent self-construal are strongly 
correlated to pro-environmental policy preferences and behaviors.  I did not find evidence to 
support my predictions about independent and interdependent self-construals and their effects on 
temporal orientations (i.e., focus on present versus future) and can rule out both Hypothesis 7 
and 8.  Furthermore, I did not find support for my prediction that interdependent self-construal is 
associated with greater support for pro-environmental policies and behaviors, but independent 
self-construal will not (Hypothesis 9). The purpose of Study 2 was to test whether self-construal, 
a construct that is commonly applied in cross-cultural studies, can be used to explain cultural 
differences in environmental decisions.  Critics of the theory of self-construal (independent-
interdependent) believe that this categorization is not sufficient to account for the variation in 
individual behaviors.  It is possible that this construct does not capture the cultural dimensions 
that are relevant to this type of decision making. For this reason, instead of conducting this same 




connectedness and time discounting that may affect how people construe objects and events over 
time (i.e. focus on present or future events).   
 While attitudes and values motivate behaviors, based on my findings using Schwartz‟s 
fifty-seven item value inventory, I find that some values are more strongly correlated with 
environmental policy preferences and behavioral intentions. In addition, these results suggest 
that the values that influence policy preferences are not necessarily overlapping with those that 
influence behavioral intentions.  Placing value on achievement and security is significantly 
correlated with greater support for environmental policies.  Schwartz‟s motivation of self-
direction is similar to independent self-construal in that it places value on independence and 
autonomy.  This connection is supported by my findings that self-direction, like independent 
self-construal, is negatively correlated with support of green behaviors.  Universalism was also 
negatively correlated to support of green behaviors. These findings of Schwartz‟s values are 
consistent with what I find in Study 1, that different worldviews motivate policy preferences and 








In order to make decisions about green behaviors or emissions taxes, people must make 
sacrifices, such as greater monetary costs or inconveniences to one‟s lifestyle, right now for the 
benefit of other individuals in the generations to come.  The costs or benefits of their decisions 
are often not tangible or experienced within their own lifetime.  Decisions that have 
consequences (i.e. costs or benefits) that play out over time are called intertemporal choices.  It is 
during these types of choices that people have been found to discount the temporal aspect of the 
decision (e.g. discounting delayed rewards) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Myerson & Green, 
1995).  People make inconsistent choices over time and discounting rates vary as a function of 
the length of delay and whether there will be a gain or a loss.  As a result of the wide range of 
processes that operate when people make these types of decisions, the way that a decision is 
framed or the context of the decision all affect the way people make intertemporal choices and 
evaluate different tradeoffs over time (Berns, Laibson, & Loewenstein, 2007; Gilovich, Griffin, 
& Kahneman, 2002).  Examples of these types of decisions include investment decisions, 
retirement savings, and health behaviors.  Decisions about climate change also require the 
weighing of costs and benefits over time and usually over longer time frames, such as over 
generations rather than a few years, than with financial or health decisions.  As with other 




different ways.  Do these discount rates for environmental decisions vary from discount rates in 
other decision domains?  
Study 3 seeks to answer three questions about how environmental decisions are 
influenced by the way individuals construe the self, others, and the environment over time and 
how culture plays into this dynamic.  The first is a general question (Study 3a) that asks whether 
or not there are cultural differences in environmental behaviors and environmental decision 
processes between Americans and Japanese.  The second question (Study 3b) is a process 
question about how differences in environmental behaviors and intertemporal discounting 
between Americans and Japanese can be explained (e.g. psychological connectedness to future 
self, future other, and to the environment or perceived social norms), and whether there is a 
cultural difference on these constructs that is related to a single dimension, a constellation of 
several dimensions.  The third question (Study 3c) asks whether such (cultural or individual) 
differences in psychological connectedness to future selves and others (or other variables) 
mediate observed differences in environmental behavior and also discounting of future costs or 
benefits in environmental and other contexts.  
 Study 3b and Study 3c test possible psychological processes that may explain predicted 
differences between Americans and Japanese in four types of environmental behaviors (food, 
household, transportation, and activism behaviors).  The first process hypothesis is that 
connectedness to future selves and of the self to others and the environment over time will 
mediate the relationship between culture and environmental behaviors.  It is expected that 
Japanese, who are more holistic thinkers (with a greater inclination to consider future events and 
perceive a continuity of the self) than Americans will feel more connected to future people and 




cultural differences in environmental behaviors (Hypothesis 10).  The second process hypothesis 
addresses the question of whether, above and beyond cognitive processing differences between 
cultures, perceived social norms may also explain some of the differences between the two 
cultures in environmental behaviors.  If Japanese (who are generally collectivistic) are more 
likely to ascribe to group norms than Americans (who are more individualistic), then it is 
possible that their own environmental behaviors are in alignment with what they expect other 
Japanese to be doing while such a pattern will not be found for Americans (Hypothesis 11).  One 
way to see if whether perceived social norms are motivating attitudes and behaviors is to ask 
participants what they believe they versus others in their society should do in a given situation 
(Heine, Buchtel, & Norenzayan, 2008).  Comparing the percentage of participants who reported 
the same response for themselves as for others as opposed to reporting different behaviors for the 
self as for the other provides some evidence of social norms.  I describe my results from Study 3 
in three sections, Studies 3a-3c, and the results all come from the dataset and sample pool.  The 
difference between the studies is the variables that I focus on and the type of analyses I conduct.  










 The United States and Japan are two of the world‟s leading economies (International 
Monetary Fund Data and Statistics, 2010).  Both countries among the top five highest CO2 
emitters in the world along with China, India and the Russian Federation. Since 1990, world 
energy consumption has increased by 2% and according to estimates provided by the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), business as usual would lead to a 40% increase in energy 
demand by 2030 (International Energy Agency Statistics and Balances, 2010).  In a 2010 survey 
conducted by the World Bank, it was reported that the United States emitted over twice the 
amount of carbon dioxide per person when compared to Japan.  Considering both Japan and the 
United States share comparable levels of economic development, education, and technological 
infrastructure (World Development Indicators, 2010), such a large difference is noteworthy.  
Comparing these two countries that are similar in technologic and economic development allows 
us to focus on cultural and psychological differences as determinants of environmental attitudes 
and behaviors (although it is important to note differences in size and travel distances).   
 Comparing the two countries in energy production and use is useful in beginning to 
understand where and why differences in emissions exist and where reductions can be made.  In 
Japan, about 1,123.5 billion kilowatts per hour of electricity is produced, while four times that 
amount (about 4,322.9 billion kilowatts per hours) is produced in the United States.  Energy use 
per capita in the United States is 7,766 kg and in Japan is 4,019 kg (World Bank). In 2006 the 
United States emitted 19.27 metric tons per capita of CO2 and Japan emitted 10.2 metric tons per 




consumption and use in the United States is different from Japan.  This is important to consider 
even when comparing energy use on the level of individual households.   
 When taking the international podium during climate treaty talks, Japan has been a strong 
voice and a leader in developing policies to mitigate climate change.  It has promised repeatedly 
over the years to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and also help developing countries financially 
and technologically in their efforts to combat emissions issues.  Most recently the Hatoyama 
Initiative (2009) pledged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 25% of 1990 levels by 2020.  
However, despite these aggressive policy measures, Japan continues to be the world‟s fifth 
largest emitter of CO2 and emissions have actually gone up almost 7% since 1990.  This is 
evidence that merely committing to a policy measure does not ensure that such goals can be met.  
Since Japanese businesses are already quite energy efficient, policies need to begin to target 
different sectors of the population to reform, such as individual households.    
 Individual households are an important target group in the efforts to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions because they are major contributors to global warming with their greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Households in 2003 were responsible for 1214.8 million metric tons (21%) of energy 
related CO2 emissions in the United States (International Energy Statistics, 2009).  Household 
energy is often used for home heating, water heating, refrigeration and freezing, lighting, 
cooking and air conditioning (Gardner & Stern, 2008).  In general, the Japanese public supports 
regulations that control the amount of household energy consumption and garbage production, 
even if it involves an economic cost (Ester et al., 2003).  Although they are supportive of both 
household environmental regulations, Japanese, like Americans were opposed to tax increases 
designed to get people to use less energy and cut back on driving.  26% of the surveyed Japanese 




environment while 37% cited the national government and 15% the local government.  While it 
is common to compare environmental outcome measures such as carbon dioxide emissions 
between countries (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), few 
comparisons have examined the relevant cultural and psychological factors.  Thus, Study 3 will 
explore possible cultural indicators of energy conservation behaviors that may help to explain 
some of these similarities and differences between the United States and Japan.   
 Study 3a will examine people‟s current energy efficiency and conservation behaviors and 
their support for such behaviors among others in their culture, and also ask them to decide 
between environmental as well as financial choice options that vary in the time delay of 
consequences.  These behaviors and choices will be related to how close or distant they feel to 
the future (future self, future other, future environment).  Four types of environmental behaviors 
will be assessed in Study 3a.  The first is energy efficiency and conservation behaviors.  The 
second is intertemporal discounting of environmental (and financial) outcomes.  The third and 
fourth types of environmental behaviors will be Leiserowitz‟s indices for environmental policy 
preferences and pro-environmental behavioral intentions that were previously used in Studies 1 
and 2. 
Participants and Design 
 
 In Study 3, I use a questionnaire designed to examine the role of culture (as measured by 
country) in influencing preferences for policy and behavioral interventions against climate 
change.  This survey was comprised of questions having to do with household energy use so that 
cultural differences in these behaviors can also be compared. Using an online survey company, 




seventy-three participants were surveyed across the United States and Japan.  One panel 
represented was a sample of residents across the United States (n = 560) and the other 
represented a sample of residents across Japan (n = 513).   Both were convenience samples 
comprised of respondents who were a part of a larger database from which Qualtrics recruits 
participants.  All participants were required to be at least 18 years of age in order to participate in 
the survey.  In the sample of American participants, the average age was 41.7 (SD = 14.29), 
43.2% were male, 25.5% had a college degree, and the median family income was $20,000 to 
$49,000.  In the sample of Japanese participants, the average age was 43.0 (SD = 11.65), 52.2% 
were male, 59.2% had a college degree, and the median family income was ¥3,330,000 to 
¥6,950,000 (which converts to roughly $40,000-$85,000
3
).  65.4% of American participants 
were homeowners and 68.2% of Japanese participants were homeowners.  In addition, 25.5% of 
American participants and 13.1% of Japanese participants were from rural areas, 49.8% of 
Americans and 48.1% of Japanese were from suburban areas, and 24.6% of Americans and 
38.8% of Japanese were from urban areas. Finally, 25.2% of Americans and 41.1% of Japanese 
self-identified as liberals, 41.1% of Americans and 33.9% of Japanese as moderates, and 31.4% 
of Americans and 25% of Japanese as conservatives.  In general, Japanese were more liberal, 
more educated, more urban, and earned a higher income than Americans. 
 
Materials and Methods 
 
 The questionnaire used was comprised of a series of attitudinal and behavioral measures.  
These items were sampled from Gardner & Stern‟s Short List (2008), Dietz, Gardner, Gilligan, 
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Stern, and Vandenbergh (2009) and the World Bank Survey 2010, along with a few other 
measures such as Leiserowitz‟s Policy Index and Behavior Index and the New Ecological 
Paradigm (Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000).   The questionnaire was first prepared in 
English and then translated and back translated from English into Japanese to ensure the 
accuracy of the translations (Brislin, 1970).  Since the survey was prepared for English speaking 
residents in the United States, it was necessary to test for the applicability and relevance of the 
survey to Japanese participants.  The pilot survey was tested on ten native Japanese speakers who 
had lived in Japan.  A few items that did not apply to the Japanese household were removed from 
both the English version and the Japanese version.   
 
Attitudinal Measures 
 New Ecological Paradigm (NEP).  Using the 15-item NEP-R scale (Dunlap et al., 2000) 
pro-environmental attitudes will be assessed along a five-point scale (1 = strongly agree, 5 = 
strongly disagree) (α = .84 overall, α = .73 for Japan, α = .87 for U.S.A).  A sample item is: “The 
balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset.”  For a full text of the items, please refer to 
Appendix C.     
 Egalitarianism.    The egalitarianism index (Dake, 1991) was calculated as the mean of 
the following five items along a four-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree) (α = 
.80 overall, α = .53 for Japan, α = .63 for U.S.A):  (1) I support government efforts to get rid of 
poverty, (2) Companies and institutions should be organized so everybody can influence 
important decisions, (3) The world would be a more peaceful place if its wealth were divided 
more equally among nations (4) We have gone too far in pushing equal rights (reverse-coded), 




 Individualism.  The individualism index (Dake, 1991) was calculated as the mean of the 
following five items along a four-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree) (α = .92 
overall, α = .72 for Japan, α = .82 for U.S.A):  (1) Our government tries to do too many things 
for too many people.  We should just let people take care of themselves, (2) If the government 
spent less time trying to fix everyone‟s problems, we‟d all be a lot better off, (3) Society works 
best when it lets individuals take responsibility for their own lives without telling them what to 
do, (4) People are poor because they are lazy and lack will power, and (5) The (federal) 
government interferes too much in our everyday lives. 
 Hierarchism.  The hierarchism index (Dake, 1991) was calculated as the mean of the 
following five items along a four-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree) (α = .56 
overall, α = .20 for Japan, α = .47 for U.S.A): (1) The sooner we get rid of the traditional family 
structure, where the father is the head of the family and the children are taught to obey authority 
automatically, the better.  The old-fashioned way has a lot wrong with it (reverse-coded), (2) 
Students must be taught to challenge their parents‟ views, confront the authorities, and criticize 
the traditions of our society (reverse-coded), (3) It is always better to trust the judgment of the 
proper authorities in government and religion, than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our 
society who are trying to create doubt in people‟s minds, (4) People should show more respect to 
people in positions of authority, and (5) Society should be organized more like the military, with 
a strict chain of command. 
 Fatalism.  The fatalism index (Dake, 1991) was calculated as the mean of the following 
five items along a four-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree) (α = .88 overall, α 
= .71 for Japan, α = .81 for U.S.A): (1) It doesn‟t make much difference if people elect one or 




future, I‟m just trying to keep up with all of the demands on me, (3) It‟s no use worrying about 
public affairs; I can‟t do anything about them anyway, (4) I feel that I have little value as an 
individual in society, and (5) The future is too uncertain for a person to make serious plans.   
 General attitudes about climate change and climate policy.  I also included a few 
questions having to do with general attitudes and opinions about climate change and related 
issues.  Some of these questions were taken from the World Bank 2010 Census and I generated 
the other questions for this survey.  A sample item is: “In your view, is climate change, also 
known as global warming, a very serious problem, somewhat serious, not too serious, or not a 
problem?”  See Table 18 & Table 20 for the text of all items. Please refer to Figures 11-14 for a 
summary of responses about what the most important problem is now and in the future. 
 Self versus other behaviors.  Two open-ended questions were asked that aim to identify 
whether or not perceived social norms are motivating each participant‟s behaviors or whether 
something else, like environmental attitudes, is guiding their behaviors. This is a methodology 
that was used by Heine et al. (2008; 2002a) as an attempt to overcome the limitation shared by 
many cross-cultural studies that rely mostly on subjective reports and Likert scales.  Rather than 
ask participants what they think the social norm is in their culture for a particular context, asking 
them how others in their culture behave (e.g. “What do Americans do…”) or how they think (e.g. 
“How do Americans feel about…”), Heine et al. (2008; 2002a) argue, is an indirect way to 
identify what is perceived to be the dominant social norm and what may influence their 
behaviors.  These two questions are: “What is the single most effective thing you can do to help 
reduce energy consumption?” and “What is the single most effective thing other 
[Americans/Japanese] can do to help reduce energy consumption?”   If the responses provided 




be the dominant social norm is also guiding their behaviors.  If there is a discrepancy between 
the two responses, it may be that rather than perceived social norms, attitudes or worldviews are 




Energy Conservation Measures 
 Food Behaviors.  Food behaviors were the mean of five items that were scored on a 5-
point Likert scale (α = .72 overall, α = .76 for Japan, α = .74 for U.S.A) where 1 is „no‟, 2 is 
„sometimes‟, 3 is „usually‟, 4 is „almost always‟, and 5 is „always‟.  These scores were 
transformed into a 0 to 1 scale so that the scores could be compared with items scored 
differently.  These five items were:  (1) Do you shop at the farmer‟s market? (2) Do you buy 
local produce at the grocery store when possible? (3) Do you consciously buy things with less 
packaging? (4) Do you bring your own bags to the store when shopping? (5) Do you recycle 
aluminum cans? 
 Household Behaviors.  Household behaviors were scored as the mean of thirty-three 
behaviors (α = .91 overall, α = .91 for Japan, α = .91 for U.S.A).  Some of these behaviors came 
from the list of household actions Dietz et al. (2009) that were identified and categorized into 
five behaviorally distinct categories and others from Attari, DeKay, Davidson, and Bruine de 
Bruin (2010).  These categories were weatherization, efficiency, adjustment, maintenance, and 
daily use behaviors.   A sample item is: “Do you unplug any devices in your home that are not in 
use (appliances continue to draw power when they are not in use, so that they can turn on quickly 




almost always, and always.  In addition, a few behaviors from Gardner and Stern‟s (2008) Short 
List were also included into this group of behaviors.  A sample item is: “Have you replaced all of 
your incandescent bulbs with equally bright fluorescent bulbs (for example, a 100-watt 
incandescent bulb will have equal brightness of a 27-watt compact fluorescent bulb)?”  Possible 
responses were no, yes, not applicable, and do not know. For a full list of these items, please 
refer to Appendix D. 
 Transportation Behaviors.  Transportation behaviors were scored as the mean of thirteen 
behaviors (α = .84 overall, α = .61 for Japan, α = .77 for U.S.A), most of which were derived 
from Dietz et al.‟s (2009) list.   A sample item is “Do you regularly change the oil in your 
vehicle?” Answer choices were: no, sometimes, usually, almost always, and always.  Refer to 
Appendix D for a full list of items. 
 Activism Behaviors.  Activism behaviors were the mean of five items (α = .69 overall, α = 
.62 for Japan, α = .71 for U.S.A): (1) Have you ever planted a tree? (2) Are you a member of an 
environmental organization? (3) Have you ever sent a letter to any political official about 
environmental or energy issues? (4) Do you consider yourself an environmentalist? and (5) Have 
you ever donated money to an environmental organization?  Participants responded either yes or 
no.   
 Total Energy Conservation Behavior.  This score was calculated as the mean of all fifty-
six items that went into the scores for food behaviors (five items), household behaviors (thirty-
three items), transportation behaviors (thirteen items), and activism behaviors (five items).  
 Policy Index.  Policy Index is the same Leiserowitz index that was used in Study 1 and 
Study 2.  It is the mean of four items (α = .75 overall, α = .75 for Japan, α = .78 for U.S.A.) that 




somewhat favor, and 4 is strongly favor.  The first item was: In February of 2005, an 
international agreement called the Kyoto Protocol went into effect in which developed countries 
collectively agreed to reduce their emissions of the greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, 
etc.) that are said to cause global warming.  How much do you favor or oppose this agreement? 
The next three items were:  To address climate change/global warming, the government should: 
a) raise taxes on fuels each year, for the next ten years to get people to use less energy, b) restrict 
or ration the amount of energy each household is allowed to use, c) spend money on campaigns 
to persuade people to cut back on driving. 
 Behavior Index.  Behavior Index is also the same as the Leiserowitz items used in Study 
1 and Study 2.  It is the mean of the following seven items (α = .81 overall, α = .78 for Japan, α = 
.83 for U.S.A) coded along a four point scale where 1 is very unlikely, 2 is somewhat unlikely, 3 
is somewhat likely, and 4 is very likely: How likely are you to do each of the following in the 
near future? (1) purchase a more fuel efficient car, (2) Join, donate money to, or volunteer with 
an organization working on issues related to climate change/global warming, (3) Make your 
views on climate change/global warming clear to politicians, (4) Talk to friends or family about 
how to reduce or prevent climate change/global warming, (5) Make more effort to reduce person 
impact, e.g. recycle, use less electricity/gas, (6) Fly less often, and (7) Bicycle or use public 








 The correlations between independent and dependent variables used in Study 3 can be 
found in Table 8.  The predicted main effect that culture will be a significant predictor of energy 
conservation behaviors was found for all but one category of behaviors.  Culture significantly 
predicted household behaviors (β = .17, t = 5.60, p = .000), transportation behaviors (β = .37, t = 
13.01, p = .000), and activism behaviors (β = .28, t = 9.63, p = .000), but not food behaviors (β = 
-.05, t = -1.70, ns).  The composite score for all of these behavior scores combined was also 
significantly predicted by culture (β = .15, t = 4.99, p = .000).  However, instead of seeing more 
pro-environmental behaviors in the Japanese as I had predicted in Hypothesis 12, I found that 
Americans were more likely to engage in these behaviors.  To see the correlations between these 
new behavioral questions and Leiserowitz‟s indices, please look to Tables 21 & 22) 
 
Main Effects 
 Effect of culture on energy conservation behaviors.  To look more closely at the 
individual behaviors that are different between Americans and Japanese, mean differences for 
each individual item that was used to score the food, household, transportation and activism 
behaviors were calculated and assessed. These mean differences were calculated by subtracting 
US scores from Japan scores, such that negative values indicated greater means for Americans 
and positive values reflect greater means for Japanese. Independent samples t-tests were carried 
out to test whether the differences between American and Japanese mean scores are statistically 
significant.  (See Figures 5-7). The results of these t-tests revealed that Americans were 
significantly more likely to engage in household energy conservation behaviors (Ms = .53 vs. 
.47, SDs = .18 vs. .15), transportation energy conservation behaviors (Ms = .59 vs. .36, SDs = .26 




mean food score for the Japanese was greater than for Americans, this difference was not 
statistically significant.   Looking at the individual food behaviors, Americans were more likely 
than Japanese to shop at the farmers market (Ms = .26 vs. .16, SDs = .24 vs. .20) and to buy local 
produce (Ms = .48 vs. .31, SDs = .27 vs. .25), while the Americans were less likely than Japanese 
to bring their own shopping bags (Ms = .36 vs. .59, SDs = .36 vs. .36) and recycle aluminum 
cans (Ms = .67 vs. .76, SDs = .38 vs. .31).  Overall, Americans were significantly more likely to 
engage in these pro-environmental or energy conserving behaviors than Japanese (See Figure 8).  
This is the opposite of what I expected to find and does not support my main effects hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 12) that Japanese will report more environmental behaviors than Americans.  For all 
of these energy conservation categories (household, transportation, and activism) Americans 
rather than Japanese were more likely to conserve energy.  It is possible that the questions in the 
questionnaire were more applicable for Americans than Japanese.  It is also possible that there 
are underlying psychological factors that can explain this difference that I found.  In the analyses 
to follow, I tried to identify why I found this particular main effect of Americans conserving 
more energy than Japanese.  
 Environmental attitudes, worldviews, and energy conservation behaviors.  Pro-
environmental attitudes (as measured by the NEP) significantly predicts all categories of energy 
conservation behaviors except for food behaviors. Egalitarianism, individualism, hierarchism, 
and fatalism are orthogonal dimensions (Dake, 1991) (see Figure 9 for mean differences between 
Americans and Japanese) and thus, multiple regressions with all four worldviews to predict the 
behavior scores were performed.  (See Tables 9-15 for summary of regression results).  It 
appears that when all four worldviews are regressed onto the behaviors, egalitarian worldview is 




worldviews.  The Cronbach‟s α-levels presented earlier were low for all four worldviews, and 
especially so for the Japanese, which may explain these surprising and anomolous results.  It 
may be that the scales I implemented may not have been as applicable to one of the populations 
sampled.    
 
Tests of Mediation  
 I have argued based on the findings in Study 1 that egalitarianism mediates pro-
environmental behaviors. Thus, it would be expected that egalitarian worldviews would mediate 
the relationship between culture and total green behavior scores (sum of food, household, 
transportation, and activism). I assessed egalitarianism as a mediator of the effects of culture on 
green behaviors using the four-step method  recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986) for 
testing mediation. As demonstrated previously, culture significantly predicted both 
egalitarianism, β = .72, t = 33.50, p < .001and green behaviors, β = .15, t = 4.99, p < .001, such 
that egalitarian worldviews and green behaviors were both higher for Americans than for 
Japanese. Next, I regressed egalitarianism onto green behavior scores and found that this 
relationship was significant, β = .27, t = 8.99, p < .001, such that greater support of egalitarian 
worldviews was more predictive of more support for green behaviors than less support.  I then 
regressed both culture and egalitarianism onto the total green behavior score.  I find that the 
effect of culture is no longer significant, β = -.08, t = -1.88, ns, while egalitarianism still remains 
a significant predictor, β = .32, t = 7.64, p < .001. Thus, the effect of culture on green behaviors 
was completely mediated by egalitarian worldviews. This is further validated by the significant 
results of the Sobel test, t (1075) = 7.45, p < .001. (See Figure 15)   I do not find any meditation 
effects of egalitarian worldview on policy preferences, but consistent with what I found in Study 




12.71, p <.001).  I also find a moderating effect of NEP (i.e. pro-environmental attitudes) on 
policy preferences (β = 0.47, t = 12.71, p <.001).  These results further support my findings from 
Study 1, that cultural worldviews have a different effect on behaviors than they have on policy 
preferences.   
It is possible that the remaining three worldviews (individualism, hierarchism, and 
fatalism) may also mediate the relationship between culture and overall green behavior score.  I 
assessed all three remaining worldviews as I did for egalitarianism using the same four-step 
method as when I assessed egalitarianism.  I found individualism and hierarchism also mediate 
the effects of culture on green behaviors.  These results seem to suggest that egalitarianism 
appears to be a more significant mediator of green behaviors than individualism (Figure 16).  
 The final series of mediation analyses that I performed was on pro-environmental 
behavioral intentions (measured by Leiserowitz‟s Behavior Index).  As I have already 
demonstrated, culture significantly predicts egalitarianism and pro-environmental behavior 
intentions, β = .11, t = 3.63, p < .001.  This effect was such that egalitarian worldviews and 
support for pro-environmental behaviors were both reported more by Americans than for 
Japanese. Next, I regressed egalitarianism onto behavioral intentions and found this relationship 
to be significant as well, β = .35, t = 12.36, p < .001.  Greater support of egalitarian worldviews 
was more predictive of environmental behavior intentions than less support.  When both culture 
and egalitarianism are regressed onto behavioral intentions I find that culture and egalitarianism 
both still remains significant predictor.  The effect of culture on behavioral intentions was at least 
partially mediated by egalitarian worldviews, t (1075) = 12.96, p < .001. As illustrated in Figure 
17, hierarchical worldviews also mediate the effect of culture on behavioral intentions, t (1075) = 





Energy conservation: Self versus other 
 As my final analysis for Study 3a, I compared responses participants gave for the two 
open-ended questions about energy conservation behaviors, one for the „self‟ and one for the 
„other‟. These responses were coded for 14 different types of conservation behaviors and as 
shown in Table 16 these behaviors were further categorized as either „easy‟ or „hard‟ (or „other‟) 
(S.Z. Attari, Weber, & Krantz, Working Paper).  Table 16 shows that Americans were more 
likely than Japanese to list an easy behavior for themselves (36.9% vs. 26.9%), and less likely to 
list a hard behavior (42.8% vs. 69.1%).  The same was true for the conservation behaviors 
suggested as most effective for others in their country, Americans were again less likely than 
Japanese to list a hard behavior (52.2% vs. 71.6%) and more likely to list an easy behavior 
(28.3% vs. 12.1%).  In comparison to Americans, Japanese were much harder on themselves and 
other Japanese (i.e., Japanese were far more likely to expect hard behaviors of both themselves 
and other Japanese).      
 Table 17 illustrates a 3 x 3 matrix
4
 for each country to test whether responses (easy or 
hard or „other‟) varied between the self and others.  I predicted that Japanese will be more likely 
than Americans to expect and endorse the same type of green behavior („easy‟ vs. „hard‟) of 
themselves as they do for other Japanese (Hypothesis 11). Japanese were more consistent 
between their expectations of themselves and of other Japanese than Americans were for 
themselves and other Americans (48.7% versus 40%, p < .001).  Based on these results, I find 
support for my prediction (Hypothesis 11) that Japanese will be more likely than Americans to 
expect and endorse the same type of green behavior („easy‟ vs. „hard‟) for themselves as they do 
for other Japanese Factors such as perceived social norms may play a significant role in 
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influencing environmental behaviors for Japanese, explaining why behaviors for the self are 
consistent with behaviors expected of others. Furthermore, it is possible that there are strong 
social norms in Japan to engage in the more effortful and challenging types of energy 
conservation behaviors than the easy ones (which would explain the greater number of Japanese 
expecting „hard‟ behaviors of themselves and other Japanese over „easy‟ ones compared to 
Americans).  I predicted that perceived social norms are more strongly correlated to the self-
reported Japanese attitudes and behaviors regarding energy conservation than Americans.  
Americans on the other hand appear to expect different behaviors of others as they do of 
themselves.  It is possible that Americans among whom a greater number seem to think they use 
less energy than other Americans (80.7% of Americans compared to 70.6% of Japanese), believe 
they are already doing enough and expect easier behaviors of themselves while they expect 




 Results from Study 3a are consistent with what I found in Study 1, that egalitarian 
worldviews mediate culture‟s effect on environmental behaviors.  This was true for both 
Leiserowitz‟s environmental behaviors and for the new energy conservation behaviors surveyed 
in Study 3a.  While I find support for the prediction that Japanese will report greater 
psychological connectedness than Americans, a surprising finding is that Americans tend to 
engage in more energy conservation behaviors than Japanese.  This result is the opposite of what 
I predict in Hypothesis 12 and surprising based on the national level data that Japanese use less 




Bank 2010 census, it seemed logical to predict Japanese would be engaging in more household 
energy conservation behaviors than Americans.  The two behaviors that the Japanese were more 
likely to report (bringing their own shopping bags and recycling) are visible behaviors.  In a 
culture such as in Japan with strong social norms and desire to conform to others, it is not 
surprising that behaviors that can be observed by others are more common than those that others 
cannot necessarily see and evaluate.  Given the government campaign to reduce the use of plastic 
bags and to encourage recycling, it would be perceived as shameful not to participate in these 
behaviors.   These findings are further supported by the responses Japanese gave for the open-
ended questions about what they can do and what other Japanese can to do use less energy; that 
is, Japanese were slightly more likely to expect hard behaviors of both themselves and of others, 
while Americans expected different behaviors of the self and other (i.e. easy vs. hard 
respectively). 
 I also found that Americans are more likely than Japanese to engage in transportation-
related energy conservation behaviors.  It is possible that these results can be explained by the 
type of question that we asked about private vehicles.  Americans own considerably more 
passenger vehicles than the Japanese (World Development Indicators, 2010) and thus these 
questions may have been less applicable to the Japanese subjects.  In fact, when asked whether or 
not they owned a personal vehicle, only 57.3% of Japanese participants responded „yes‟ while 
86.3% of American participants responded „yes‟.  This means that 42.7% of the Japanese 
participants that were sampled did not own a vehicle.  I find significant differences between 
Japanese and Americans in use of public transportation, with Japanese relying more on public 
transportation than Americans.  Public transportation is more readily available in Japan than the 




because of the efficiency and reliability of public transport that Japanese do not own as many 
personal vehicles, or that they use public transport more because they do not own vehicles.  It is 
difficult to make any generalizations about transportation related conservation behaviors in the 
United States and Japan based on the responses from this survey because of these other 
confounding factors.     
 There is conflicting evidence about how consistent environmental attitudes are with 
environmental behavior.  Some have found that people‟s environmental attitudes are consistent 
with their actual behaviors (Dunlap et al., 2000; Kates, Parris, & Leiserowitz, 2005; A. 
Leiserowitz, 2006a; Stern & Dietz, 1994) while others have found that they are not (Steger, 
Pierce, Steel, & Lovrich, 1989).  My results indicate that although Japanese are more likely to 
report pro-environmental attitudes and support policy interventions than Americans, they seem to 
engage in fewer actual energy conservation behaviors than Americans.  For Americans but not 
Japanese, I find that their environmental attitudes are relatively consistent with their behaviors.  
My findings lend credence to claims that environmental attitudes are always not consistent with 
actual behaviors, and this may vary by the prevalent social norms in cultures.  In this particular 
example of Japanese culture, it is possible that the attitudes and (intended) behaviors they 
endorse for themselves is consistent with the dominant social norms, but not with individual 
attitudes and actual behaviors.   From the various analyses there is a greater consistency between 
attitudes and behaviors for Americans than for Japanese.  For Japanese, there is less variability in 
the reported attitudes further suggesting that attitudes do not necessarily motivate behaviors 
because their attitudes may reflect what they believe the dominant social norms are.  It could be 
that for Japanese, attitudes are more likely to be consistent with dominant social norms and less 




others.  Since most of the green behaviors we looked at were for the household or things that are 
generally private and not easily monitored, that could be the biggest explanation for why 
Japanese don't report doing them.  They also prefer more stringent external controls and 
regulations, which is further supported by their greater support for environmental policies than 
Americans.  Another possible explanation for these cultural difference is that lifestyles and 
technologies are already much more efficient in Japan in general, such that individual consumers 
may be less conscious of them.  These efficiency targets and technologies are usually controlled 
for at the government and corporate level and the burden does not fall on the individual and the 
household.  In the next two sections, I will present results from Study 3b and Study 3c that 
attempt to shed light on some of these motivational and psychological factors that may explain 
the cultural differences in levels of reported green behaviors.   
  
 







 Study 3b tested my hypothesis that greater psychological connectedness will be reported 
by Japanese than by Americans and this will be related to environmental behaviors (Hypothesis 
10).  For Study 3b, I carried out a series of multiple regressions to see the strength of the 
different categories of predictors (e.g. demographics, attitudes, and connectedness) and their 
relative contribution to the predictive power of the overall model. I also regressed culture and 
connectedness onto separate energy conservation behavior scores (food, household, 
transportation, activism, and total) to examine their relationships and identify any interaction 
effects.  
 
Methods and Materials 
 
 Two variables were added to the energy conservation behavior survey used in Study 3a.  
One of these variables was psychological connectedness, or the perceived psychological distance 
between an individual and events or objects in future.  The other variable measured for how 
important these social relationships (both now and in the future) are to a person. 
 Psychological Connectedness.  I developed the following seven-item question to measure 
psychological connectedness along a five-point scale (1=not at all connected, 5 = completely 
connected) (α = .88):  Please think of your relationship to each of the following.  Rate how 




Americans/non-Japanese] right now, (3) the natural environment right now, (4) Yourself in 25 
years, (5) [Americans/Japanese] in 25 years, (6) [Non-Americans/non-Japanese] in 25 years, (7) 
the natural environment in 25 years.   
 Importance of relationships.  Participants were asked to rate on a five-point scale (1=not 
at all important, 5=extremely important) how important their relationship to each of the 
following were (α = .75): (1) [Americans/Japanese] right now, (2) [Non-Americans/non-
Japanese] right now, (3) the natural environment right now, (4) Yourself in 25 years, (5) 
[Americans/Japanese] in 25 years, (6) [Non-Americans/non-Japanese] in 25 years, (7) the natural 
environment in 25 years.   
Results and Discussion 
 
Independent Samples t-tests 
 Psychological Connectedness.  First I compared the mean connectedness scores between 
Americans and Japanese using independent samples t-tests.  The mean differences between 
Americans and Japanese were significant along all seven connectedness dimensions such that 
Japanese reported greater connectedness than Americans:  other in-group members right now (F 
(2, 1071) = 8.43, t = 11.05, p = .000), other out-group members right now (F (2, 1071) = 3.14, t 
= 3.59, p = .000), the natural environment in the present (F (2, 1071) = 37.92, t = 5.64, p = .000), 
yourself 25 years from now (F (2, 1071)  = 10.14, t = 6.77, p = .000), other in-group members 25 
years from now (F (2, 1071) = 20.24, t = 8.78, p = .000), other out-group members 25 years from 
now (F (2, 1071) = .62, t = 5.18, p = .000), and the natural environment 25 years from now (F (2, 
1071)  = 11.07, t = 5.63, p = .000).  This supports my original claim that Japanese will report 




   
 Importance of relationship to others.   Relationships to others in the present were more 
important to Japanese participants than to American participants: relationship to other in-group 
members right now (F (2, 1071) = .07, t = 4.45, p =.000), relationship to other out-group 
members right now (F (2, 1071) = 1.96, t = 2.91, p < .01), and relationship to the natural (F (2, 
1071) = .10, t = 2.77, p = .01).  Relationships to others (Japanese 25 years from now (F (2, 1071) 
= 3.07, t = 1.96, p < .05) and non-Japanese 25 years from now (F (2, 1071) = .08, t = 2.21, p < 
.05) were also more important for Japanese than American participants.  No significant 
difference was found between Americans and Japanese in their reports of the importance of their 
relationship to the natural environment 25 years from now and of their relationships to their 
future selves 25 years from now.   
 
Multiple regressions 
 Next, I carried out some multiple regressions in order to determine how the statistical 
significance of culture as a predictor changes as other predictors (e.g. demographics, attitudes, 
connectedness) are added to the model.  I performed multiple regressions for each of the five 
dependent variables:  food, household, transportation, activism, and the overall green behaviors.  
Model 1 regressed culture onto these dependent variables and Model 2 regressed culture and 
connectedness items. Model 3 included culture and demographics (i.e. gender, age, education, 
income, occupation, etc).  Model 4 added on attitudinal measures (i.e., NEP, egalitarianism, 
individualism, hierarchism, and fatalism) to Model 3.  Lastly, Model 5 was the full model with 





 In predicting food behaviors, the results of these regressions (see Table 29) show that 
being Japanese is more strongly correlated with these behaviors than being Americans.  Women 
are more likely to participate in food related conservation behaviors than men.  In addition, this 
is more common in individuals that are older, more educated, and earn higher incomes.  Pro-
environmental attitudes (NEP), egalitarianism, and individualism also help predict food related 
behaviors.  In regards to connectedness, I found that the more connected a person is to their 
future self 25 years from now the more likely you are to engage in food related pro-
environmental behaviors.  The more a person values their relationship to the environment now 
and to other in-group members in 25 years, the more likely they are to report this category of 
behaviors.    
 The results of the multiple regression predicting household behaviors can be seen in 
Table 30.  What is most interesting about these results is that in both Models 1 and 3, culture is a 
significant predictor variable.  However, in the full model, the effect of culture is no longer 
significant indicating that in predicting household behaviors the combined effect of a variety of 
individual differences is a more robust predictor than culture alone.  Furthermore, in Model 3 
with just the demographic factors being controlled for, being American was associated with more 
household behaviors while in Model 4, when attitudes are also controlled for, being Japanese 
were more likely than American was suggesting that these worldviews explain some of the 
cultural variation in household behaviors. Other factors that influence household conservation 
behaviors are: higher income, age, egalitarian worldviews, individualistic worldview, feeling 
connected to yourself in 25 years and valuing your relationship to the environment.  Overall, 
while Americans had higher means than Japanese for household behaviors, when attitudes are 




predictor than being American.  Taking into account the absence of a culture effect in Model 5, it 
seems that attitudes and worldviews, along with connectedness are more important predictors 
than culture. This suggests a possible mediation, which will be tested in a later analysis.   
 As shown in Table 31, transportation behaviors are more likely to be reported by 
Americans than Japanese.  In addition, higher income, not being single, more years living in 
one‟s country, being older, and living outside of an urban area are all significantly correlated to 
these behaviors.  Having individualistic worldviews also increases the likelihood that one will 
adopt more pro-environmental behaviors in the transportation domain.  Feeling connected to 
other in-group members right now is the only type of connectedness that is correlated to 
transportation behaviors.   
 Similar findings were observed for activism behaviors (see Table 32).  Being American, 
more educated, earning greater income, and being liberal all correlated to activism. Egalitarian 
and individualistic worldviews are also consistent with these behaviors.  The less fatalistic one is 
the more likely one is to engage in activism behaviors, which could be attributed to the fatalistic 
belief that nothing you do will make a difference. Thus, those who feel more self-efficacious (or 
less fatalistic) are likely to be pro-active and be environmental activists.  The more connected a 
person is to the environment now and 25 years from now and the more they value this particular 
relationship, the more likely they are to participate in environmental activism.  More than any of 
the other green behavior category that I tested, it seems that feeling connected to the natural 
environment is an especially strong motivator of activism. 
   Overall green behaviors are the composite of scores for food, household, transportation 
and activism.  As shown in Table 33 once worldviews and connectedness are taken into account, 




income and are politically liberal tend to be more conscientious about energy conservation.  Pro-
environmental attitudes, egalitarianism, and individualism are all significant predictors of a 
person‟s conservation behaviors.  Furthermore, feeling connected to one‟s future self is an 
important indicator for energy conservation.   
 The more a person values their relationship to the environment the more motivated and 
likely they are to conserve energy.  However, in general, these findings seem to indicate that 
psychological connectedness is not as robust of an indicator as I had predicted.  Based on the R
2 
values in these regressions, connectedness accounts for very little of the variation in these 
behaviors, even though there are some significant relationships.  Cultural worldviews, such as 
egalitarianism, individualism, and hierarchism, appear to account for a greater portion of the 
variation, although even these factors only account for a modest amount of the variance. 
 
Multiple Regressions of Leiserowitz’s Policy Index and Behavior Index 
 In predicting support for environmental policies, using Leiserowitz‟s Policy Index, I find 
that being a Japanese female, earning higher income, and being more liberal are predictive of 
support for environmental policies.  To add to these predictors, egalitarian and hierarchical 
worldviews also correlate to policy preferences along with a general pro-environmental attitude 
(as measured by the NEP).  While the results suggest that the less an important a person views 
his or her relationship to other in-group members, the more likely they are to support policies, 
this effect is only marginally significant.  Valuing one‟s relationship to the environment is 
positively correlated but this effect is also only marginally significant.  When it comes to 
attitudes towards environmental policies connectedness is not an important indicator.  




more variance than connectedness. Please refer to Table 34 for full results of this multiple 
regression. 
 The final multiple regressions were to predict pro-environmental behavioral intentions, as 
measured by Leiserowitz‟s Behavior Index.  Unlike the other categories of behaviors I examined 
earlier (food, household, transportation, activism), these questions do not ask about what 
behaviors a person currently does, but whether or not they intend to do so in the future.  Without 
accounting for any attitudinal measures, being American is a significant predictor of behavioral 
intentions as demonstrated by Model 1.  However, once cultural variables and environmental 
attitudes are added in Model 4, being Japanese is actually a better predictor.  With the addition of 
connectedness items in Model 5, culture is no longer a significant predictor of behavioral 
intentions. As a result of these findings, I will also be looking at possible mediations in later 
analyses.  It seems that being older and liberal is important, as well as believing in more 
egalitarian and hierarchical worldviews.  The less fatalistic one is the more likely one is to 
engage in these green behaviors in the future.  Connectedness to other out-group members now, 
to the environment now, and to the self in 25 years is all positively correlated with pro-
environmental behavioral intentions.  Valuing one‟s relationship to the environment and to other 
in-group members now are positively related to pro-environmental behavior intentions.  Please 
refer to Table 35 for full regression results.  
 
Factor Analysis 
 A factor analysis of the seven items of connectedness was carried out to get a better 
understanding of the relationship between the different categories of connectedness.  The items 




related to the in-group and the second factor was comprised of two items related to the out-
group.  The Anderson-Rubin factors scores from this factor analysis were then used in 
regressions to predict the five energy conservation behavior scores (food, household, 
transportation, activism, total green behaviors) and two Leiserowitz indices (policy and 
behavior).  Japanese have a higher score for in-group connectedness than Americans.  In the case 
of out-group connectedness the reverse is true, with Japanese scoring lower than Americans.  
Thus, Japanese are more connected than Americans are to in-group members, suggesting that 
they may view a greater continuity between in-group members, the environment, and the future, 
resulting in a greater value placed on these relationships.  In contrast, Americans are more 
connected than Japanese to out-group members, possibly revealing that Americans are better 
able to relate to a more general “other” (in this case other Americans) than to their future selves 
or the future environment. 
 In-group connectedness.  Results from all analysis of variance carried out can be found in 
Tables 37-41.  I performed univariate ANOVAs to test for main effects and interaction effects 
between culture and in-group connectedness in predicting my dependent variables.  Results 
indicated that there is a main effect of culture on household behaviors and a significant „In-group 
Connectedness x Culture‟ interaction such that greater in-group connectedness in Japanese is 
correlated with greater reporting of household energy conservation behaviors while less so for 
Americans (See Table 37).  In predicting transportation behaviors, I found that there is a 
significant main effect of culture and of in-group connectedness along with a small, but 
significant interaction effect between the two predictor variables (See Table 38).  The nature of 
this interaction was similar to that found for household behaviors, with greater in-group 




in Japanese than for Americans who reported fewer transportation related energy conservation 
behaviors as levels of in-group connectedness increases.  Similar interaction effects of in-group 
connectedness and culture were found on activism, total green behaviors (i.e. sum of food, 
household, transportation, and activism), and behavioral intentions (Leiserowitz) (shown in 
Table 39, Table 40, & Table 41 respectively). 
 Out-group connectedness. The results of the ANOVAs that I performed, as shown in 
Table 42, indicated that there is a significant main effect of out-group connectedness on activism 
behaviors but not other behaviors and a significant interaction between connectedness and 
culture. Interactions between out-group connectedness and culture were also significant in 
predicting policy preferences (Leiserowitz) (See Table 43) and behavioral intentions 
(Leiserowitz) (See Table 44).  For these three significant interaction effects, the interaction was 
such that greater out-group connectedness is associated with greater reported activism, support 





 The results from Study 3b seem to indicate that connectedness does not affect 
environmental behaviors as strongly as I had predicted.  This could be the result of the 
measurement tools that I used to quantify psychological connectedness, but it could also be that 
despite the recent attention that this concept is getting, the way in which a person construes the 
self in relation to others over time does not play a crucial role in environmental decisions.  




worldviews relied on by Cultural Theorists like Mary Douglas (1970; 1982), Aaron Wildavsky 
(1982), and Karl Dake (1991) to study the social construction of risk and risk perception.  This 
was somewhat surprising since there has been growing criticism over the years about the validity 
of these four broad concepts, that were based on the social and cultural structure of decision 
making, and their capacities to explain individual perceptions on risk (Marris, Langford, & 
O'Riordan, 1998). In addition, both connectedness to the self in the near and distant future 
(Bartels & Rips, 2009) and connectedness to nature (Mayer & McPherson Frantz, 2004) has been 
garnering a great deal of attention in both the judgment and decision making literature as well as 
the environmental psychology literature.  While there could be a problem with the items I used to 
measure psychological connectedness, it is also equally possible that people‟s perceptions about 
time and how connected they are to future events is not the best indicator of how people actually 
behave.  It may be that general attitudes and worldviews (as demonstrated by the mediation 
results) along with perceived social norms (as demonstrated by the open-ended results) are more 
important drivers of environmental decisions.  I find partial support for Hypothesis 10, in that 
Japanese were more psychologically connected than Americans; however, I do not find support 
for my prediction that this difference in psychological connectedness will mediate the effect of 
culture on environmental behaviors.  In Study 3c, I use intertemporal discounting rates to further 
test whether or not this idea that cultural differences in temporal orientations are influencing 







 In Study 3c, I focus my analysis on intertemporal choice and discounting for 
environmental and financial scenarios.  An individual‟s temporal orientation, or how separate or 
continuous a person perceives people, objects, and events are over time, may be correlated in 
some way to intertemporal discounting rates (i.e. discounting of future gains or losses) (Pronin et 
al., 2007).  Studies have found that culture influences how likely a person is to discount future 
financial gains and losses (Bontempo et al., 1997) . For example, Westerners tend to discount 
delayed monetary losses and tend to be more impulsive in their decisions compared to Easterners 
(Takahashi et al., 2009) Since both connectedness and discounting rates have a temporal 
component to them and cultures have been found to embrace different views on time (Bartels & 
Rips, 2009), Study 3c will focus attention on these two factors to study their individual and 
interactive effects on environmental decisions, such as policy preferences and energy 
conservation behaviors.  Since I find support in Study 3b for part of my hypothesis that greater 
psychological connectedness will be reported by Japanese than by Americans and this will be 
correlated to environmental behaviors, I test the other part of my hypothesis that Japanese will 
engage in less temporal discounting, both in the environmental and financial domains, than 
Americans (Hypothesis 12).  I proposed that psychological connectedness will be inversely 
proportional to discounting of future environmental (and financial) outcomes and will mediate 
the effect of culture on discounting (Hypothesis 12).  In Study 3c, I also test whether the effect of 
the interaction of culture and psychological connectedness on environmental behaviors will be 




   
Methods and Materials 
 
 After participants completed the first part of Study 3, each participant was asked to read 
and answer questions about four hypothetical scenarios and make a series of choices between 
immediate and future outcomes.   All participants responded to two environmental scenarios 
(gain, loss) and two financial scenarios (gain/loss) in counterbalanced orders.  After each 
scenario, participants had to answer ten binary choice questions using a titration method.  For 
example, they were asked to choose between winning $250 immediately or $410 one year in the 
future (or $390, or $370, etc.).  These scenarios were developed by Hardisty and Weber (2009).   
Dependent Measures 
 Improved Air Quality (Gain).  The following scenario was used in the air quality 
improvement question:  
 “Imagine the current air quality (measured by number and size of particulates) in your 
area is neither particularly good, nor particularly bad, and the local county government is 
considering a temporary change to its emissions policy, to study the effects of air quality on 
human health and local plants and wildlife.  The polluting output of nearby factories and power 
plants will be reduced, but these factories and power plants will be compensated so that they do 
not incur any additional loss during the test period.  
 The test will lead to an immediate, noticeable improvement in air quality over a period of 
4 weeks, during which the air will smell surprisingly fresh and clean.  Afterward, the air quality 
will return to its former level.  However, the government is also considering carrying out the test 
ten years from now, for a different length of time. 
 We are not interested in how you feel about the way the county government is studying 
air quality or what they might learn.  What we are interested in is your preferences between 
options of having noticeably improved air quality for a period of 28 days starting now, or having a 
potentially shorter or longer period of noticeably improved air quality that would start ten years 
from now.  
 Please choose the option that you prefer in each pair.  Make sure you provide an answer 





 Worsening Air Quality (Loss).  The following scenario was used in the worsening air 
quality scenario: 
 “Imagine the current air quality (measured by number and size of particulates) in your 
area is neither particularly good, nor particularly bad, and the local county government is 
considering a temporary change to its emissions policy, to study the effects of air quality on 
human health and local plants and wildlife.  The polluting output of nearby factories and power 
plants will be reduced, but these factories and power plants will be compensated so that they do 
not incur any additional loss during the test period.   
 The test will lead to an immediate, noticeable worsening in air quality over a period of 4 
weeks, during which the air will smell polluted and dirty.  Afterward, the air quality will return to 
its former level.  However, the government is also considering carrying out the test ten years from 
now, for a different length of time. 
 We are not interested in how you feel about the way the county government is studying 
air quality or what they might learn.  What we are interested in is your preferences between 
options of having noticeably worse air quality for a period of 28 days starting now, or having a 
potentially shorter or longer period of noticeably worse air quality that would start ten years from 
now.  
 Please choose the option that you prefer in each pair.  Make sure you provide an answer 
for all ten pairs.” 
  
 Monetary Loss.  The following scenario was used in the monetary gain scenario: 
 “Imagine you just got a speeding ticket for $250, which you must pay immediately.  
However, the city court is giving you the option of paying a different amount instead, one year 
from now.  Please choose the option that you prefer in each pair.  Make sure you provide an 
answer for all ten pairs.” 
 
 Monetary Gain.  The following scenario was used in the monetary loss scenario: 
 “Imagine you just won a lottery, worth $250, which will be paid to you immediately.  
However, the lottery commission is giving you the option of receiving a different amount, paid to 
you one year from now.  Please choose the option that you prefer in each pair.  Make sure you 




 Discounting scores were calculated using the hyperbolic discounting formula V = 
A/(1+kD) where V is the present value, A the future amount, D is the temporal delay, and k is the 




discounting.  I performed independent samples t-tests of the mean discount rates for the four 
scenarios between Americans and Japanese.  Japanese are more likely to discount future 
environmental gains and financial gains than Americans, t (1073) = 4.46, p <.001 and t (1073) = 
-3.70, p < .001, respectively.   No significant differences were found between Americans and 
Japanese in discount rates for the negative environmental scenario, (i.e. worsening air quality 
scenario), t (1073) = -1.61, ns. Americans were more likely to discount future financial losses 
than Japanese, t (1073) = 11.71, p < .001.  (See Figures 19 & 20)  I find that the direction of my 
results, that gains are discounted more than losses, are consistent with the findings that were 
reported by Hardisty and Weber (2009).  In general Americans discount losses more than 
Japanese and Japanese discount gains more than Americans.  Results from Study 3c show a 
significant difference between discounting rates for environmental gains (M = 0.06, SD = .06) 
and financial gains (M = 0.20, SD = 0.12) such that financial gains are generally discounted more 
than environmental gains, t (1074) = -37.59, p < .001.  While I also find a domain effect in the 
opposite directions in the discounting of losses (financial losses, M = 0.02, SD = 0.07 vs.  
environmental losses, M = 0.04, SD = 0.05), t (1074) = 7.74, p < .001, the effect size is not as 
large as it is for discounting of gains.  One possible mechanism to explain these findings is that 
Japanese have a greater present bias than Americans and prefer both gains and losses more 
immediately.         
  Discount rates for financial gains significantly predicted food behaviors (β = .09, t = 
2.80, p < .01) such that greater discounting of future financial gains was correlated with greater 
reported food related energy conservation behaviors.  More transportation behaviors (β = -.07, t 
= -2.39), p < .05) were reported as future financial gains were discounted less while greater 




increased ( β = .18, t = 5.97, p < .001).  For financial losses, the only significant effect I found 
was that greater discount rates predicted greater reported activism behaviors (β = .09, t = 2.95, p 
< .01).  While I found no significant effect of discount rates for environmental gains on 
behaviors, less discounting of future environmental losses (i.e., worsening air quality) was 
predictive of greater support for environmental policies (β = -.09, t = -2.94, p < .01).     
The next step in my analysis was to test my prediction that discounting will mediate 
culture‟s effect on environmental behaviors (Hypothesis 12). Thus, I explored the possibility of 
conducting mediation analyses using the discounting rates for environmental gains and losses 
and financial gains and losses.  I carried out a series of regressions to test the relationship 
between the independent variable (i.e. culture) and the possible mediation variables (i.e. 
discounting rates).  Using Baron and Kenny‟s (1986) four-step mediation analysis, I find no 
significant z-scores after performing the Sobel test for each predicted mediation relationship.  
Based on my results, I do not find support for my hypothesis that discounting rates will mediate 
culture‟s effect on environmental behaviors.  While I find some relationships, these results are 
difficult to interpret.  I expected to find that greater discounting is correlated with fewer 
environmental behaviors; however, I find no systematic pattern that would help me to interpret 
the role that discounting rates play in environmental policy preferences and behaviors.  This 
absence of a systematic pattern in these findings is also why I find no mediation effects.     
 Since psychological connectedness and discount rates have to do with temporal 
orientations, the last set of analyses I conducted for Study 3c was to find out the correlations 
between connectedness and discount rates. In-groups connectedness was negatively correlated 
with discounting of future environmental and financial losses, but positively correlated with 




future financial gains.  Please refer to Table 45-47 for correlation matrices with connectedness 
and discounting.  The more connected one feels to other in-group members, the less likely one is 
to discount future losses.  Greater discounting of future environmental gains was positively 
correlated with in-group and out-group connectedness.  While these results cannot account for 
the differences between Japanese and Americans in discount rates, there is some evidence to 
warrant a closer look at how psychological connectedness might affect environmental and 




 In Study 3c, I find some support that discounting rates are affected by an individual‟s 
temporal orientation or views about time (e.g. psychological connectedness) and that this 
relationship can vary by culture.  I find evidence to show that gains are discounted more than 
losses, regardless of domain, consistent with what Hardisty and Weber (2009) also found.  I did 
not expect to find any domain differences between financial and environmental domains since no 
effect was found by Hardisty and Weber (2009), but my results show that financial gains are 
discounting more than environmental gains, and environmental losses are discounted more than 
financial losses.  It is worth exploring in future studies what other factors could be contributing 
to these inconsistent findings about a domain effect (e.g. reliability of the scenarios used to 
measure discounting rates).   
 I also find that culture influences discounting rates in both financial and environmental 
scenarios.  In my study, I find that Japanese were more likely than Americans to discount future 




that Americans will have higher discounting scores than Japanese (Hypothesis 12).  In contrast, 
Americans were more likely than Japanese to discount future losses in the financial domain, 
which only partially supports my predictions in Hypothesis 12.  No significant difference was 
found between Americans and Japanese in their rate of discounting of future financial gains.    It 
could be that for Japanese, following the social norms that are presently being endorsed by their 
culture and their current peer groups (such as the importance of embracing a green lifestyle) is a 
more salient motivator of their behavioral intentions than events in the future, such as air quality 
improvements.  Thus, in making certain types of decisions, Japanese may have a greater present 
bias and be more focused on the immediate gains rather than greater future gains while the 
opposite may be true for Americans.  I do not find support for Hypothesis 12a, which predicted 
that greater psychological connectedness will be correlated to smaller discounting rates.  Lastly, I 
do not find support for my prediction that psychological connectedness will be inversely 







 The threat of change of any sort can create overwhelming feelings of uncertainty and 
fear. In his acceptance speech for the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize, Al Gore said of the uncertain 
future of our planet, “The way ahead is difficult.  The outer boundary of what we currently 
believe is feasible is still far short of what we actually must do.  Moreover, between here and 
there, across the unknown, falls the shadow.”  Climate change is one very amorphous and 
troubling type of change and challenge that we are faced with.  Van den Bos et al. (2005 ) argued 
that people have an instinctive and fundamental need to feel certain about their world and their 
place within in.  Furthermore, it is assumed that uncertainty leads to an overwhelming negative 
sentiment and an experience of threat.  In order to eliminate this tension and discomfort due to 
uncertainty, people have developed ways to cope.  By nature, the topic of climate change elicits 
feelings of uncertainty (Arndt, Greenberg, & Cook, 2002; Hart, Shaver, & Goldenberg, 2005). 
Cognitive biases, positive illusions, egocentrism, a tendency to discount the future and a lack of 
motivation to invest in prevention (Bazerman, 2006) are some cognitive explanations for why 
society has failed to address climate change.  In the face of such uncertainty, individuals may 
turn to dominant social norms and ideologies when forming attitudes and preferences about 
environmental behaviors or policies.  The results from my dissertation find support for the role of 
cultural worldviews in these types of decisions.   
 Overall, I find some results that were expected and others that were rather surprising.  For 
example, I find support for my predictions about the role of cultural worldviews in influencing 




psychological connectedness, were not as I had predicted because they did not affect 
environmental policy preferences and behaviors above and beyond the effects of cultural 
worldviews.  This was surprising considering the controversy surrounding the unreliability of 
these worldviews (i.e., egalitarianism, fatalism, hierarchism, and individualism) (Boholm, 1996; 
Marris et al., 1998; Sjöberg, 1998b) and my findings provide some validation about their 
application in the study of environmental decision making.  In addition, I expected not to find, 
but did find, domain differences between financial and environmental decisions. 
 
Summary of Results 
  
 Results from Study 1 using Anthony Leiserowitz‟s dataset demonstrate a link between 
cultures and environmental decision making.  The effect of egalitarian worldview on 
environmental policy preferences is different from its effects on intentions for pro-environmental 
behaviors.  In comparing policy preferences between Anglo and Latin countries, egalitarianism 
did not interact with  culture to effect policy preferences while it served as a partial mediator 
between culture and intentions for pro-environmental behaviors (as illustrated in Figure 2).   
 In Study 2, I find that whether or not individuals see themselves as independent or not 
from others (i.e. independent self-construal) does not significantly affect their environmental 
behaviors (as measured by Leiserowitz Behavior Index).  This disconfirms my general prediction 
that how a person construes themselves in relation to others and to the environment will 
influence the types of environmental decisions they make.  I do not find support for my 




the future than independent self-construal (Hypotheses 7 & 8).  My results also do not support 
Hypothesis 9, that interdependent self-construal will be correlated to pro-environmental 
behaviors while independent self-construal will not.  Thus, in Study 3, I use a measure of 
psychological connectedness to further test these hypotheses about culture‟s effect on 
environmental decisions in a cross-cultural setting.   
 In Studies 3a and 3b, I find not only country differences in energy conservation behaviors 
and attitudes, but also country differences in psychological connectedness.  I find that Japanese 
are in general more connected than Americans, but that this connectedness is not what motivates 
their environmental behaviors; thus, I find my results support only half of Hypothesis 10 and 
disconfirm the other half. As in Study 1, I find that the role of worldviews such as egalitarianism 
is different according to the context.  Consistent with my findings from Study 1, I find that in 
Study 3a, egalitarian worldviews mediate culture‟s effect on behavioral intentions, but moderate 
culture‟s effect on policy preferences.  I also find that individualistic and hierarchical worldviews 
mediate culture‟s effect on behaviors such that greater support for these values predicts greater 
support for green behaviors.  I do not find any mediating effects in predicting policy preferences, 
suggesting that policy preferences and decisions are constructed by other factors not limited to 
worldviews.  Study 1 provides some support for this interpretation of cross-cultural differences 
in policy preferences.  Policy preferences and decisions are probably much more dependent on 
the existing political climate of each country and the types of issues and social structures that are 
currently prevalent.   
 I find support in Study 3b for my prediction that Japanese will report greater 
psychological connectedness than Americans (Hypothesis 10).  It is possible that this effect (a 




holistic nature of Japanese culture (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  Japanese indicated that their 
relationships to other Japanese and to other non-Japanese presently and 25 years from now were 
more important to them than Americans reported about other Americans.  Furthermore, when 
asked to rate the importance of these relationships, Japanese participants valued their 
relationships to others (both now and in the future) and to the present environment more than 
Americans.  This is consistent with what others have found about the importance of maintaining 
harmonious relationships and supporting group goals in collectivist societies like Japan and less 
so in individualistic countries like the United States. 
In addition, I find that Americans and Japanese differ in what energy conservation 
behaviors they expect of themselves and of others.  Japanese expected similar things of 
themselves and of others in response to the question about the single most effective behavior to 
conserve energy.   Japanese were also more likely to expect hard behaviors of themselves and of 
others.  Some scholars have suggested that what individuals report that other members of their 
society should be doing, is a reflection of the societal norms that the individual perceives (Heine 
et al., 2008).  Thus, the more similar the behaviors they suggest for themselves are to what they 
suggest for others, the more likely it is that perceived social norms are influencing their attitudes 
and behaviors.  On the other hand, if the reported behaviors for the self are different from that for 
others, it suggests that individuals are not strongly influenced by external forces such as social 
norms.   
 As Study 1 and Study 2 already did, Study 3 contributes more findings to support the idea 
that cross-cultural differences in environmental decisions can be explained in part by cultural 
attitudes and motivational factors, such as how connected one feels to others, the environment, 




suggest that cultural differences in discounting rates, such as for financial losses, may be 
correlated to certain green behaviors; however, I do not find support for my hypothesis (12a) that 
Americans will discount future gains and losses more than Japanese. While I find some support 
that the extent to which people discount future gains or losses influences the way that they 
evaluate environmental policies and behaviors, I find no systematic pattern in my results that can 




  Different psychological and cultural determinants influence environmental (and other 
types, such as financial) behaviors.  While a lot is understood about the role of culture in social 
dilemmas, little is known about how cultural differences manifest in intertemporal choices.  
Looking at the domain of environmental decisions allows for a real-world context to study how 
cultural attitudes and norms influence decisions over long and uncertain temporal horizons.  The 
literature on cross-cultural differences in intertemporal decision making is sparse and little is 
known about how similar or different cultures are in how they make intertemporal choices, and 
whether cultural effects vary by domain.  I attempted to contribute to this research area by 
applying constructs used in both cross-cultural and intertemporal choice studies to the 
environmental domain.  Specifically, I tested cultural worldviews (Study 1), independent and 
interdependent self-construals (Study 2), Schwartz value orientations (Study 2), psychological 
connectedness (Study 3b) and discounting behaviors (Study 3c).  I found that some of these 
constructs are more useful than others when studying environmental decisions.  I found that there 




worldviews and other psychosocial factors on these attitudes and behaviors vary by culture and 
domain. 
    In addition to demonstrating the broader conceptual theory that there are cross-cultural 
differences in environmental decisions, there are also a number of other theoretical implications 
of the findings in the three studies that I presented in this dissertation.  In Study 1, by 
demonstrating that cultural worldviews have a different effect on policy preferences than on 
behavioral intentions, I found results in support of the Cultural Theory of Risk (Dake, 1992; 
Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Thompson et al., 1990).  While this school of thought has received 
criticism over the years for being vague and unreliable (Boholm, 1996; Marris et al., 1998; 
Sjöberg, 1998a), I find that the constructs from Cultural Theory (i.e., egalitarianism, 
individualism, fatalism, and hierarchism) are in fact useful in studying environmental decisions.  
 In Study 2, I find that some of the constructs that cross-cultural psychologists employ in 
their studies were not as robust as I had predicted (i.e., independent and interdependent self-
construal, Schwartz Value Orientations).  As a result, I developed my own measure for 
psychological connectedness as an attempt to explain some of the variation in environmental 
decisions (i.e., policy preferences, behavioral intentions, temporal discounting) observed across 
cultures.   
 In Study 3a, I applied a methodology used by Heine and colleagues (2008; 2002b) to 
study culture and social norms.  With two open-ended questions about energy-conservation, I 
asked participants what they believed they should do and what they believe others should do.  
Based on how congruent the two responses were, I can infer whether personal beliefs or 
perceived social norms motivate respondents‟ behaviors.  If the responses they gave for 




to be the dominant social norm for a situation of that nature (i.e. energy conservation) is 
motivating what they think they should do.  If the actions they should engage in versus what 
others should engage in are inconsistent with one another, then this discrepancy is an indication 
that factors other than perceived social norms may be shaping their attitudes about energy 
conservation behaviors. 
 Psychological connectedness has received attention in its possible role in intertemporal 
decision making (Day & Bartels, 2008; Mayer & McPherson, 2004).  I predicted that perceived 
connectedness to others and nature over time will affect intertemporal decisions, specifically 
decisions about environmental policies and behaviors.  My results from Study 3b suggest that at 
least in the context of environmental decisions, psychological connectedness does not play as big 
of a role as the literature may suggest.  While similarities have been found between 
environmental and financial decisions (e.g. discounting) (Hardisty & Weber, 2009), my results 
found differences in discounting between these two domains.  Other methods and measures for 
temporal orientation and connectedness need to be developed to better understand the role and 
culture of time in intertemporal decisions.   
 Taken together, my findings suggest that in addition to the larger sociological structures 
and norms that contribute to cross-cultural variation in the types of decisions that I studied, other 
underlying psychological processes (such as connectedness, which I tested in Study 3b) explain 
parts of the variation seen both within and across cultures.  Bridging the gap between cross-
cultural and environmental psychology can at least provide some insight into factors that account 
for differences in environmental behaviors and policies. However, these theories and 
explanations are not sufficient in studying the processes underlying environmental decisions.  




Furthermore, my studies illuminated the need to investigate whether or not the effects I found are 
specific to the domain of environmental decisions, or can be applied to other decision contexts 
such as financial or health decisions.  Prior research on decision making have revealed that some 
attitudes about  risks and decision making are domain specific (Weber et al., 2002), it is also 




 Researchers have explored topics on psychological processes related to climate change 
ranging from public attitudes concerning climate change across nations (Jamieson, 2006; 
Krosnick, Holbrook, Lowe, & Visser, 2006; Leiserowitz et al., 2006; Lorenzoni et al., 2006; 
Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006) to how climate risk is perceived and analyzed by individuals 
(Baron, 2006; Bazerman, 2006; Sunstein, 2006; Viscusi & Zeckhauser, 2006; Weber, 2006). 
Understanding the public‟s perceptions of environmental and other types of risk is needed in 
order to find effective ways to communicate climate information and mitigation strategies.  For 
example, in addition to scientific and technical descriptions of danger, a variety of psychological 
and social factors can influence the public‟s perception of risk such as personal experience, 
affect and emotion, imagery, trust, values, and worldviews (Slovic, 2000).  The importance of 
public opinion in shaping political, economic, and social action and policymaking cannot be 
overlooked.  In thinking about the influence individual or cultural differences may have on 
climate risk perception and policy preferences, it is important to consider how the different sets 
of expectations and motivations that people bring to the table may influence how they evaluate 




 The way Americans understand and react to climate issues is just one facet of a very 
complex problem.  Since climate change is something that affects all nations and cultures, each 
group may have their own unique set of attitudes and behaviors in response to this type of threat.  
Evidence in support of this line of reasoning was found in the studies I presented in this 
dissertation.  Attitudes and worldviews either amplify or dampen cultural differences in policy 
preferences and behaviors.  These psychological factors may not necessarily be unique to 
environmental decisions and may be applicable to other decision domains such as financial or 
health domains that may also be affected by a person‟s worldviews and temporal orientations.  
Furthermore, the different effect that a particular worldview can have on policy preferences and 
behavioral intentions indicates that in discussing these types of issues, it is important to 
differentiate the specific context that is being discussed as people‟s attitudes and policy 
preferences are not always consistent with their actual behaviors.  Public perceptions of and 
responses to climate change are influenced by both psychological and socio-cultural factors. In 
order to ensure more action and understanding of climate change, risk communication strategies 
based solely on scientific information is not sufficient in that it does not account for the biases 
and misinformed opinions that individuals may hold (Bazerman, 2006; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 
2006).  
 The collective results from the three studies that I presented in my dissertation have some 
practical implications.  On an individual level, understanding the social and psychological factors 
influencing household energy consumption will aid those who develop consumer and household 
programs to curb energy use.  As Gardner and Stern (2008) emphasized, part of successful 
climate change mitigation is to reduce the quantity of GHG emissions stemming from 




responses that individuals may have in response to that information (Marx et al., 2007).  There 
are also different cultural scripts that may be guiding environmental behaviors, and these 
differences must also be considered when communicating and framing climate information.  
Identifying additional factors, such as egalitarian worldview, independent self-construal, and 
psychological connectedness that may influence how climate information is processed adds to 
the growing list of factors that can be accounted for when developing intervention programs and 
policies.  By looking at the environmental domain, I found some similarities and differences in 
cultural scripts for that domain, such as more stringent expectations of others than for oneself in 
regards to pro-environmental behaviors (Study 3a).  Having a better sense of the dimensions 
along which cultural differences in environmental attitudes and behaviors manifest is useful 
when understanding and adopting methods that have been successful in other countries for 
curbing the negative human impact on the environment.   
 The knowledge that cultural worldviews play an important role in environmental 
decisions can be incorporated in educational and policy programs.  An awareness of the types of 
worldviews and psychological factors that are salient for environmental decisions aids in 
fostering understanding and commitment by private and government institutions to commit to  
reducing GHG emissions and curbing the negative effects that humans have on the environment.  
Understanding the role that culture plays in environmental decisions (as well as other types of 
intertemporal decisions) is helpful in providing successful strategies for multi-cultural decision 
making settings, such as at the G8 conferences.  The impact that developing countries with large 
populations, like China and India, will have on global ecology in the years to come is another 
reason why there need to be ways to study environmental attitudes and behaviors across 




hope is that these types of studies will better inform individuals and encourage households to cut 
back on their energy use and invest in energy-efficient technologies.   
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 
 Some limitations of these studies are the method of data collection that may have lead to 
possible sampling biases; Studies 1 and 2 recruited participants from college campuses and 
Study 3 from an online survey website.  In addition, self-reports of behaviors are not always an 
accurate indicator of what individuals actually do in real-life.  I am only able to speculate about 
the broader implications of these findings.  In addition, there is always a challenge of developing 
survey items that can be translated and applicable in other languages and cultures.  While I put 
great care into the translation process to avoid any ambiguous or inapplicable questions, it is 
possible that the questions in my surveys were not understood in the same way in both countries.    
 While Study 2 was a good starting point in exploring the applicability of some of the 
constructs used by cross-cultural psychologists in the study of environmental attitudes and 
behaviors, it is difficult to make any strong conclusions based on these results.  One of the 
shortcomings of these measures of cultural values and orientations is that it cannot be used to 
study within-population variations in attitudes and behaviors and can only be useful when 
comparing large samples across populations.  One important finding that adds to what I found in 
Study 1 is that independent self-construal and interdependent self-construal have different effects 
on environmental decisions.  These dimensions are orthogonal.  More significant in influencing 
environmental decisions (at least policy preferences) was the degree to which one views oneself 




belongingness to the group.   
 Another weakness of both Study 1 and Study 2 is that the dependent measures used to 
capture policy preferences and behavioral intentions are very general.  Based on the findings 
from Study 1 and Study 2, Study 3 aimed to address some of these weaknesses by looking at 
more specific green behaviors and asked about whether or not participants actually engage in 
some of these pro-environmental behaviors rather than asking how much they intend to engage 






Table 1. Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 (Study 1):  Egalitarians will be supportive of environmental behaviors. 
Hypothesis 2 (Study 1):  Hierarchists and individualists will be supportive of environmental policies. 
Hypothesis 3 (Study 1):  More Latin-Americans will be egalitarians than Anglo-Saxons. 
Hypothesis 4 (Study 1):  More Anglo-Saxons will be individualists than Latin-Americans. 
Hypothesis 5 (Study 1):  Egalitarianism will mediate the effect of culture on pro-environmental behaviors, such that 
Latin-Americans are more egalitarian and more willing to engage in green behaviors than Anglo-Saxons. 
Hypothesis 6 (Study 1):  Individualism will mediate the effect of culture on policy preferences, such that Anglo-
Saxons will be more individualistic and less supportive of policy preferences than Latin-Americans. 
Hypothesis 7 (Study 2):  Interdependent self-construal leads to greater long-term orientation and awareness of future 
events. 
Hypothesis 8 (Study 2):  Independent self-construal leads to a focus on the present and on events taking place in the 
near future. 
Hypothesis 9 (Study 2):  Interdependent self-construal is associated with greater support for pro-environmental 
policies and behaviors, but independent self-construal will not. 
Hypothesis 10 (Study 3b):  There will be greater psychological connectedness (i.e., less psychological distance) 
between the current self and the future (self, other, and environment) in Japanese than in Americans, and this will 
mediate the effect of culture on environmental behaviors. 
Hypothesis 11 (Studies 3a & 3b):  The degree of connectedness to others will result in different expectations for 
what others in the same culture should be doing to mitigate the effects of climate change than what each individual 
actually does. 
Hypothesis 11a:  Environmental behaviors expected of the self will be similar to behaviors expected of 
others in Japan, but not in the United States. 
Hypothesis 12 (Study 3c):  More environmental behaviors and less discounting reported by Japanese than 
Americans. 
Hypothesis 12a:  Psychological connectedness will be inversely proportional to discounting of future 
environmental and financial outcomes and will mediate the effect of culture on discounting. 
 






Table 2. Correlation Matrix for Independent and Dependent Variables (Study 1) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Knowledge About CC --- -0.28*** 0.04 -0.07† -0.25*** -0.19*** -0.08† 0.02 0.06 -0.11** 0.03 
2. Perceived Climate Risk  --- 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.56*** 0.33*** -0.09* -0.12** -0.11** 0.47*** 0.20*** 
3. Self-Efficacy   --- 0.10* 0.09* 0.17*** -0.29*** -0.11** -0.17*** 0.33*** 0.25*** 
4. Trust    --- 0.04 0.11** -0.10** 0.34*** -0.07† 0.12** 0.01 
5. Worry About CC     --- 0.36*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.20*** 0.50*** 0.14*** 
6. Egalitarianism      --- -0.16*** -0.28*** -0.39*** 0.33*** 0.23*** 
7. Fatalism       --- 0.06 0.30*** -0.20*** -0.01 
8. Hierarchism        --- 0.15*** -0.16*** -0.15*** 
9. Individualism         --- -0.20*** -0.14*** 
10. Behavioral Intentions          --- 0.32*** 
11. Policy Preferences                     --- 
Note.  † p < .10; * p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Parameters.  knowledge about climate change (1-8); perceived climate risk (1= very unlikely, 4 = very likely); self-efficacy (1 = strongly agree, 4 = strongly disagree); trust (1 = 
strongly distrust, 4 = strongly trust); worry (1= not at all, 4= a great deal); NEP (1=completely disagree, 7=completely agree); egalitarian, individualism, hierarchism, fatalism 




Table 3.  Summary of multiple regression results for predicting policy preferences (Study 1) 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model  3 Model 4 
  β β β β 
Culture (0=Anglo-Saxon, 1=Latin-American) -0.12** -0.12** -0.30*** -0.29*** 
Age  0.03 -0.04 -0.05 
Gender (1=Male, 2= Female)  0.02 -0.03 -0.05 
Knowledge About CC (1-4)   0.01 0.04 
Perceived Climate Risk (1-4)   0.20*** 0.17*** 
Self-Efficacy (1-4)   0.14*** 0.14*** 
Trust (1-4)   -0.02 0.00 
Worry (1-4)   0.20*** 0.16** 
Egalitarianism (1-4)    0.15*** 
Fatalism (1-4)    0.10* 
Hierarchism (1-4)    -0.06 
Individualism (1-4)       -0.06 
Note.  R2 = 0.01 for Model 1; R2 = 0.02 for Model 2; R2 = 0.13 for Model 3; R2 = 0.17 for Model 4 
* p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Parameters.  knowledge about climate change (1-8); perceived climate risk (1= very unlikely, 4 = very likely); self-efficacy (1 = 
strongly agree, 4 = strongly disagree); trust (1 = strongly distrust, 4 = strongly trust); worry (1= not at all, 4= a great deal); NEP 





Table 4. Summary of multiple regression results for predicting behavioral intentions (Study 1) 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables β β  β 
Culture (0=Anglo-Saxon, 1=Latin American) 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.03 0.03 
Age  0.12** 0.04 0.04 
Gender (1 = Male, 2= Female)  0.06 -0.03 -0.05 
Perceived Climate Risk   0.22*** 0.20*** 
Self-Efficacy   0.25*** 0.22*** 
Trust   0.06
†
 0.09* 
Worry    0.34*** 0.30*** 
Egalitarianism    0.08
†
 
Fatalism    -0.04 
Hierarchism    -0.09* 
Individualism       -0.02 
Note.  R
2 
= 0.08 for Model 1; R
2 
= 0.10 for Model 2; R
2 
= 0.37 for Model 3; R
2 
= 0.39 for Model 4 
† p < .10; * p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Parameters.  knowledge about climate change (1-8); perceived climate risk (1= very unlikely, 4 = very likely); self-
efficacy (1 = strongly agree, 4 = strongly disagree); trust (1 = strongly distrust, 4 = strongly trust); worry (1= not at 
all, 4= a great deal); NEP (1=completely disagree, 7=completely agree); egalitarian, individualism, hierarchism, 
fatalism (1=strongly disagree to 4=strongly agree) 
 









Table 5.  Correlation matrix for dependent and independent variables (Study 2) 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Knowledge About CC --- -0.05 0.08 0.07 -0.23 0.09 -0.33† 0.14 -0.13 -0.03 0.28 0.06 0.12 0.19 
2. Perceived Climate Risk  --- 0.49*** 0.03 0.40** 0.29* -0.21 -0.25† -0.40** 0.36† 0.01 0.15 0.63*** 0.28* 
3. Self-Efficacy   --- 0.07 0.30 0.27† -0.51*** -0.01 -0.33* 0.17 0.10 0.07 0.56*** 0.02 
4. Trust    --- 0.00 -0.03 -0.35* 0.43*** 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.19 0.04 0.27† 
5. Worry     --- 0.29* -0.08 -0.05 -0.25† 0.18 -0.06 0.09 0.34* 0.08 
6. Egalitarian      --- -0.05 -0.09 -0.59*** 0.22 -0.14 0.12 0.33* 0.07 
7. Fatalism       --- -0.13 0.31* -0.32* 0.09 -0.03 -0.30* -0.14 
8. Hierarchism        --- 0.29* 0.01 0.11 0.32* -0.14 0.04 
9. Individualism         --- -0.34* 0.48*** -0.18 -0.44*** -0.09 
10. NEP          --- -0.12 0.13 0.31* 0.19 
11. Independent           --- -0.06 0.06 0.03 
12. Interdependent            --- 0.14 0.09 
13. Behavioral Intentions             --- 0.14 
14. Policy Preferences                           --- 
Note.  † p < .10; * p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001  
Parameters.  gender (1 = male, 2 = female); knowledge about climate change (1-8); perceived climate risk (1= very unlikely, 4 = very likely); self-efficacy (1 = strongly agree, 4 = 
strongly disagree); trust (1 = strongly distrust, 4 = strongly trust) NEP (1=completely disagree, 7=completely agree); egalitarian, individualism, hierarchism, fatalism (1=strongly 
disagree to 4=strongly agree); connectedness (1=not at all connected, 5=completely connected); relationship (1=not at all impt, 5=extremely impt); political views (1=extremely 




Table 6.  Multiple regression for predicting policy preferences (Study 2) 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 






Gender 0.28 0.23 0.29 0.28 
Political views 0.16 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 
Knowledge About CC  0.09 0.01 -0.02 
Perceived Climate Risk  0.37* 0.49* 0.49
†
 





Trust  -0.38* 0.25 0.24 
Worry About CC  0.16 0.13 0.13 
Egalitarian   -0.06 -0.05 
Fatalism   -0.18 -0.22 
Hierarchism   0.19 0.17 
Individualism   0.01 0.00 
NEP   -0.11 -0.13 
Independent    0.05 
Interdependent       0.06 
Note.  R2 = 0.01 for Model 1; R2 = 0.02 for Model 2; R2 = 0.13 for Model 3; R2= 0.17 for Model 4 = 0.04 
† p < .10; * p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Parameters.  gender (1 = male, 2 = female); knowledge about climate change (1-8); perceived climate risk (1= very unlikely, 4 = 
very likely); self-efficacy (1 = strongly agree, 4 = strongly disagree); trust (1 = strongly distrust, 4 = strongly trust) NEP 
(1=completely disagree, 7=completely agree); egalitarian, individualism, hierarchism, fatalism (1=strongly disagree to 4=strongly 
agree); connectedness (1=not at all connected, 5=completely connected); relationship (1=not at all impt, 5=extremely impt); 
political views (1=extremely liberal, 7=extremely conservative); independent (1= strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree); 





Table 7.  Multiple regression predicting behavioral intentions (Study 2) 
  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables β β β β 
Age 0.31 0.20 0.23 0.20 
Gender 0.28 0.04 0.09 0.06 
Political views -0.33 -0.30 -0.33 -0.38 
Knowledge About CC  0.18 0.17 0.10 
Perceived Climate Risk  0.41** 0.33 0.31 
Self-efficacy  0.27 0.24 0.17 
Trust  -0.02 -0.04 -0.09 
Egalitarianism   -0.04 0.12 
Fatalism   0.15 0.04 
Hierarchism   0.17 0.12 
Individualism   -0.29 -0.30 
NEP   0.10 0.04 
Independent    0.13 
Interdependent       0.16 
 
Note. R2 = 0.08 for Model 1; R2 = 0.02 for Model 2; R2 = 0.27 for Model 3; R2= 0.17 for Model 4 = 0.02 
**p < .01 
Parameters.  gender (1 = male, 2 = female); knowledge about climate change (1-8); perceived climate risk (1= very unlikely, 4 = 
very likely); self-efficacy (1 = strongly agree, 4 = strongly disagree); trust (1 = strongly distrust, 4 = strongly trust) NEP 
(1=completely disagree, 7=completely agree); egalitarian, individualism, hierarchism, fatalism (1=strongly disagree to 4=strongly 
agree); connectedness (1=not at all connected, 5=completely connected); relationship (1=not at all impt, 5=extremely impt); 
political views (1=extremely liberal, 7=extremely conservative); independent (1= strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree); 







Table 8. Correlation matrix for dependent and independent variables (Study 3) 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Egalitarianism (1-4) --- 0.47*** 0.56*** 0.59*** 0.15*** -0.10*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.25*** 0.28*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.04 
2. Individualism (1-4)  --- 0.62*** 0.63*** -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.09*** 0.00 0.20*** 0.35*** 0.21*** 0.05* -0.33*** 
3. Fatalism (1-4)   --- 0.59*** -0.01 -0.20*** -0.07** -0.01 0.11*** 0.20*** 0.15*** 0.06* -0.22*** 
4. Hierarchism (1-4)    --- -0.17*** -0.12*** 0.06* 0.05 0.21*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.18*** -0.17*** 
5. NEP (1-7)     --- 0.17*** 0.04 0.22*** 0.12*** 0.05 0.15*** 0.03*** 0.42*** 
6. Connectedness (In-Group) (1-
5) 
     
--- 
0.00 0.25*** 0.18*** 0.00 0.09*** 0.24 0.23*** 
7. Connectedness (Out-Group) 
(1-5) 
      
--- 
0.22*** 0.23*** -0.02 0.26*** 0.31*** 0.24*** 
8. Food (0-1)        --- 0.54*** 0.22*** 0.40*** 0.48*** 0.28*** 
9. Household (0-1)         --- 0.36*** 0.48*** 0.52*** 0.18*** 
10. Transportation (0-1)          --- 0.28*** 0.25*** -0.05* 
11. Activism (0-1)           --- 0.55*** 0.19*** 
12. Behavioral Intentions (1-4)            --- 0.40*** 
13. Policy Preferences (1-4)             --- 
Note. *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 
Parameters. NEP (1=completely disagree, 7=completely agree); egalitarian, individualism, hierarchism, fatalism (1=strongly disagree to 4=strongly agree); connectedness (1=not 







Table 9.  Summary of regression analyses for NEP predicting energy conservation behaviors (Study 3a)  
 Food Household Transportation Activism Total Green Behaviors 
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Note.  N = 1074 (except food has N = 1069) 



















Table 10.  Summary of regression analyses for NEP predicting Leiserowitz Indices (Study 3a) 
  Behavior Index Policy Index 
  B SE(B) Β t B SE B β t 
NEP  -0.24 0.02 0.30 10.23*** 0.35 0.02 0.42 15.13*** 
  R
2
 = 0.18 R
2
 = 0.09 
Note. N = 1074 
* p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 
Table 11. Results of multiple regression of worldviews predicting food behaviors (Study 3a) 
Variable B SE(B)  Β t 
Egalitarianism 0.03 0.01  0.17 4.29*** 
Fatalism -0.02 0.01  -0.10 -2.41* 
Hierarchism 0.01 0.01  0.04 0.80 




*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
 
Table 12. Results of multiple regression of worldviews predicting household behaviors (Study 
3a) 
Variable B SE(B) β t 
Egalitarianism 0.04 0.01 0.22 5.81*** 
Fatalism -0.02 0.01 -0.13 -3.21*** 
Hierarchism 0.02 0.01 0.08 1.84*** 




*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 
 
Table 13. Results of multiple regression of worldviews predicting transportation behaviors 
(Study 3a) 
Variable B SE(B) β t 
Egalitarianism 0.05 0.04 0.17 4.68*** 
Fatalism -0.03 0.01 -0.11 -2.68** 
Hierarchism 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.76 









Table 14.  Results of multiple regression of worldviews predicting activism behaviors (Study 3a) 
Variable B SE(B) β t 
Egalitarianism 0.09 0.01 0.33 8.88*** 
Fatalism -0.04 0.01 -0.14 -3.58*** 
Hierarchism 0.04 0.01 0.11 2.71** 







p < .10 *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 
 
Table 15.  Results of multiple regression of worldviews predicting total green behavior (sum of 
food, household, transportation, and activism) (Study 3a) 
Variable B SE(B) β t 
Egalitarianism 0.13 0.02 0.21 7.35*** 
Fatalism -0.06 0.02 -0.15 -3.69*** 
Hierarchism 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.50 










Table 16.  Responses and frequencies for open-ended questions about energy conservation for 
self and others (Study 3a) 
 
 








E Adjust thermostat 4.80% 9.90% 2.70% 5.30% 
E Recycle 2.10% 4.30% 2.10% 3.30% 
E Shut off appliances 13.90% 5.30% 10.00% 1.40% 
E Turn off the lights 12.00% 6.60% 10.50% 1.90% 
E Use energy efficient bulbs 4.10% 0.80% 3.00% 0.20% 
H Change lifestyle 2.00% 2.10% 1.60% 15.40% 
H Conserve energy/electricity 9.60% 38.20% 11.40% 28.10% 
H Drive less/bike/use public transport 11.60% 11.90% 22.10% 19.30% 
H Efficient cars/hybrids 1.10% 10.30% 4.30% 1.60% 
H Energy efficient appliances 3.20% 1.20% 2.00% 0.40% 
H Green energy/solar energy/alternative 
energy 
3.40% 0.20% 4.50% 4.70% 
H Insulate home/weatherize 1.40% 2.10% 1.10% 0.20% 
H Use appliances less 10.50% 3.10% 5.20% 1.90% 
--- Other 20.30% 3.70% 19.20% 14.80% 
Note. E= Easy; H = Hard 
Self: “What is the single most effective thing you can do to reduce your energy consumptions?” 







Table 17.  Number of Respondents choosing Easy vs. Hard vs. Other Energy Reduction Action for Themselves vs. Others in Their 
Country in the USA and in Japan (Study 3a) 
 
    Other USA 
 
    Other Japan 
    Easy Hard  Other Total     Easy Hard Other Total 
Self USA 
Easy 103 85 22 210 
Self Japan 
Easy 24 75 14 113 
Hard 31 121 18 170 Hard 29 226 40 295 
Other 11 32 137 180 Other 0 20 85 105 
Total 145 238 177 560 Total 53 321 139 513 








Table 18.  Means and standard errors for attitudes about climate change and related issues (Study 3a) 
 
Item Japan US χ2 














I believe that climate change is not an urgent problem that humans 





Dealing with the problem of climate change should be given priority 

















I believe that advanced technologies like carbon sequestration are 












Table 19.  Beliefs about impact of climate change (Japan vs. US) (Study 3a) 
  Not at all Not very much Some A lot   
  Japan USA Japan USA Japan USA Japan USA χ2 
If climate change is left unchecked worldwide, how 
much do you think climate change will affect each of 
the following in your country in the next 25 years?                 
 
The types of food we produce. 1.2% 4.1% 8.6% 13.4% 33.1% 13.4% 57.1% 40.8% 34.16*** 
The type of plants and animals that can live here. 2.0% 4.3% 7.0% 12.6% 31.2% 39.2% 60.8% 44.0% 38.78*** 
Rainfall and available water sources. 0.6% 4.1% 8.8% 13.7% 31.8% 37.0% 58.9% 46.4% 27.09*** 
The price of food and other essential goods. 0.4% 4.3% 7.2% 7.5% 30.4% 32.2% 59.1% 56.1% 17.25*** 
The likelihood of natural disasters like droughts or 
floods. 0.6% 4.8% 6.4% 13.9% 30.8% 33.3% 62.2% 48.0% 41.81*** 
Our coastline. 0.6% 4.5% 11.1% 14.4% 34.5% 38.3% 53.8% 42.9% 25.33*** 
People's needs to move their homes to different 
locations. 2.1% 8.5% 24.8% 17.8% 44.3% 40.6% 28.9% 36.3% 28.57*** 














In your view, is climate change a very serious problem, somewhat serious, not too 
serious, or not a problem?     
 
Not a serious problem 1.17% 6.58%  
Not too serious 8.58% 12.81%  
Somewhat serious 45.81% 42.53%  
Very serious problem 44.44% 38.08% 27.41*** 
If our country does not do things differently in the future, do you think that the amount of 
GHG that our country produces will…     
 
Go down 2.73% 3.56%  
Go up 78.56% 68.68%  
Stay the same 18.71% 27.76% 13.51*** 
Do you think climate change will be:      
More harmful to wealthy countries 5.26% 5.34%  
More harmful to poor countries 20.66% 16.01%  
About equally harmful to poor and wealthy countries 30.41% 30.78%  
Both will be affected, but in different ways 43.66% 47.86% 4.23 
On the subject of climate change, is it your impression that among the scientists of the 
world:   
 
Most scientists think the problem is urgent and enough is known to take action 28.65% 41.81%  
Most think the problem is not urgent, and not enough is known yet to take action 34.31% 18.86%  
Views are pretty evenly divided 33.81% 39.32% 37,83*** 
When do you think climate change will substantially harm people in your country?    
People are harmed now 44.05% 31.49%  
In 10 years 17.35% 15.48%  
In 25 years 19.69% 20.82%  
In 50 years 9.75% 10.68%  
In 100 years 5.46% 10.32%  
Never 3.70% 10.68% 38.24*** 
To deal with the problem of climate change, do you think your government is doing…    
Too much 8.97% 17.08%  
Not enough 84.60% 69.40%  
About the right amount 6.43% 13.52% 34.76*** 
Do you think your country does or does not have a responsibility to take steps to deal 
with climate change?   
 
Does have a responsibility 89.47% 83.81%  
Does not have a responsibility 10.53% 16.19% 7.38** 
Do you think that if your country takes steps to deal with the problem of climate change, 
other countries would then be more willing to act, r do you think it wouldn't make much 
difference?   
 
Other countries would be more willing to act 65.69% 61.92%  
It wouldn't make much difference 34.31% 38.08% 1.65 
As you may know, countries from around the world will be meeting in 2010 in Mexico to 
develop a new agreement to take steps against climate change by limiting GHG 
emissions.  If the other countries come to an agreement, do you think your country should 
or should not be willing to commit to limiting its GHG emissions as part of such an 
agreement?   
 
Should be willing 91.03% 87.54%  

















Imagine that at the meeting, the other countries do NOT come to a global agreement on 
taking steps against climate change.  If this happens, do you think your country would 
have a responsibility to take steps against climate change, or would it not have a 
responsibility?   
 
Would have a responsibility 84.80% 82.92%  
Would not have a responsibility 15.20% 17.08% 0.70 
Do you think it will be necessary or will not be necessary to increase the cost of energy, 
to encourage individuals and businesses to conserve more or to use alternative forms of 
energy?   
 
Will be necessary 66.67% 59.07%  
Will not be necessary 33.33% 40.93% 6.61** 
Imagine that taking steps against climate change would increase costs to the average 
person for energy and other products by $30 (or ¥2500) per month? Would you be 
willing or not willing to pay this cost as a part of taking steps against climate change?   
 
Would be willing 59.26% 55.16%  









Table 21.  Correlation matrix with energy conservation behavior categories (food, household, transportation, activism) and 
Leiserowitz's Pro-environmental Behaviors (Behavior Index) (Study 3b) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1.  Food ― 0.54** 0.22** 0.40** 0.32** 0.33** 0.31** .37** 0.41** 0.26** 0.30** 
2.  Household  ― 0.36** 0.48** 0.34** 0.39** 0.41** .43** 0.41** 0.29** 0.23** 
3.  Transportation   ― 0.28** 0.29** 0.21** 0.26** .25** 0.24** 0.17** -0.17** 
4.  Activism    ― 0.30** 0.52** 0.59** .48** 0.33** 0.24** 0.20** 
5.  Buy fuel efficient car     ― 0.40** 0.32** .38** 0.40** 0.30** 0.19** 
6.  Join, donate money to, or volunteer 
with organization working on CC/GW 
     ― 0.66** .62** 0.38** 0.29** 0.31** 
7.  Make your views on CC/GW clear to 
politicians. 
      ― .62** 0.32** 0.29** 0.27** 
8.  Talk to friends and family about how 
to reduce or prevent CC/GW 
       ― 0.53** 0.36** 0.33** 
9.  Make more effort to reduce person 
impact 
        ― 0.46** 0.32** 
10.  Fly less often          ― 0.26** 
11.  Bicycle or use public transportation 
more 
          ― 
Note.  N = 1070 









Table 22.  Correlation matrix with energy conservation behavior categories (food, household, transportation, activism) and 
Leiserowitz's Pro-environmental Behaviors (Behavior Index) for Japan Only (Study 3b) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Food ---- 0.51*** 0.18*** 0.40*** 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.21*** 0.39*** 0.44*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 
2. Household  ---- 0.27*** 0.48*** 0.33*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.41*** 0.39*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 
3. Transportation   ---- 0.19*** 0.35*** 0.27*** 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.18*** 0.17*** -0.12** 
4. Activism    ---- 0.28*** 0.48*** 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.31*** 0.26*** 0.23*** 
5. Buy fuel efficient car     ---- 0.36*** 0.26*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.31*** 0.13** 
6. 
Join, donate money to, or 
volunteer with organization 
working on CC/GW 
     ---- 0.66*** 0.55*** 0.31*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 
7. 
Make your views on 
CC/GW clear to politicians 
      ---- 0.52*** 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 
8. 
Talk to friends and family 
about how to reduce or 
prevent CC/GW 
       ---- 0.52*** 0.36*** 0.31*** 
9. 
Make more effort to reduce 
person impact 
        ---- 0.43*** 0.35*** 
10. Fly less often          ---- 0.28*** 
11. 
Bicycle or use public 
transportation more 
                    ---- 
Note.  N = 513 









Table 23.  Correlation matrix with energy conservation behavior categories (food, household, transportation, activism) and 
Leiserowitz's Pro-environmental Behaviors (Behavior Index) for U.S.A. Only (Study 3b) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Food ---- 0.60*** 0.34*** 0.46*** 0.32*** 0.35*** 0.42*** 0.38*** 0.40*** 0.26*** 0.31*** 
2. Household  ---- 0.39*** 0.44*** 0.34*** 0.38*** 0.4*** 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.27*** 0.30*** 
3. Transportation   ---- 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.08* 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.27*** 0.12** -0.05 
4. Activism    ---- 0.31*** 0.53*** 0.62*** 0.49*** 0.33*** 0.21*** 0.32*** 
5. Buy fuel efficient car     ---- 0.42*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.41*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 
6. 
Join, donate money to, or 
volunteer with 
organization working on 
CC/GW 
     ---- 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.42*** 0.32*** 0.47*** 
7. 
Make your views on 
CC/GW clear to 
politicians 
      ---- 0.66*** 0.40*** 0.31*** 0.46*** 
8. 
Talk to friends and family 
about how to reduce or 
prevent CC/GW 
       ---- 0.53*** 0.35*** 0.42*** 
9. 
Make more effort to 
reduce person impact 
        ---- 0.47*** 0.37*** 
10. Fly less often          ---- 0.31*** 
11. 
Bicycle or use public 
transportation more 
                    ---- 
Note.  N = 558 









Table 24.  Correlation matrix for activism behaviors and Leiserowitz's policy index items (Study 3b) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1.  Have you ever planted a tree? ― 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.17*** -0.04 -0.08* 0.04 
2.  Member of an environmental organization  ― 0.52*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.10*** 0.07* 0.07* 0.12 
3.   Sent a letter to political official about 
environmental or energy issues 
  ― 0.36*** 0.40*** 0.10*** 0.03 -0.01 0.09** 
4.  Do you consider yourself an 
environmentalist? 
   ― 0.40*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 
5.  Donated money to an environmental 
organization 
    ― 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.20*** 
6.  International agreements to reduce emissions 
of GHGs 
     ― 0.34*** 0.28*** 0.38*** 
7.  Increase in fuel taxes       ― 0.70*** 0.47*** 
8.  Restrict or ration energy each household is 
allowed to use 
       ― 0.40*** 
9.  Spend money on campaigns to persuade 
people to cut back on driving. 
        ― 
Note.  N = 1075 
* p < .05.  ** p < .01 *** p < .001 











Table 25.  Correlation matrix for activism behaviors and Leiserowitz's policy index items for Japan Only (Study 3b) 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Have you ever planted a tree? ---- 0.15*** 0.21*** 0.32*** 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.07 
2. Member of an environmental 
organization? 
 ---- 0.61*** 0.27*** 0.26*** -0.02 0.00 0.05 0.08 
3. Sent a letter to political official about 
environmental or energy issues? 
  ---- 0.29*** 0.32*** 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.09* 
4. Do you consider yourself an 
environmentalist? 
   ---- 0.35*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.10* 
5. Donated money to an environmental 
organization? 
    ---- 0.06 0.12** 0.15*** 0.13** 
6. International agreements to reduce 
emissions of GHG 
     ---- 0.47*** 0.42*** 0.31*** 
7. Increase in fuel taxes       ---- 0.57*** 0.37*** 
8. Restrict or ration energy each 
household is allowed to use 
       ---- 0.45*** 
9. Spend money on campaigns to 
persuade people to cut back on 
driving 
                ---- 
Note.  N = 513 
* p < .05.  ** p < .01 *** p < .001 








Table 26.  Correlation matrix for activism behaviors and Leiserowitz's policy index items for U.S.A. Only (Study 3b) 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Have you ever planted a tree? ---- 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.21*** 0.13** 0.07 0.02 0.07 
2. Member of an environmental 
organization? 
 ---- 0.47*** 0.45*** 0.42*** 0.13** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.17*** 
3. Sent a letter to political official about 
environmental or energy issues? 
  ---- 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.12** 0.22*** 0.15*** 0.13** 
4. Do you consider yourself an 
environmentalist? 
   ---- 0.43*** 0.18*** 0.27*** 0.24*** 0.20*** 
5. Donated money to an environmental 
organization? 
    ---- 0.21*** 0.32*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 
6. International agreements to reduce 
emissions of GHG 
     ---- 0.39*** 0.33*** 0.44*** 
7. Increase in fuel taxes       ---- 0.65*** 0.54*** 
8. Restrict or ration energy each household 
is allowed to use 
       ---- 0.40*** 
9. Spend money on campaigns to persuade 
people to cut back on driving 
                ---- 
Note.  N = 562 
* p < .05.  ** p < .01 *** p < .001 









Table 27.  Correlation matrix for U.S.A. with connectedness, NEP, and cultural worldviews (Study 3b) 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Connectedness to In-Group --- -0.11* 0.30*** 0.23*** -0.06 -0.08 -0.01 
2. Connectedness to Out-Group  --- 0.00 0.11** 0.06 -0.11** 0.06 
3. NEP   --- 0.30*** -0.22*** -0.05 -0.19*** 
4. Egalitarian    --- -0.21*** 0.01 -0.20*** 
5. Individualism     --- 0.21*** 0.21*** 
6. Fatalism      --- -0.09 
7. Hierarchism             --- 
Note. N = 513 
* p < .05.  ** p < .01 *** p < .00 
 
 
Table 28.  Correlation matrix for Japan with connectedness, NEP, and cultural worldviews (Study 3b) 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Connectedness to In-Group --- 0.08* 0.06 0.12** 0.11* -0.02 0.14*** 
2. Connectedness to Out-Group  --- 0.06 0.32*** -0.11** 0.00 0.18*** 
3. NEP   --- 0.25*** -0.25*** 0.05 -0.21*** 
4. Egalitarian    --- -0.15*** 0.23*** 0.30*** 
5. Individualism     --- 0.29*** 0.28*** 
6. Fatalism      --- 0.38*** 
7. Hierarchism             --- 
Note. N = 562 








Table 29.  Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Food Behaviors (N = 1074) (Study 3b) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Variables β β β β Β 
Culture (0=Japan; 1=US) -0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.39*** -0.25*** 
Age   0.20*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 
Area of residence    -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Education (0-1)   0.09** 0.10*** 0.08** 
Gender (0=female; 1=male)   -0.17*** -0.10*** -0.14*** 
Homeowner (0=rent; 1=own)   0.00 -0.01 0.01 
Household size   0.08* 0.06* 0.06* 
Income (0-1)   0.12*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 
Marital status    0.02 0.01 0.00 
Numeracy   -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 
Occupation    -0.01 0.01 0.02 
Political views (1-7)   -0.07* -0.03 -0.02 
Years in country   -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 
Egalitarian (1-4)    0.22*** 0.13** 
Individualism (1-4)    0.20*** 0.16*** 
Fatalism (1-4)    -0.06 -0.01 
Hierarchism (1-4)    0.15*** 0.09* 
NEP (1-7)    0.21*** 0.12*** 
Connected environment  0.08   0.05 
Connected environment in 25 years  0.05   0.06 
Connected other Americans/Japanese (1-5)  0.03   0.02 
Connected other Americans/Japanese in 25 years  -0.10   -0.13* 
Connected other non-Americans/non-Japanese   0.05   0.05 
Connected other non-Americans/non-Japanese in 25 years  0.08   0.08 
Connected self in 25 years  0.14**   0.17*** 
Relationship environment  0.23***   0.15 
Relationship environment in 25 years    0.01     -0.04 
Relationship other Americans/Japanese (1-5)  -0.07   -0.09 
Relationship other Americans/Japanese in  25 yrs  0.21***   0.23*** 
Relationship other non-Americans/non-Japanese  0.10   0.08 
Relationship other non-Americans/non-Japanese in 25 years  -0.11   -0.08 
Relationship self in 25 years  -0.18***   -0.15** 
 
Note. R2 = .003 for Model 1 (n.s.); ∆R2 = .17 for Model 2 (p <.001); ∆R2 = .07 for Model 3 (p <.001); ∆R2 = .10 for Model 4 (p <.001); ∆R2 = .10 for Model 5 (p <.001). 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Parameters: Occupation (1= office employee, 2=self-employed businessman, 3=government employee, 4=NGO employee, 5=other); marital status (1=never married, 2=married, 3=separated or 
divorced, 4=widowed); yrs in country (1=less than 1yr, 2=1-5yrs, 3=5-10yrs, 4=more than 10yrs); political views (1=extremely liberal, 7=extremely conservative); area of residence (1=urban, 
2=suburban, 3=rural);NEP (1=completely disagree, 7=completely agree); egalitarian, individualism, hierarchism, fatalism (1=strongly disagree to 4=strongly agree); connectedness (1=not at all 








Table 30.  Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Household Behaviors (N = 1074) (Study 3b)  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Variables β β β β β 
Culture (0=Japan; 1=US) 0.17*** 0.23*** 0.21*** -0.17** -0.02 
Age   0.08* 0.06 0.06 
Area of residence    0.02 0.03 0.03 
Education (0-1)   0.05 0.05 0.02 
Gender (0=female; 1=male)   -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 
Homeowner (0=rent; 1=own)   -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
Household size   0.09** 0.08* 0.07* 
Income (0-1)   0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 
Marital status    0.06 0.05 0.04 
Numeracy   -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 
Occupation    0.01 0.03 0.04 
Political views (1-7)   -0.06* -0.05 -0.03 
Years in country   -0.02 -0.01 0.01 
Egalitarian (1-4)    0.24*** 0.11* 
Individualism (1-4)    0.26*** 0.22*** 
Fatalism (1-4)    -0.12*** -0.05 
Hierarchism (1-4)    0.14*** 0.08 
NEP (1-7)    0.13*** 0.02 
Connected environment  0.12*   0.09* 
Connected environment in 25 years  0.03   0.04 
Connected other Americans/Japanese (1-5)  -0.02   -0.03 
Connected other Americans/Japanese in 25 years  -0.09   -0.11 
Connected other non-Americans/non-Japanese   0.07   0.07 
Connected other non-Americans/non-Japanese in 25 years  0.07   0.05 
Connected self in 25 years  0.10   0.12* 
Relationship environment  0.14**   0.12* 
Relationship environment in 25 years   0.06     0.07 
Relationship other Americans/Japanese (1-5)  0.04   0.01 
Relationship other Americans/Japanese in  25 yrs  0.08   0.07 
Relationship other non-Americans/non-Japanese  0.01   0.00 
Relationship other non-Americans/non-Japanese in 25 years  0.03   0.05 
Relationship self in 25 years  -0.09   -0.08 
Note. R2 = .03 for Model 1; ∆R2 = .17 for Model 2 (p <.001); ∆R2 = .04 for Model 3 (p <.001); ∆R2 = .07 for Model 4 (p <.001); ∆R2 = .10 for Model 5 (ps <.001). 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Parameters: Occupation (1= office employee, 2=self-employed businessman, 3=government employee, 4=NGO employee, 5=other); marital status (1=never married, 2=married, 3=separated or 
divorced, 4=widowed); yrs in country (1=less than 1yr, 2=1-5yrs, 3=5-10yrs, 4=more than 10yrs); political views (1=extremely liberal, 7=extremely conservative); area of residence (1=urban, 
2=suburban, 3=rural);NEP (1=completely disagree, 7=completely agree); egalitarian, individualism, hierarchism, fatalism (1=strongly disagree to 4=strongly agree); connectedness (1=not at all 









Table 31.  Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Transportation Behaviors (N = 1074) (Study 3b) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Variables β β β β β 
Culture (0=Japan; 1=US) 0.37*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.24*** 0.29*** 
Age   0.09** 0.08* 0.07* 
Area of residence    0.08** 0.09** 0.08** 
Education (0-1)   0.03 0.03 0.03 
Gender (0=female; 1=male)   0.01 0.01 0.03 
Homeowner (0=rent; 1=own)   0.03 0.03 0.04 
Household size   0.10*** 0.10** 0.09** 
Income (0-1)   0.10*** 0.10** 0.10*** 
Marital status    0.16*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
Numeracy   0.06* 0.06 0.06* 
Occupation    -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
Political views (1-7)   -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 
Years in country   0.05 0.06* 0.06* 
Egalitarian (1-4)    0.05 0.01 
Individualism (1-4)    0.22*** 0.22*** 
Fatalism (1-4)    -0.09* -0.06 
Hierarchism (1-4)    0.04 0.02 
NEP (1-7)    0.07* 0.04 
Connected environment  0.07   0.04 
Connected environment in 25 years  0.01   -0.01 
Connected other Americans/Japanese (1-5)  0.12**   0.10* 
Connected other Americans/Japanese in 25 years  0.01   0.02 
Connected other non-Americans/non-Japanese   -0.04   -0.03 
Connected other non-Americans/non-Japanese in 25 years  -0.07   -0.08 
Connected self in 25 years  -0.04   -0.02 
Relationship environment  0.03   0.01 
Relationship environment in 25 years   0.03     0.07 
Relationship other Americans/Japanese (1-5)  -0.03   -0.09 
Relationship other Americans/Japanese in  25 yrs  -0.02   -0.02 
Relationship other non-Americans/non-Japanese  0.05   0.08 
Relationship other non-Americans/non-Japanese in 25 years  0.06   0.08 
Relationship self in 25 years  -0.01   -0.02 
Note. R2 = .14 for Model 1; ∆R2 = .03 for Model 2; ∆R2 = .08 for Model 3; ∆R2 = .02 for Model 4; ∆R2 = .02 for Model 5 (ps <.001). 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Parameters: Occupation (1= office employee, 2=self-employed businessman, 3=government employee, 4=NGO employee, 5=other); marital status (1=never married, 2=married, 3=separated or 
divorced, 4=widowed); yrs in country (1=less than 1yr, 2=1-5yrs, 3=5-10yrs, 4=more than 10yrs); political views (1=extremely liberal, 7=extremely conservative); area of residence (1=urban, 
2=suburban, 3=rural);NEP (1=completely disagree, 7=completely agree); egalitarian, individualism, hierarchism, fatalism (1=strongly disagree to 4=strongly agree); connectedness (1=not at all 









Table 32.  Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Activism Behaviors (N = 1074) (Study 3b) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Variables β β β β β 
Culture (0=Japan; 1=US) 0.28*** 0.35*** 0.33*** 0.07 0.19*** 
Age   0.14*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
Area of residence    0.05 0.06* 0.07** 
Education (0-1)   0.11*** 0.11*** 0.08** 
Gender (0=female; 1=male)   0.02 0.03 0.03 
Homeowner (0=rent; 1=own)   -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
Household size   0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
Income (0-1)   0.11*** 0.11*** 0.09** 
Marital status    0.01 0.00 -0.02 
Numeracy   -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 
Occupation    -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 
Political views (1-7)   -0.14*** -0.10** -0.07** 
Years in country   -0.07 -0.06* -0.03 
Egalitarian (1-4)    0.23*** 0.14** 
Individualism (1-4)    0.10* 0.09 
Fatalism (1-4)    -0.14*** -0.10** 
Hierarchism (1-4)    0.16*** 0.12** 
NEP (1-7)    0.14*** 0.03 
Connected environment  0.15***   0.12** 
Connected environment in 25 years  0.12*   0.13** 
Connected other Americans/Japanese (1-5)  -0.02   -0.02 
Connected other Americans/Japanese in 25 years  -0.07   -0.09 
Connected other non-Americans/non-Japanese   0.07   0.07 
Connected other non-Americans/non-Japanese in 25 years  0.11*   0.09* 
Connected self in 25 years  0.01   0.03 
Relationship environment  0.29***   0.24*** 
Relationship environment in 25 years   -0.10     -0.09 
Relationship other Americans/Japanese (1-5)  -0.08   -0.08 
Relationship other Americans/Japanese in  25 yrs  0.05   0.05 
Relationship other non-Americans/non-Japanese  -0.02   -0.05 
Relationship other non-Americans/non-Japanese in 25 years  0.01   0.03 
Relationship self in 25 years  -0.09   -0.07 
Note. R2 = .08 for Model 1; ∆R2 = .18 for Model 2; ∆R2 = .07 for Model 3; ∆R2 = .06 for Model 4; ∆R2 = .10 for Model 5 (ps <.001). 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Parameters: Occupation (1= office employee, 2=self-employed businessman, 3=government employee, 4=NGO employee, 5=other); marital status (1=never married, 2=married, 3=separated or 
divorced, 4=widowed); yrs in country (1=less than 1yr, 2=1-5yrs, 3=5-10yrs, 4=more than 10yrs); political views (1=extremely liberal, 7=extremely conservative); area of residence (1=urban, 
2=suburban, 3=rural);NEP (1=completely disagree, 7=completely agree); egalitarian, individualism, hierarchism, fatalism (1=strongly disagree to 4=strongly agree); connectedness (1=not at all 









Table 33.  Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Total Green Behaviors (Food, Household, 
Transportation, Activism) (N = 1074) (Study 3b) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Variables β β β β Β 
Culture (0=Japan; 1=US) 0.15*** 0.23*** 0.20*** -0.21*** -0.04 
Age   0.14*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
Area of residence    0.02 0.03 0.03 
Education (0-1)   0.06 0.06* 0.03 
Gender (0=female; 1=male)   -0.12*** -0.10*** -0.07 
Homeowner (0=rent; 1=own)   -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
Household size   0.06 0.05 0.04 
Income (0-1)   0.11*** 0.11*** 0.10** 
Marital status    0.06 0.05 0.04 
Numeracy   0.00 0.00 0.00 
Occupation    0.01 0.03 0.04 
Political views (1-7)   -0.08** -0.04 -0.03 
Years in country   -0.01 0.01 0.03 
Egalitarian (1-4)    0.27*** 0.15*** 
Individualism (1-4)    0.283*** 0.24*** 
Fatalism (1-4)    -0.14*** -0.06 
Hierarchism (1-4)    0.12** 0.06 
NEP (1-7)    0.21*** 0.09** 
Connected environment  0.12**   0.08 
Connected environment in 25 years  0.02   0.04 
Connected other Americans/Japanese (1-5)  0.04   0.02 
Connected other Americans/Japanese in 25 years  -0.10   -0.11 
Connected other non-Americans/non-Japanese   0.03   0.03 
Connected other non-Americans/non-Japanese in 25 years  0.06   0.05 
Connected self in 25 years  0.13**   0.15** 
Relationship environment  0.22***   0.16*** 
Relationship environment in 25 years   0.06     0.03 
Relationship other Americans/Japanese (1-5)  -0.01   -0.04 
Relationship other Americans/Japanese in  25 yrs  0.09   0.1 
Relationship other non-Americans/non-Japanese  0.09   0.08 
Relationship other non-Americans/non-Japanese in 25 years  -0.03   -0.01 
Relationship self in 25 years  -0.11*   -0.09 
Note. R2 = .02 for Model 1; ∆R2 = .21 for Model 2; ∆R2 = .06 for Model 3; ∆R2 = .10 for Model 4; ∆R2 = .11 for Model 5 (ps <.001). 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Parameters: Occupation (1= office employee, 2=self-employed businessman, 3=government employee, 4=NGO employee, 5=other); marital status (1=never married, 2=married, 3=separated or 
divorced, 4=widowed); yrs in country (1=less than 1yr, 2=1-5yrs, 3=5-10yrs, 4=more than 10yrs); political views (1=extremely liberal, 7=extremely conservative); area of residence (1=urban, 
2=suburban, 3=rural);NEP (1=completely disagree, 7=completely agree); egalitarian, individualism, hierarchism, fatalism (1=strongly disagree to 4=strongly agree); connectedness (1=not at all 









Table 34.  Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Policy Preferences (Leiserowitz's Policy Index) (N = 
1074) (Study 3b) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Variables β β β β β 
Culture (0=Japan; 1=US) -0.32*** -0.29*** -0.20*** -0.51*** -0.45*** 
Age   0.07* 0.01 0.02 
Area of residence    -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 
Education (0-1)   -0.01 0.02 0.00 
Gender (0=female; 1=male)   0.01 0.05* 0.06* 
Homeowner (0=rent; 1=own)   0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Household size   0.04 0.03 0.03 
Income (0-1)   0.08* 0.09** 0.08** 
Marital status    0.00 0.00 -0.01 
Numeracy   0.06* 0.04 0.05 
Occupation    -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
Political views (1-7)   -0.27*** -0.12*** -0.11*** 
Years in country   -0.08** -0.07** -0.05 
Egalitarian (1-4)    0.37*** 0.31*** 
Individualism (1-4)    0.02 0.01 
Fatalism (1-4)    -0.10** -0.07 
Hierarchism (1-4)    0.11** 0.09** 
NEP (1-7)    0.34*** 0.27*** 
Connected environment  0.05   0.02 
Connected environment in 25 years  0.06   0.07 
Connected other Americans/Japanese (1-5)  0.04   0.03 
Connected other Americans/Japanese in 25 years  -0.01   -0.03 
Connected other non-Americans/non-Japanese   0.08*   0.05 
Connected other non-Americans/non-Japanese in 25 years  -0.02   -0.02 
Connected self in 25 years  -0.03   -0.03 
Relationship environment  0.26***   0.10* 
Relationship environment in 25 years   0.18***     0.06 
Relationship other Americans/Japanese (1-5)  -0.18***   -0.10* 
Relationship other Americans/Japanese in  25 yrs  -0.09   -0.01 
Relationship other non-Americans/non-Japanese  0.09   0.06 
Relationship other non-Americans/non-Japanese in 25 years  -0.02   -0.01 
Relationship self in 25 years  0.00   0.01 
Note. R2 = .10 for Model 1; ∆R2 = .20 for Model 2; ∆R2 = .10 for Model 3; ∆R2 = .20 for Model 4; ∆R2 = .03 for Model 5 (ps <.001). 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Parameters: Occupation (1= office employee, 2=self-employed businessman, 3=government employee, 4=NGO employee, 5=other); marital status (1=never married, 2=married, 3=separated or 
divorced, 4=widowed); yrs in country (1=less than 1yr, 2=1-5yrs, 3=5-10yrs, 4=more than 10yrs); political views (1=extremely liberal, 7=extremely conservative); area of residence (1=urban, 
2=suburban, 3=rural);NEP (1=completely disagree, 7=completely agree); egalitarian, individualism, hierarchism, fatalism (1=strongly disagree to 4=strongly agree); connectedness (1=not at all 








Table 35.  Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Behavioral Intentions (Leiserowitz's Behavior Index) 
(N = 1074) (Study 3b)  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Variables β β β β β 
Culture (0=Japan; 1=US) 0.11*** .18*** 0.16*** -0.26*** -0.10 
Age   0.12*** 0.07* 0.07* 
Area of residence    -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 
Education (0-1)   0.04 0.06* 0.02 
Gender (0=female; 1=male)   -0.07* -0.04 -0.02 
Homeowner (0=rent; 1=own)   -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
Household size   0.07* 0.06 0.05 
Income (0-1)   0.06 0.06 0.04 
Marital status    -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
Numeracy   -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
Occupation    -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 
Political views (1-7)   -0.19*** -0.08** -0.06* 
Years in country   -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.07** 
Egalitarian (1-4)    0.43*** 0.30*** 
Individualism (1-4)    0.11** 0.08 
Fatalism (1-4)    -0.18*** -0.11*** 
Hierarchism (1-4)    0.20*** 0.14*** 
NEP (1-7)    0.26*** 0.12*** 
Connected environment  0.12**   0.10* 
Connected environment in 25 years  0.10*   0.13** 
Connected other Americans/Japanese (1-5)  -0.03   -0.04 
Connected other Americans/Japanese in 25 years  -0.11*   -0.16*** 
Connected other non-Americans/non-Japanese in 25 years  0.01   -0.01 
Connected other non-Americans/on-Japanese   0.12**   0.10** 
Connected self in 25 years  0.12**   0.14*** 
Relationship environment  0.32***   0.23*** 
Relationship environment in 25 years   0.05     -0.01 
Relationship other Americans/Japanese (1-5)  -0.07   -0.03 
Relationship other Americans/Japanese in  25 yrs  0.07   0.11* 
Relationship other non-Americans/non-Japanese  0.05   0.01 
Relationship other non-Americans/non-Japanese in 25 years  0.04   0.04 
Relationship self in 25 years  -0.13**   -0.12** 
Note. R2 = .01 for Model 1; ∆R2 = .31 for Model 2; ∆R2 = .07 for Model 3; ∆R2 = .19 for Model 4; ∆R2 = .14 for Model 5 (ps <.001). 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Parameters: Occupation (1= office employee, 2=self-employed businessman, 3=government employee, 4=NGO employee, 5=other); marital status (1=never married, 2=married, 3=separated or 
divorced, 4=widowed); yrs in country (1=less than 1yr, 2=1-5yrs, 3=5-10yrs, 4=more than 10yrs); political views (1=extremely liberal, 7=extremely conservative); area of residence (1=urban, 
2=suburban, 3=rural);NEP (1=completely disagree, 7=completely agree); egalitarian, individualism, hierarchism, fatalism (1=strongly disagree to 4=strongly agree); connectedness (1=not at all 













Table 37.  ANOVA results for effects of culture and level of in-group connectedness on household energy conservation scores (Study 
3b) 
Source df MS F 
Partial 
η2 
Culture 1 1.69 63.73*** 0.06 
In-Group Connectedness 1 2.03 76.54*** 0.07 
Culture x In-group Connectedness 1 0.44 16.41*** 0.02 









Other Americans/Japanese in 25 years 0.86 0.26 
Yourself in 25 years 0.84 0.14 
The natural environment in 25 years 0.76 0.39 
Other Americans/Japanese right now 0.75 0.11 
The natural environment right now 0.68 0.37 
Other Non-Americans/Non-Japanese right now 0.13 0.91 









Table 38.  ANOVA results for effects of culture and level of in-group connectedness on transportation related energy conservation 
scores (Study 3b) 
Source df MS F 
Partial 
η2 
Culture 1 15.37 189.26*** 0.15 
In-Group Connectedness 1 1.45 17.83*** 0.02 
Culture x In-group Connectedness 1 0.38 4.72* 0.00 




Computed using α = 0.05 
 
Table 39.  ANOVA results for effects of culture and level of in-group connectedness on activism behaviors (Study 3b) 
Source df MS F 
Partial 
η2 
Culture 1 8.57 125.69*** 0.11 
In-Group Connectedness 1 2.84 41.68*** 0.04 
Culture x In-group Connectedness 1 0.39 5.78* 0.01 














Table 40.  ANOVA results for effects of culture and level of in-group connectedness on total green behaviors (food, household, 
transportation, activism) (Study 3b) 
Source df MS F 
Partial 
η2 
Culture 1 12.35 63.70*** 0.06 
In-Group Connectedness 1 21.89 112.89*** 0.10 
Culture x In-group Connectedness 1 2.40 12.36*** 0.01 




Computed using α = 0.05 
 
Table 41.  ANOVA results for effects of culture and level of in-group connectedness on pro-environmental behavioral intentions 
(Leiserowitz Index) (Study 3b) 
Source df MS F 
Partial 
η2 
Culture 1 17.11 40.55*** 0.04 
In-Group Connectedness 1 40.8 96.67*** 0.08 
Culture x In-group Connectedness 1 2.08 4.93* 0.01 

















Table 42.  ANOVA results for effects of culture and level of out-group connectedness on activism behaviors (Study 3b) 
Source df MS F 
Partial 
η2 
Culture 1 7.46 117.56*** 0.1 
Out-Group Connectedness 1 6.86 108.10*** 0.09 
Culture x Out-group 
Connectedness 1 1.32 20.73*** 0.02 




Computed using α = 0.05 
 
 
Table 43.  ANOVA results for effects of culture and level of out-group connectedness on pro-environmental policy preferences 
(Leiserowitz Index) (Study 3b) 
Source df MS F 
Partial 
η2 
Culture 1 46.45 115.41*** 0.1 
Out-Group Connectedness 1 25.08 62.32*** 0.06 
Culture x Out-group 
Connectedness 1 8.21 20.40*** 0.02 















Table 44.  ANOVA results for effects of culture and level of out-group connectedness on pro-environmental behavioral intentions 
(Leiserowitz Index) (Study 3b) 
Source df MS F 
Partial 
η2 
Culture 1 8.62 21.42*** 0.02 
Out-Group Connectedness 1 53.1 131.92*** 0.11 
Culture x Out-group 
Connectedness 1 10.17 25.26*** 0.02 













Table 45.  Correlation Matrix for Connectedness and Discounting Rates (Study 3c) 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. In-group Connectedness ---- 0.00 0.75** 0.11** 0.65** 0.85** 0.86** 0.34** 0.74** 0.05 -0.11** -0.11** 0.18** 
2. Out-group Connectedness 
 
---- 0.08** 0.91** 0.41** 0.15** 0.26** 0.83** 0.42** 0.01 -0.01 0.13** 0.01 
3. Connectedness to Other 
[Americans/Japanese] Now 
  
---- 0.30** 0.53** 0.49** 0.60** 0.26** 0.43** 0.06* -0.10** -0.13** 0.19** 
4. Connectedness to Other [Non-
Americans/Non-Japanese] Now 
   
---- 0.43** 0.25** 0.32** 0.67** 0.37** 0.02 -0.03 0.07* 0.05 
5. Connectedness to Environment 
Now 
    
---- 0.47** 0.52** 0.44** 0.70** 0.04 -0.07* -0.06* 0.15** 
6. Connectedness to Yourself in 25 
Years 
     
---- 0.78** 0.45** 0.64** 0.04 -0.12** -0.06 0.15** 
7. Connectedness to Other 
[Americans/Japanese] in 25 Years 
      
---- 0.57** 0.70** 0.03 -0.06* -0.01 0.13** 
8. Connected to Other [Non-
Americans/Non-Japanese] in 25 
Years 
       
---- 0.59** 0.02 -0.03 0.11** 0.06 
9. Connectedness to Environment in 
25 Years 
        
---- 0.04 -0.11** -0.02 0.10** 
10. Environmental Gain  
         
---- 0.01 0.04 0.16** 
11. Environmental Loss 
          
---- 0.12** -0.06* 
12. Financial Loss 
           
---- -0.05 
13. Financial Gain                         ---- 
Note.  N = 1075 








Table 46.  Correlation Matrix for Connectedness and Discounting Rates for Japan Only (Study 3c) 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. In-group 
Connectedness 
---- -0.11* 0.78*** 0.01 0.64*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.26*** 0.75*** 0.05 -0.15*** -0.15*** 0.17*** 
2. Out-group 
Connectedness 
 ---- 0.02 0.91*** 0.38*** 0.04 0.13** 0.81*** 0.36*** -0.02 0.05 0.06 -0.08† 




  ---- 0.23*** 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.63*** 0.23*** 0.5*** 0.07 -0.12** -0.19*** 0.19*** 




   ---- 0.41*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.62*** 0.32*** 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.03 
5. Connectedness to 
Environment Now 
    ---- 0.49*** 0.53*** 0.43*** 0.69*** 0.04 -0.07 -0.04 0.12** 
6. Connectedness to 
Yourself in 25 Years 
     ---- 0.84*** 0.38*** 0.67*** 0.02 -0.14*** -0.13** 0.12** 
7. Connectedness to 
Other 
[Americans/Japanese] 
in 25 Years 
      ---- 0.48*** 0.73*** 0.01 -0.10* -0.09* 0.10* 
8. Connected to Other 
[Non-
Americans/Non-
Japanese] in 25 Years 
       ---- 0.59*** -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.03 
9. Connectedness to 
Environment in 25 
Years 
        ---- 0.04 -0.11* -0.06 0.09* 
10. Environmental Gain           ---- 0.02 -0.02 0.17*** 
11. Environmental Loss           ---- 0.16*** -0.03 
12. Financial Loss            ---- -0.10* 
13. Financial Gain                         ---- 
Note.  N = 513 








Table 47.  Correlation Matrix for Connectedness and Discounting Rates for U.S.A. Only (Study 3c) 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. In-group Connectedness ---- 0.09* 0.67*** 0.17*** 0.63*** 0.80*** 0.81*** 0.37*** 0.72*** -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.04 
2. Out-group Connectedness  ---- 0.11** 0.92*** 0.43*** 0.25*** 0.38*** 0.86*** 0.47*** 0.01 -0.05 0.19*** 0.04 
3. Connectedness to Other 
[Americans/Japanese] 
Now 
  ---- 0.33*** 0.43*** 0.33*** 0.48*** 0.21*** 0.31*** -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.03 
4. Connectedness to Other 
[Non-Americans/Non-
Japanese] Now 
   ---- 0.42*** 0.30*** 0.39*** 0.70*** 0.39*** 0.01 -0.06 0.15*** 0.05 
5. Connectedness to 
Environment Now 
    ---- 0.41*** 0.45*** 0.41*** 0.68*** -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 0.08 
6. Connectedness to 
Yourself in 25 Years 
     ---- 0.70*** 0.49*** 0.59*** 0.00 -0.07† 0.04 0.06 
7. Connectedness to Other 
[Americans/Japanese] in 
25 Years 
      ---- 0.64*** 0.63*** -0.01 0.00 0.11** 0.01 
8. Connected to Other [Non-
Americans/Non-Japanese] 
in 25 Years 
       ---- 0.58*** 0.00 -0.04 0.21*** 0.03 
9. Connectedness to 
Environment in 25 Years 
        ---- -0.01 -0.09* 0.05 0.02 
10. Environmental Gain          ---- 0.02 0.10** 0.10* 
11. Environmental Loss           ---- 0.08† -0.06 
12. Financial Loss            ---- 0.03 
13. Financial Gain                         ---- 
Note.  N = 562 






























Construals of Time 
(Connectedness, 
Discounting) 













β = .24, t = 6.01, 
 p < .001 
Without Egalitarianism 
β = .28, t = 7.11, p < .001 
 
With Egalitarianism 
β = .22, t = 5.47, p < .001 
 
 
Β = .001, t =.01, p = .99 
 













Note.  Difference scores were calculated by subtracting the mean scores for U.S.A. from mean scores for Japan so 
that positive values indicates that Japanese had greater mean values than Americans and negative values indicate 









Note.  Difference scores were calculated by subtracting the mean scores for U.S.A. from mean scores for Japan so 
that positive values indicates that Japanese had greater mean values than Americans and negative values indicate 





Legend Key (For Figure 4) 
1     Is your home weatherized? *** 
2     Does your home have weather-stripped to seal drafts? *** 
3     Is the attic space in your home adequately insulated? *** 
4     Is your refrigerator an Energy Star model? *** 
5     Do you have any compact fluorescent light bulbs or fluorescent linear bulbs installed in your home? *** 
6     Have you replaced all of your incandescent bulbs with equally bright fluorescent bulbs? *** 
7     Does your home have a front-loading washing machine? 
8     Does your home have a low-flush toilet? *** 
9     When buying small household appliances, do you consider their energy efficiency in your purchasing decisions? 
*** 
10     When buying large household appliances, do you consider their energy efficiency in your purchasing 
decisions? ** 
11     Do you replace your home ventilation filters for heating and central AC every month in use? *** 
12     Have you turned up your fridge's thermostat so that it will consume less energy? *** 
13    Have you turned up your freezer's thermostat so that it will consume less energy? *** 
14     Have you ever had an energy audit of your home? *** 
15     Have you ever bought renewable energy from your electricity provider? *** 
16     Have you signed up to reduce junk mail? *** 
17     Do you reduce hot water consumption by changing the clothes washer temperature setting from hot/warm to 
warm/cold?*** 
18     Have you set back the water heater temperature to 120F? 
19     Do you unplug any devices in your home that are not in use? *** 
20     Do you have a programmable thermostat? *** 
21     Do you set back the heating thermostat in the winter to 65F during the day when no one is home? *** 
22     Do you set back the heating thermostat in the winter to 68F during the day when someone is home?* 
23     Do you set back the heating thermostat in the winter to 65F at night? 
24     Do you set up the AC thermostat in the summer to 80F during the day when no one is home? 
25     Do you set up the AC thermostat in the summer to 78F during the day when someone is home? 
26     Do you set up the AC thermostat in the summer to 78F at night?* 
27     Do you air-dry clothes when possible instead of using a dryer? *** 
28     Have you switched off any bulbs that would be on all night long? *** 
29     Do you shut off the water while brushing your teeth? *** 
30     Do you shop at thrift stores? *** 
31     Do you air-dry clothes for at least 5 months of the year instead of using a dryer? ***   
32     Have you replaced at least two 100-watt kitchen bulbs with 75-watt bulbs? *** 









     
 
Note.  Difference scores were calculated by subtracting the mean scores for U.S.A. from mean scores for Japan so 
that positive values indicates that Japanese had greater mean values than Americans and negative values indicate 










Note.  Difference scores were calculated by subtracting the mean scores for U.S.A. from mean scores for Japan so 
that positive values indicates that Japanese had greater mean values than Americans and negative values indicate 










Note.  Difference scores were calculated by subtracting the mean scores for U.S.A. from mean scores for Japan so 
that positive values indicates that Japanese had greater mean values than Americans and negative values indicate 






Figure 8. Mean Difference of Attitudes (Study 3a)  
 
 
     
 
 
Note.  Difference scores were calculated by subtracting the mean scores for U.S.A. from mean scores for Japan so 
that positive values indicates that Japanese had greater mean values than Americans and negative values indicate 






Figure 9. Mean Difference of Leiserowitz Indices (Study 3a) 
 
 
      
 
 
Note.  Difference scores were calculated by subtracting the mean scores for U.S.A. from mean scores for Japan so 
that positive values indicates that Japanese had greater mean values than Americans and negative values indicate 

































Figure 14. Mediation of the relationship between culture and total green behaviors (food, household, transportation, activism) by 
egalitarian worldview (Study 3a) 
 
 
β = .72, t = 33.50, 
 p < .001 
Without Culture                    
β = .27, t = 9.00, p < .001 
With Culture                          
β = .32, t = 7.64, p < .001 
Without Egalitarianism 
β = .15, t = 4.99, p < .001 
 
With Egalitarianism 
β = -.08, t = -1.88, ns 
 
 
Β = .001, t =.01, p = .99 
 












Figure 15. Mediation of the relationship between culture and total green behaviors (food, household, transportation, activism) by 






β = .76, t = 38.39, 
 p < .001 
Without Culture                    
β = .17, t = 5.66, p < .001 
With Culture                          
β = .13, t = 2.85, p < .01 
Without Individualism 
β = .15, t = 4.99, p < .001 
 
With Individualism 





 Figure 16. Mediation of the relationship between culture and behavioral intentions (Leiserowitz) by egalitarian worldview 
(Study 3a)   
 
Without Egalitarianism 
β = .11, t = 3.63, p < .001 
 
With Egalitarianism 
β = -.29, t = -7.30, p < .001 
 
Without Culture                    
β = .35, t = 12.36, p < .001 
With Culture                          
β = .56, t = 14.05, p < .001 
β = .76, t = 38.39, 
















Without Culture                    
β = .18, t = 5.96, p < .001 
With Culture                          
β = .19, t = 4.71, p < .001 β = .66, t = 28.37, 
 p < .001 
Without Hierarchism 
β = .11, t = 3.63, p < .001 
 
With Hierarchism 











Figure 19. Mean Difference of Discounting Rates (Study 3c)   






Note.  Difference scores were calculated by subtracting the mean scores for U.S.A. from mean scores for Japan so 
that positive values indicates that Japanese had greater mean values than Americans and negative values indicate 
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Appendix A: Self-Construal Scale (Study 2) 
 
Independent Self-Construal Items 
1. I'd rather say "No" directly, than risk being misunderstood. 
2. Speaking up during a class is not a problem for me. 
3. Having a lively imagination is important to me. 
4. I am comfortable with being singled out for praise or rewards. 
5. I am the same person at home that I am at school. 
6. Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me. 
7. I act the same way no matter who I am with. 
8. I feel comfortable using someone's first name soon after I meet them, even when they are 
much older than I am. 
9. I prefer to be direct and forthright when dealing with people I've just met. 
10. I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects. 
11. My personal identity independent of others is very important to me. 
12. I value being in good health above everything. 
Interdependent Self-Construal Items 
1. I have respect for the authority figures with whom I interact. 
2. It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group. 
3. My happiness depends on the happiness of those around me. 




5. I respect people who are modest about themselves. 
6. I will sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of the group I am in. 
7. I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than my own 
accomplishments. 
8. I should take into consideration my parents' advice when making education / career plans. 
9. It is important to me to respect decisions made by the group. 
10. I will stay in a group if they need me, even when I'm not happy with the group. 
11. If my brother or sister fails, I feel responsible. 
12. Even when I strongly disagree with group members, I avoid an argument. 
Response Options:  
1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither agree nor disagree, 5 = 





Appendix B: Schwartz Values Survey (Study 2) 
INSTRUCTIONS:  Please indicate the extent to which each of the following statements on the 
extent to which it is A GUIDING PRICIPLE IN YOU LIFE using the scale below.  Before you 
rate each value, please read all of the values in the list, choose and rate a SINGLE value that is 
most important to you.  Next, choose and rate a SINGLE value that is least important (or most 
opposed).  Once you have done this, complete your rating of the 57 values.  Please be sure to use 






























































 (equal opportunity for 
all) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
INNER HARMONY  
(at peace with myself) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
SOCIAL POWER 
(control over others, 
dominance) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
PLEASURE 
(gratification of desires) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
FREEDOM 
(freedom of action and 
thought) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A SPIRITUAL LIFE 
(emphasis on spiritual 
not material matters) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
SENSE OF 
BELONGING (feeling 
that others care about 
me) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
SOCIAL ORDER 
(stability of society) 
































































AN EXCITING LIFE 
(stimulating 
experiences) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
MEANING IN LIFE  
(a purpose in life) 








-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NATIONAL 
SECURITY (protection 
of my nation from 
enemies) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
SELF RESPECT 
(belief in one’s own 
worth) 









-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A WORLD AT PEACE 
(free of war and 
conflict) 





-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
MATURE LOVE  
(deep emotional & 
spiritual intimacy) 




































































-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
PRIVACY (the right to 
have a private sphere) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
FAMILY SECURITY 
(safety for loved ones) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
SOCIAL 
RECOGNITION 
(respect, approval by 
others) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
UNITY WITH 
NATURE (fitting into 
nature) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A VARIED LIFE  
(filled with challenge, 
novelty, and change) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
WISDOM  
(a mature 
understanding of life) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 AUTHORITY  
(the right to lead or 
command) 




-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A WORLD OF 
BEAUTY (beauty of 
nature and the arts) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 
(correcting injustice, 
care for the weak) 





































































(avoiding extremes of 
feeling & action) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
LOYAL  
(faithful to my friends, 
group) 




-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
BROADMINDED  
(tolerant of different 
ideas and beliefs) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
HUMBLE  
(modest, self-effacing) 








-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
INFLUENTIAL  
(having an impact on 
people and events) 





-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CHOOSING OWN 
GOALS  
(selecting own purpose) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
HEALTHY  
(not being sick 
physically or mentally) 

































































 CAPABLE  
(competent, effective, 
efficient) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ACCEPTING MY 
PORTION IN LIFE 
(submitting to life’s 
circumstances) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
HONEST 
(genuine, sincere) 

































Appendix C:  New Ecological Paradigm (Dunlap & Van Liere, 2001) (Study 2 & Study 3) 
1.  We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support. 
2.  Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs. 
3.  When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences. 
4.  Human ingenuity will insure that we do NOT make the earth unlivable. 
5.  Humans are severely abusing the environment. 
6.  The earth has plenty of natural resources if we can just learn how to develop them. 
7.  Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist. 
8.  The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrialized 
nations. 
9.  Despite our special abilities, humans are still subject to the laws of nature. 
10.  The so-called “ecological crisis” facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated. 
11.  The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources. 
12.  Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature. 
13.  The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset. 
14.  Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to control it. 
15.  If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological 
catastrophe. 
Note.  Answers were provided on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = completely disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 
= somewhat disagree, 4 = neither disagree nor agree, 5 = somewhat agree, 6 = agree, 7 = 
completely agree).  Even numbered items were reverse coded and the total NEP score was 





Appendix D:  List of all energy conservation questions by category (Study 3) 
 
Food 
1.  Do you shop at the farmers market? 
2.  Do you buy local produce at the grocery store when possible? 
3.  Do you consciously buy things with less packaging? 
4.  Do you bring your own bags to the store when shopping? 
5.  Do you recycle aluminum cans? 
6.  Do you eat seasonally? 
Household 
1.  Is your home weatherized? (Examples include caulking and weather-stripping to 
seal air leaks around windows and doors, etc.) 
2.  Does your home have weather-strips to seal drafts? 
3.  Is the attic space in your home adequately insulated? 
4.  Is your refrigerator and Energy Star model? (Energy Star is an independent US 
government program establishing a standard set of guidelines to recognize the energy 
efficiency of various products) 
5.  Do you have any compact fluorescent light bulbs or fluorescent linear bulbs (tube 
lights) installed in your home? 
6.  Have you replaced all of your incandescent bulbs with equally bright fluorescent 
bulbs (for example, a 100-watt incandescent bulb will have the equal brightness of a 
27-watt compact fluorescent bulb)? 
7.  Does your home have a front-loading washing machine? 
8.  Does your home have a low-flush toilet? 
9.  When buying small appliances (like coffee makers, blenders, etc.) do you consider 
their energy efficiency in your purchasing decisions? 
10.  When buying large household appliances (like refrigerators, dishwashers, etc.), do 
you consider their energy efficiency in your purchasing? 
11.  Do you replace your home ventilation filters for heating and central AC every 
month in use? (Clogged, dirty filters block normal air flow and reduce a system's 
efficiency significantly.  Keeping the filter clean can lower your air conditioner's 
energy consumption by 5%-15%. 
12.  Have you turned up your fridge's thermostat so that it will consume less energy? 
13.  Have you turned up your freezer's thermostat so that it will consume less energy? 
14.  Have you ever had an energy audit of your home? A home energy audit is done to 
evaluate measures you can take to make your home more energy efficient. 
15.  Have you ever bought renewable energy from your electricity provider? 
Renewable energy is generated from natural sources such as sunlight and wind.  One 
can buy electricity generated from renewable sources at a rate higher than conventional 
electricity. 
16.  Have you signed up to reduce junk mail? 




setting from hot/warm to warm/cold? 
18.  Have you set back the water heater temperature to 120F? 
19.  Do you unplug any devices in your home that are not in use (appliances continue 
to draw power when they are not in use, so that they can turn on quickly when 
switched on)? 
20.  Do you have a programmable thermostat? 
21.  Do you set back your heating thermostat in the winter to 65F during the day when 
no one is home? 
22.  Do you set back your heating thermostat in the winter to 68F during the day when 
someone is home? 
23.  Do you set back your heating thermostat in the winter to 65F at night? 
24.  Do you set up your AC thermostat in summer to 80F during the day when no one 
is home? 
25.  Do you set up the AC thermostat in summer to 78F during the day when someone 
is home? 
26.  Do you set up the AC thermostat in summer to 78F at night in the summer? 
27.  Do you air dry clothes when possible instead of using a dryer? 
28.  Have you switched off any bulbs that would be on all night long? 
29.  Do you shut off the water while brushing your teeth? 
30.  Do you shop at thrift stores? 
31.  Do you air-dry clothes for at least 5 months of the year instead of using a dryer? 
32.  Have you replaced at least two 100-watt kitchen bulbs with 75-watt bulbs? 
33.  Do you watch 25% fewer hours of TV than you used to a year ago? 
Transportation 
1.  When possible, do you use public transportation instead of driving? 
2.  Do you own or lease a vehicle? 
3.  Does your car use low rolling resistance tires (these are tires that are designed to 
minimize the energy wasted as heat as the tire rolls down the road)? 
4.  Do you regularly change the oil in your vehicle? 
5.  Do you change the air filter in your vehicle at recommended intervals? (Replacing 
clogged filters improves vehicle efficiency, lengthens engine life, and consequently 
saves you money.  Specialists recommend air filter changes every 12,000 to 15,000 
miles.) 
6.  Do you change the oxygen sensor in your vehicle at recommended intervals? (The 
oxygen sensor feeds data to the engine management computer.  Replacing a faulty 
oxygen sensor can improve your vehicle's gas mileage by as much as 40 percent) 
7.  Have you removed all excess weight from your car? 
8.  Do you maintain the recommended tire pressure for the tires on your car? 
9.  While driving, do you reduce acceleration and unnecessary braking when possible? 
10.  When driving, do you maintain a 55 mph speed for highway driving? 
11.  When driving, do you reduce idling time (idling your car for two minutes uses the 
same amount of fuel as your car would need to go about one mile)? 





13.  When you need to drive to run your errands, do you combine errands? 
Activism 
1.  Have you ever planted a tree? 
2.  Are you a member of an environmental organization? 
3.  Have you ever sent a letter to any political official about environmental or energy 
issues? 
4.  Do you consider yourself an environmentalist? 
5.  Have you ever donated money to an environmental organization? 
 
